1966. 10.4 英国外交官观察到中共1966年国庆仪式与往年的差异

 1966. 10.4. 英国外交官观察到中共1966年国庆仪式与往年的差异

英国驻华外交官Peters向英国外交部报告中共1966年国庆仪式与往年国庆的区别，其中包括：

1.     本年度国庆没有任何值得注意的外国代表团前来。即便是从其他共产党友邦也只来了几个低级别的专业技术类代表团，而且这些代表团早就来了，目的显然不是为了祝贺中国国庆。古巴倒是来了一个友好代表团，但日本共产党没有派代表团。虽然中共在国庆仪式上安排五个外国朋友（按：人民日报报道说是“越南南方女战斗英雄谢氏娇，澳大利亚共产党（马克思列宁主义者）主席爱·弗·希尔，安哥拉民族解放运动战士达克鲁斯，日中友协副会长黑田寿男和著名的美国黑人领袖罗伯特·威廉”）发言，试图给人以北京是世界革命前线中心的印象，但实际上中共看起来更像是被孤立和蔑视。

2.     关于国际尤其是越南问题，还是国内问题，各方发言都聊无新意。澳大利亚共产党爱·弗·希尔再次贬低苏联针对越南问题发起的“社会主义国家联合行动”，或许说明中共担心对越南影响力减弱。虽然“越南南方女战斗英雄谢氏娇”出席了国庆，但越南南方民族解放阵线常驻中国代表团团长显然未出席活动（按：据人民日报报道，南越该代表团的代团长阮明芳出席了仪式，团长陈文成通过电台广播发表贺词。）

3.     严格说来，这次国庆集会和前几次接见红卫兵的集会是一致的，重点仍是中共内部斗争，林彪的讲话表明文革远未结束，因为他在谈到文革时既未用过去式，也没有对现状做总结。人民日报10.1社论也再次强调文革仍遇到来自各方面的阻力。英国人说虽然不知道这种阻力具体指什么，但很明显中共领导认为不能放松对内部政治的压力。

4.     本次国庆最引人注意的是对毛的高度个人崇拜，表明中共领导面临巨大压力，于是打算通过对毛的神化来统一人民的思想。毛在天安门城楼上对人群示意时看起来有些迷茫和失落。

5.     官方报道时没提到出席者的职位，虽然刘少奇、宋庆龄、董必武的排名紧随毛、林之后，这只表明中共还承认这三人的国家主席和副主席职位，不代表他们有任何实权。宋庆龄的出席和孙中山像的继续使用或许意味着中共和资产阶级的阶级联盟仍然可以存在。

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

CYPHER/OTP

Mr.Peters                     FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION

NO. 825                           D. 0949 4 October 1966

4 October 1966                     R. 1226 4 October 1966

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.825 of 4 October.

Repeated for information to:   Washington

Hong Kong

POLAD Singapore

Moscow

Saigon

and Saving to: Warsaw        Bucharest

Prague         Budapest

Berlin          Belgrade

                             Sofia           Tokyo

My telegram No.816, 818, 819, 820 and 822 (Saving to some).

National Day.

The celebrations, in particular the parade of 1 October, differed in many respects from those of previous years. On the international front, there was a striking absence of any foreign delegations of note. Friendly Communist countries were represented by low level technical delegations, some already here for other reasons: Albania (petroleum, harbour and cultural delegations): Viet Nam (public health, scientific cooperation and economic delegations): Korea (a team of wireless operators). The Cubans sent a friendship delegation. There was no Japanese Communist Party representation. Despite the attempt, via the five speeches from foreign friends, to give the impression that Peking is a centre of a world-wide revolutionary front, the general effect was one of isolation and defiance.

2.   There was no significant new foreign policy statement and no departure from the current line on Viet Nam, though the repeated references to this last topic and the denunciation by Hill of "joint Socialist action" may indicate Chinese fear of diminishing influence in Hanoi. Despite the presence of a "heroine" from South Viet Nam the Head of the SVNLF Delegation apparently did not attend the celebrations.

3.   The speeches were also uninformative on home affairs and consisted of generalised claims of unprecedented prosperity and vigour coupled with explanations of the cultural revolution. Assertion that national defence is unprecedentedly strong was given point by publicity in Peoples Daily of 1 October for Chinese nuclear tests.

4.   Strictly the rally belonged to the series of cultural revolution rallies of 18 and 31 August and 15 September. There was the same preoccupation with the internal struggle: emphasis on the revolutionary masses and on direct contact between Mao and the masses. Lin Piao spoke of the cultural revolution as far from complete: there was no attempt to refer to it in the past tense or to present any synthesis.

The most important National Day statement, the Peoples Daily editorial of 1 October, again concentrated on the cultural revolution, spoke of it as "meeting desperate opposition from the class enemy and resistance from various quarters" and also contained a stern warning to those who gave only half-hearted devotion to the "revolutionary line of the proletariat represented by Mao". It is uncertain just where these centres of continuing resistance lie, but the editorial makes it clear that the leadership feel they cannot relax pressure in the internal political situation.

5.   Perhaps the most striking aspect of the celebrations was the adulation of Mao, indicating that the leadership are embarked on an immense and almost desperate attempt to achieve unified thinking by a full exploitation of the Mao cult. Mao himself appeared strong, though obviously old, and stood for a long time in the hot sun on the reviewing stand. He seemed however, rather lost and confused in his brief sorties into the crowd to meet the masses. As before, Lin Piao was clearly next in prominence. Excellent health of both was repeatedly emphasised.

6.   No announcements were made of the posts held by the leaders. The listing follows that of 18 August with the insertion after Mao and Lin Piao of three names: Liu Shao-ch'i, Soong Ch'ing-Ling and Tung Pi-wu. This should probably be interpreted as an acknowledgement of their Government positions as President and Vice-Presidents rather than an indication of any return to positions of real power.

Soong's appearance and the continued use of Sun Yat-Sen's portrait may suggest that the facade of class alliance including the bourgeoisie is to be maintained.

Foreign Office please pass Washington 309, Moscow 222, Saigon 124, and Saving to Warsaw 26, Prague 21, Berlin 22, Sofia 21, Bucharest 22, Budapest 22, Belgrade 19 and Tokyo 31.

[Repeated as requested]

vvvvv

CONFIDENTIAL

英国外交部档案 FO371/186982