同港英接头的线人（文件中称informant）名叫 K.C. Jay，其全名待查。Jay同中共在香港势力关系密切，比如该档案提到Jay告诉港英最近他被点名要求向周恩来提供对香港局势的分析报告。很可能是港英首先主动接触他以了解共产党情况的，但似乎中共方面也知道Jay在同港英接头，所以我猜测Jay是共产党和港英的中间人。
Jay说在中共九大（1969年4月）时周还被批评拿香港这种小事情来讨论，但现在周却特意询问他对香港局势的看法，Jay认为这显示周恩来的权力比以前更稳固了。Jay还说来自周恩来办公室的消息说周得到了军方的支持，因为林彪对周有好感。毛泽东虽然身体不好，但不至于重病或将死。
Jay密切关注中国大陆现状，他说广西、广东局势都不好，再加上中共完全意识到香港的重要价值。Jay因此认为在港的共产党势力很难挑起事端，并建议港英方面借机采取强硬的对华政策。他说即便香港愿意在某方面对大陆示好，也应建立在总体的强硬基础之上。
～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～
SECRET
Political Adviser
I arranged to see
Mr. K. C. Jay at 4.30 p.m. on Thursday, 25th September.
2. Referring back to a previous
discussion when I had mentioned the Universal Federation of Travel Agents'
Associations conference, I reiterated the H.K.G's position vis-a-vis this conference:
that it had been privately organized and was by no means an official function.
I also gave Jay brief detail of the position concerning applications for visas
in respect of East Europeans. Jay said that the position was thoroughly
understood and that he was quite sure that there would be "no
trouble": He had explained the position both to local communists and to
Peking some time ago but had received no adverse reaction.
3. Jay said that after some
thought he had dispatched his report to CHOU En-lai some days ago. He had
commented at length on the present situation and suggested that it was now time
for China to take positive steps to show that her intentions towards Hong Kong
were friendly: in particular, Jay had mentioned:-
(a) the advisability of releasing Anthony Grey
before 3rd October when WONG Chak is due for release. It was Jay's advice that
such a move would be favorably regarded by the rest of the worlds;
(b) although there had been some improvement in
the tone and content of the local communist press, nevertheless at times the
communist newspapers were very critical of the H.K.G and probably libelous: Jay
felt that the H.K.G. was particularly sensitive on this score and would only be
really convinced that China intended good relations if and when the newspapers
behaved themselves properly. (In reporting this, Jay suggested to me that this
in many ways was the most difficult recommendation for the Chinese to accept
but that he quite genuinely expected to see an improvement over a period of
time.);
(c) the problems and difficulties on the border:
Jay had strongly advised that early action should be taken by the military to
ensure that there was no violation of British territory and that nuisance
activities such as the firing of firework rockets should be stopped.
4. Throughout the interview Jay
was in a very confident mood: this may have been partly due to his obvious pleasure in having been asked to provide a special
report on the local situation for Prime Minister CHOU En-lai. Jay read
into this request a further indication that CHOU was in the ascendency once
again in Peking. At the time of the 9th Party Congress CHOU had been criticized
for bothering about such a small matter as Hong Kong: the fact that CHOU was
now specifically asking for advice on future policy in Hong Kong indicated to
Jay that CHOU felt strong enough to be able to ignore would-be critics in
Peking. According to Jay, correspondence from the Prime
Minister's office tended to show that CHOU was strongly supported now by the
military and that, as reported before, LIN Piao was continuing to curry favour
with CHOU. Jay said that, whilst it was true
that MAO had been unwell for some time, he did not believe that MAO was dying
or even seriously ill.
5. Jay expressed serious
concern at the present situation in China. If the situation in Peking were not
quickly resolved he felt that in particular there would be trouble in South
China: already report had been received of the serious
situation in Kwangsi and there seemed little doubt that the position in
Kwang-tung was deteriorating. Jay expressed the hope that the H.K.G was
prepared to meet the consequences of the internal strife in Kwangtung and
Kwangsi which he felt on present indications to be almost certainly worsening.
According to Jay, there were still a large number of Tao Chu supporters in
important positions in the region and in communist circles there had been much
discussion and speculation that these people were preparing for the overthrow
of the present leadership in South China.
6. AS for Hong Kong, Jay was firmly of the
opinion that the H.K.G was in a very strong position - "In your overall policy you can now afford to be quite firm -
very firm". With the deterioration in the
situation in China and the full appreciation that Hong Kong is considered to be
of great value to China, it was Jay's opinion that local Hong Kong communists
would be very hesitant before causing trouble. Jay came back to this
"quite firm - very firm" theme on several occasions during the
discussion: towards the end he did suggest, however, that if possibilities occurred
in which the H.K.G could show some friendship or desire to improve
relationships, then this might be considered, but only in the context of the
overall firm policy. Jay said that he had been very pleased indeed to see the
newspaper report in which it was alleged that Mr. Anthony Crosland and others
had refused an invitation from the Chinese Charge d'Affaires in London to attend
the 1st October celebrations: Jay thought that this refused would have shown
the Chinese that the British were not over-anxious to be friendly and would
probably encourage the Chinese to believe that something more positive had to
be done before Britain would publicly accept the hand of friendship.
7. Other matters discussed
were:-
(1) South China Iron Works: Jay said that he expected a reply from
Peking in the near future. Meantime, LI Cho-chih had again complained about the
low offer made by the H.K.G. but Jay allegedly had told LI that the H.K.G. was
obviously doing China a favour and that if LI and others did not recognise
this, the simple answer was to reject the offer and attempt to se11 the land
themselves.
(2) Sand: Jay said that he had not yet had the opportunity of
discussing this matter with China Resources but he had discussed it at length
with Li Cho-chin. Apparently LI had indicated that he was aware that there had
been a proposal for an increase in the cost of "compensation", but he
was quite sure that the proposal had come from Henry FOK himself. Indeed, on
hearing the proposal, LI had not bothered to find out from whom the increased
cost would be obtained - he had assumed that in view of the very substantial
profits made by FOK, the increased "compensation" would come from
him. On reflection, LI had become quite concerned about the proposal and
suggested that it was not in keeping with previous policy; he gave as example the
proposal that there should be an increase in the price of water to the H.K.G.
(please see my last report). According to Jay, LI had then commented that it
seemed a pity that the H.K.G had originally insisted on using Henry FOK's
services. Jay enquired whether there would be any objection in the future if others
were asked to tender in addition to FOK: LI said that there was certainly no
objection to this but when Jay suggested that he would pass this advice on to
me, LI allegedly said that this might not be advisable; that it might even be a
"threat" to my future career as "clearly those in authority
wanted FOK to continue as the sand contractor". I informed Jay that this
was utter nonsense: that I had been asked to make enquiries about the proposed
increase in the cost of sand and that in any event the consideration and award
of tenders such as this was done on a completely impartial and honest basis.
(J. Cater)
26th September, 1969.
c.c. J. Murray, Esq. ( F.C.O )
J. B. Denson, Esq. ( PEKING)
D.S.B.
H.S.G
E.S.S
出处：英国外交部档案FCO_21_541
没有评论:
发表评论