1967年8月驻守厦门的一名共军陆军士官叛逃（材料里称他在班里负责政治宣传，他大概是游水到金门的）。8月31日CIA通报了这名军官所提供的关于大陆文革、军队、红卫兵、粮食收成等多方面信息，此人说到：
1. 共军中很多人认为文化大革命是必要的，虽然也有些人对由此引发的秩序混乱感到不满。很多士兵认为文革永远不会结束也不应该结束，因为文革结束就意味着中国变色。
2. 文革导致共军的军事训练时间大大减少，只有三分之一时间用于军事，其余都用在政治活动上，而这三分之一的军训时间也包括生产劳动在内。现在是军纪涣散，效率低下。
3. 他所在部队士气低落，相信全军都是这样，并将其归咎于文革及其破坏性政策。很多士兵不满于秩序混乱，而且大都担心家人的安全。很多士兵都想家，他所在连队1967年1月就收到通知不再准许士兵回家探亲，官方的理由是节省开支，但真实的理由应该是共军长官担心士兵回家后对于文革现状不满。
4. 对“武汉事件”地宣传铺天盖地，官方公然谴责这是一场军事政变，大家都知道该事件是反对毛泽东的。这名共军士官说他和同伴们虽然没有公开讨论此事，但他猜测普遍认为武汉事件是好事，因为这可以鼓励别人反抗文革和红卫兵。他说他和他的同伴会执行上级下达的逮捕任何人和镇压任何群众组织的命令，即便是要逮捕谢富治，因为共军士兵必须执行命令，别无选择。他怀疑会有任何士兵敢于反抗上级的命令，但无法评论高级军官是否会反抗或拒绝更高级权威的指令。
5. 在过去7个月内，他所在部队被屡次要求支持红卫兵，有明确指令要求即便红卫兵行为不端军队也不能干预。他没有见过武装红卫兵，但听说福建有些地方的红卫兵偷了些武器用来对付反对派。目前共军在支持福建的红卫兵。
6. 福建的夏收已经结束，收成不好，据说是近年来最差。此人认为原因是大风和虫灾，但不能指明是那种昆虫，据信是一种蝗虫。
7. 1967年2月间福建境内传言说共军前不久在新疆两次挫败苏联入侵者图谋，一次是苏联某骑兵师，另一次是苏联某炮兵部队挑起的。
8. 此人对江青被任命为军队文革小组顾问非常吃惊，他说军内有人公开反对此任命，很多士兵不能接受文革中批判刘少奇关于怎样做一名好共产党员的论述（按：即《论共产党员的修养》一书），认为这本书是一本共产主义的好著作。
9. 至少在地方上，共青团仍然存在，在厦门就保留有共青团的办公室。
10. 厦门的学校是开着的，但没有人来上学。
11. 他所在的部队普遍相信国民党政权在不久的将来一定会反攻大陆。
12. 厦门曾有传言说明年将召开中共党代会和全国人大。
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CENTRAL
INTELEGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information
Cable
THIS IS AN INFORMATION
REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
DIST 31 AUG 67
COUNTRY-- CHINA/TAIWAN
DOI-- (CROSSOUT)
SUBJECT-- (CROSSOUT) STATEMENTS
ON THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, REDUCED MILITARY TRAINING, POOR MORALE, WUHAN INCIDENT,
REO GUARDS, POOR HARVEST, AND SOVIET BORDER INCIDENET.
ACQ-- (CROSSOUT)
SOURCE--(CROSSOUT)
1. SUMMARY. (CROSSOUT) WHO SERVED WITH THE (CROSSOUT) INFANTRY
(CROSSOUT) IN AMOY (CROSSOUT) SAID THAT MANY OF HIS COMRADES
REGARDED THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AS A NECESSARY AND CONTINUING PHENOMENON.
(CROSSOUT) PLA TROOPS MUST OBEY ORDERS AND HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO CARRY OUT
ORDERS ISSUED BY COMMANDERS IN THE CURRENT REVOLUTION. (CROSSOUT) MILITARY MORALE
AND DISCIPLINE ARE AT A LOW POINT, AND ONLY ONE THIRD OF THE TIME IS NOW
DEVOTED TO MILITARY TRAINING. A POOR HARVEST, POSSIBLY THE WORST IN RECENT
YEARS, WAS EXPERIENCED IN THE AMOY AREA. A RUMOR CIRCULATING IN AMOY INDICATED
THAT THE PLA HAD DEFEATED TWO SOVIET MILITARY UNITS IN SINKIANG.
2. (CROSSOUT) MANY (CROSSOUT) PLA COMRADES REGARDED THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION
AS "VERY NECESSARY," ALTHOUGH SOME WERE UPSET BY THE ACCOMPANYING CHAOS.
WHEN ASKED WHEN HE TOUGHT THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION WOULD END, (CROSSOUT) SAID
"MANY" (CROSSOUT) PLA COMRADES BELIEVE IT
WILL "NEVER END" AND "SHOULD NEVER END" BECAUSE THEY
FEAR THAT CHINA "WILL CHANGE ITS POLITICAL COLORING IF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION
ENDED."
3. (CROSSOUT) THE CULTRUAL REVOLUTION HAD A SHATTERING EFFECT ON
MILITARY TRAINING. (CROSSOUT) HE WAS IN CHARGE OF POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION IN
HIS SQUAD, AND HE SAID THAT (CROSSOUT) ALL PLA UNITS WERE DEVOTING TWO-THIRDS
OF THEIR TIME TO POLITICAl SESSIONS AND ONLY ONE-THIRD TO MILITARY TRAING, THIS
ONE-THIRD ALSO INCLUDED TIME ALLOCAED FOR PRODUCTIVE LABOR. (CROSSOUT) MILITARY
EFFICIENCY WAS AT A LOW POINT, (CROSSOUT) THE TROOPS ARE BECOMING SLOPPY AND
THERE WAS NO DISCIPLINE.
4. (CROSSOUT) MORALE WAS VERY LOW IN HIS UNIT, AND WE BELIEVED THAT
THIS ALSO APPLIED TO THE ENTIRE PLA. HE ATTRIBUTED LOW MORALE TO THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION
AND ITS DISRUPTIBE POLICIES.
MANY PLA COMRADES WERE UPSET BY THE LAWLESSNESS AND CHAOS, AND THERE
WAS GREAT CONCERN FOR THE SAFETY OF THEIR FAMILIES. (CROSSOUT) MOST OF HIS FELLOW COMRADES WERE
HOMESICK AND (CROSSOUT) SINCE JANUARY 1967, THE PLA HAD REFUSED TO GRANT
FIGHTERS LEAVE TO GO HOME. (CROSSOUT) A
NOTICE WAS ISSUED AT COMPANY LEVEL IN JANUARY 1967 STOPPING ALL HOME LEAVES.
(CROSSOUT) THIS MEASURE WAS TAKEN FOR THE SAKE OF ECONOMY BECAUSE THE STATE
NEEDED TO SAVE MONEY. HOWEVER, (CROSSOUT) HOME LEAVES WERE SUSPENDED BECAUSE
PLA COMMANDERS FEARED THAT SOLDIERS WHO RETURNED HOME WOULD BE UPSET WITH THE
CONDITIONS THEY FOUND.
5. (CROSSOUT) A GREAT DEAL OF PUBLICITY WAS GIVEN TO THE "WUHAN INCIDENT." (CROSSOUT) IT WAS OPENLY CALLD A
"MILITARY COUP," AND (CROSSOUT) IT WAS WELL KNOWN THAT THIS WAS A
MOVEMENT AGAINST MAO. (CROSSOUT) HIS PLA COMRADERS LOOKED UPON THE WUHAN
INCIDENT AS "A GOOD THING" BECAUSE IT WOULD INSPIRE OTHERS TO RESIST
THE RED GUARDS AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION. HOWEVER, THIS WAS ONLY HIS BELIEF SINCE
HIS COMRADES WERE RELUCTANT TO DISCUSS THE MATTER OPENLY. (CROSSOUT) HE AND HIS
COMRADES WOULD HAVE COMPLIED WITH ORDERS FROM COMMANDERS TO ARREST ANYONE, SUCH
AS HSI FU-CHIH, OR EVEN SUPPRESS THE MASSES BECAUSE THEY HAVE NO CHOICE.
(CROSSOUT) PLA FIGHTERS HAVE TO OBEY ORDERS, (CROSSOUT) THEY HAVE NO CHOICE.
(CROSSOUT) HE DOUBTED THAT MANY OR EVEN ANY FIGHTERS WOULD REBEL AGALNST ORDERS
FROM THEIR COMMANDERS. (CROSSOUT) HE COULD NOT OFFER AN OPINION AS TO WHETHER
OR NOT A COMMANDER WOULD REBEL AGAINST HIGHER AUTHORITY OR REJECT CERTAIN
ORDERS.
6. (CROSSOUT) FOR THE PAST SEVEN MONTHS HIS UNIT HAD BEEN REPEATEDLY
TOLD TO SUPPORT THE RED GUARDS. (CROSSOUT) THERE WERE SPECIFIC ORDERS AGAINST
INTERFERING WITH THE RED GUARDS, EVEN WHEN THEY WERE ACTING IMPROPERLY.
(CROSSOUT) HE HAD NEVER SEEN ANY ARMED RED
GUARDS. BUT HE INDICATED THAT HE HAD HEARD THAT IN SOME AREAS OF FUKIEN THE RED
GUARDS HAD STOLEN WEAPONS AND WERE USING THEM AGAINST THEIR OPPONENTS.
(CROSSOUT) THE PLA WAS SUPPORTING THE RED GUARS IN AMOY.
7. (CROSSOUT) THE HARVEST IN FUJIEN HAD BEEN COMPLETED (CROSSOUT). IT
WAS A POOR HARVEST AND (CROSSOUT) IT WAS SAID TO BE ONE OF THE WORST IN RECENT
YEARS. HE ATTRIBUTED THE POOR HARVEST TO
HEAVY WINDS AND PESTS. HE WAS UNABLE TO IDENTIFY THE TYPE OF INSECT, BUT HE
ASSUMEND IT WAS SOME SORT OF LOCUST.
8. (CROSSOUT) A RUMOR CIRCULATED IN AMOY IN FEBRUARY 1967 THAT THE PLA
HAD DEFEATED TWO SOVIET UNITS THAT HAD TRIED TO "INVADE" (CROSSOUT) SINKIANG.
(CROSSOUT) ONE OF THE UNITS WAS A CAVALRY DIVISION AND THE OTHER WAS A MOBILE
ARTILLERY UNIT.
9. (CROSSOUT) HE WAS ASTONISHED BY THE APPOINTMENT OF CHIANG CHING/MADAME
MAO AS CULTURAL ADVISOR TO THE PLA.(CROSSOUT) THERE WAS SOME OPEN CRITICISM
ABOUT HER APPOINEMENT A196MONG PLA TROOPS. (CROSSOUT) THE HARDEST THING FOR PLA
FIGHTERS TO ACCEPT IN THE .CULTURAL REVOLUTION WAS THE SLANDEROUS
ATTACKS ON LIU SHAO-CHI'S “HOW TO BE A GOOD COMMUNIST." (CROSSOUT) EVERY
PLA SOLDIER WAS VERY FAMILIAR WITH THE BOOK AND (CROSSOUT) MOST BELIEVED IT WAS
AN EXCELLENT PIECE OF COMMUNIST WRITING.
10. (CROSSOUT) DO NOT KNOW VERY MUCH ABOUT PURGES IN THE SENIOR RANKS OF
THE PLA. (CROSSOUT) THERE WERE MANY POSTERS CRITICIZING YEH FEI, LO JUI-CHING
AND PENG TEH-HWAI. HE HAD NOT SEEN ANY
CRITICISM OF CHU TEH.(CROSSOUT) LIN PIAO WAS HIGHLY REGARDES BY HIS FELLOW PLA FIGHTERS.
(CROSSOUT) THIS WAS DUE TO THE FACT THAT LIN HAD BOLSTERED THE PRESTIGE OF THE
PLA.
11. (CROSSOUT) THE COMMUNIST YOUTH LEAGUE/CYL/ STILL EXISTED AT LEAST
AT THE LOCAL LEVEL. (CROSSOUT) THERE WAS A CYL BRANCH OFFICE IN AMOY.
12. (CROSSOUT) ALTOUGH THE SCHOOLS ARE OPEN IN AMOY, (CROSSOUT) NO ONE
ATTENDS THEM.
13. (CROSSOUT) HIS PLA UNIT
FULLY EXPECTS THE CHINESE NATIONALISTS TO COUNTERATTACK THE MAINLAND IN THE
NEAR FUTURE.
14. (CROSSOUT) THERE WAS A RUMOR IN AMOY THAT BOTH A PARTY CONGRESS AND
A NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS WOULD BE CONVENED NEXT YEAR.
15. (CROSSOUT) DISSEM-- STATE (CROSSOUT) CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF DAO PACFLT
(CROSSOUT).
出处：美国DDRS-249132
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