1969年2月21日朝鲜驻华商务参赞拜访了英国驻华外交官J.D. Laughton，主要谈论的是朝鲜和香港的贸易问题。朝鲜参赞说朝鲜在广州设立贸易代表处完全是为了和香港做生意，但现在香港商人不能轻松的进出广州，所以朝鲜贸易代表处的业务大受影响。为此，他希望英国能允许朝鲜驻广州贸易代表访问香港洽谈业务。
因为英国和朝鲜当时没有正式外交关系（两国直到2000年才建交），所以英国外交官对和朝鲜的官方接触非常谨慎，3月1日Laughton在英国驻华代办的许可下将朝鲜参赞来访一事报告英国外交部和港督府，寻求指示。
3月29日由英国外交部派给港督协助处理外交事务的助理政治顾问（assistant political advisor，一秘级）Robin
John Taylor McLaren （麦若彬，1991到1994年任英国驻华大使）回复说他对朝鲜参赞拜访一事很感兴趣，据他所知这是朝鲜方面第一次使用官方渠道和英国商量派贸易代表访问香港的问题，此前朝鲜人都是通过怡和（Jardines）来转达的。他说虽然英国拒绝朝鲜关于在香港设立永久性贸易代表处的提议，但从未排除朝鲜代表在有正当商业利益的情况下访问香港的可能性。Mclaren进而指出过去3年来的港朝贸易几乎是一边倒的有利于朝方，数据显示朝鲜向香港年出口额超过两千万美金，但年进口额不到七十万美金，所以港方希望朝方能增加从香港进口，如果是这样的话就更容易批准朝方代表的访港签证。
4月15日朝鲜击落一架美军电子侦察机导致31人遇难，4月24日港英表示在这种情况下很难批准朝鲜商务人员访问香港，并建议英国驻华代办处先不要回复朝鲜外交官。直到7月31日朝鲜商务参赞再次来拜会时，英国外交官Laughton才有机会转告他香港方面在3月29日的答复。另外，此前英国人已经发现朝鲜驻广州贸易代表处业务减少的原因不是到广州的外商减少，而是因为中朝关系变化，导致中方不愿意协助到广州的国外商人与朝鲜代表联系。
March
29, 1969
North Korean/Hong Kong Trade
We were interested to see your letter of 1st March recording your conversation
with the North Korean commercial counselor. As far as I can recall this is the first time the North Koreans have used official channels to raise the question of visits by trade
officials to Hong Kong. Past approaches have been made through Jardines.
2. Our attitude towards visits by North Korean
officials is not quite so restrictive as you seem to think. In the past the North Koreans have
made it clear that their main interest is in establishing a permanent trade
office here. We have consistently opposed this but we have never ruled out the possibility of occasional
visits from Canton or elsewhere provided that
there is adequate commercial justification for them. Our policy remains as set out in the first
four sentences of paragraph 5 of Anthony Elliott's letter to James
Murray SCR 11/5401/59 of 24th January 1968 (I
enclose a copy as yours may not have been preserved).
3. It follows that we
would have no objection to your informing the
commercial counsellor that we would consider any application for a visit from members of the North Korean trade office in Canton on
its merits. You could go on to explain that trade
between Hong Kong and North Korea has been very one-sided in the past few years as the following figures show:
|
|
1966
|
1967
|
1968
|
|
Hong
Kong exports to
|
|
North
Korea
|
700
|
541
|
834
|
|
Hong Kong imports from North Korea
|
24,200
|
14,800
|
25,000
|
The improvement which we hope for is in Hong Kong exports to North Korea, not
in imports or entrepot trade, and we would look at applications in this light.
I am sending a copy of
this letter (without enclosure) to John Boyd.
(R.J.T. McLaren)
Assistant Political Adviser
(to:)J..D.Laughton, Esq.,
PEKING
_____________________________________
CONFIDENTIAL
OFFICE OF THE BRITISH CHARGE
D’ AFFAIRES.
PEKING,
1 March, 1969
North Korea/Hong Kong trade
On 21 February I received
a call from the North Korean Commercial Counsellor, accompanied by an
interpreter. (As you know, we allow ourselves a good deal of latitude in
informal contacts with Communist missions, even those from countries we do not recognise
because of the need to pick up information where we can. The North Korean has
previously, on the few occasions we have met, made himself as sociable as the
virtually total language barrier between us allows, and claims to have been
well acquainted with my predecessors).
2. His visit probably had several purposes. One was to establish contact for
longer term China-watching purposes before he went on leave for 2 1/2
months on 24 February. A second was to rehearse the familiar North Korean theme of
wanting to increase trade between the U.K. and North Korea, particularly by exchanging
permanent trade missions. However his main purpose was to discuss the equally
familiar theme of North Korean access to Hong Kong. He said that until recently
North Korean trade with Hong Kong had flourished, and the North Korean trade
office in Canton existed only for this purpose. (You will be able to comment on
these claims better than I). Recently however, because Hong Kong businessmen
were no longer able to travel so freely to Canton, the Korean trade office
there had been seriously hampered, and this had meant a substantial loss of
commercial opportunities. He hoped that a solution could be found in permitting
members of the Canton office to visit Hong Kong, in which case visas would
presumably be issued by this Office. I explained the limitation of our
functions here, both as regards trade with North Korea, and particularly as
regards Hong Kong. But in the main, so as not to nip our personal relations in
the bud, I relied on affecting ignorance of the situation in Hong Kong, and
promised to write a letter asking for clarification.
3. I think it extremely unlikely that there is any room for change in the policy of the Hong Kong Government in this respect. Apart from other
considerations, I doubt the extent of Hong Kong's commercial interest in trade
with North Korea. However, the Charge d’Affaires
agrees that this approach should be reported and the subject aired; and I
should be grateful for guidance and ammunition on which to base any oral reply which it might seem
desirable to give to the North Koreans. I certainly do not intend
to rush back to them with a formal response, and it may be that we shall be able to avoid replying at all.
4. A copy of this letter goes to John Boyd
in Far Eastern Department.
J.D. Laughton.
(to:) R.J.T. McLaren, Esq.,
HONG KONG.
CONFIDENTIAL
出处：英国外交部档案 FCO_21_549
