简而言之，CIA认为如果没有美方的大力支持（包括直接参战），国军登陆中国南方、切断中国与越南的联系、占领广东省的计划几无成功可能性。
国军的投放半径在250英里左右，在此范围内国军可以派出4个师约5万人的广东挺进军，足以在广东支撑一个月。但若超出此范围，国军投放能力则大大下降。除非有大量共军迅速叛变并加入国军（美方认为这极其不可能发生），台湾反攻的最好结果也不过是有力打击共军一下然后就跑。即便如此，也可能了打了却跑不掉，因为在1962年至1964年间国军进行了数十次这种小规模的闪击战（每次约30人），却屡屡失败，而且这反而增强了共军的反入侵能力。没有理由认为如果扩大这种闪击战的规模就足以取得胜利，最多是能略为延长支撑时间而已。
国军私下里也认为在没有美方支持的情况下反攻大陆无望，不过显然蒋介石有更高的期望，他预期一旦国军登上大陆后前景不妙，美方就会武力介入，至少也会实施空中打击。如果美方给予海上和空中支持，国军登陆成功的可能性会增加，但夺取和占领广东省的可能性仍然微乎其微。因为共军可以很快地调动已部署在华南的预备队前去广东支援，在数量上会大大超过国军。
1963年中华民国设计了一个详细的关于夺取广东的方案，将调用53万8千名陆海空士兵，几乎是国军的全部力量，到时只留下少量的正规军配合预备役部队来防御台湾。
但美方评估该方案有多处重大缺陷，国军在关键人员和物资上都很不足。而即便这些不足得以弥补，国军也仅能建立滩头阵地并占领汕头港，而无法在没有美军援助的情况下继续突破。很难讲在这种困境下国军士气能保持多久，虽然高级军官多是大陆来的，但85%左右的普通军人都生在台湾，这些士兵并不在意能否征服大陆。
相反，共军很容易在受到袭击后向广东大量增兵。比如1962年见共军在一周内就向福建调兵六个步兵师和一个炮兵师，将作战力量由19万4千人增加打破31万1千人。空军也能很快调动起来，就像1962年时几天内就向福建调动了4个团。虽然以西方标准来衡量共军飞机大多数是过时的，但对付缺少地面优势的国军挺进军还是很有效的。
国军对大规模入侵导致共军叛变的期待看来是一厢情愿。即便在1960到1962年经济灾难期间，共军也没有表现出明显的不满。在过去多年来只有少数共军低层军官叛逃。同样的，关于大陆民众自发反抗共产党和支持国民政府的预期看来也只是幻想而已。现有证据表明，南方沿海地区的农业状况比几年前饥荒时大大改善。另外，基层官员和警察仍然对共产党保持忠诚。
南方人一般都对北方来的中央政权不太满意，而且共产党的严厉统治和糟糕的经济状况也足以令他们对现政权不满，但现有证据表明他们认为国民党很糟糕。所以，对国军来说最好的状况也不过是民众保持中立，坏的就是他们相信共产党宣传，认为国军入侵时帝国主义势力操纵的。
共军反击时虽不至于发动登陆台湾的战役，但至少会拿下邻近的岛屿，甚至攻击澎湖和高雄的军港。共产党还可能煽动台湾民众反对国民政府，挑起对中华民国和美帝国主义势力的暴动。国军的军事失败和重大人员伤亡很可能会导致台湾人对国民政府的不满，大大动摇国民政府的统治。共军到时还会以胜利反击为例再次宣称“帝国主义都是纸老虎”，趁机丑化美国。
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TOP SECRET DINAR
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20505
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY
DIRECT0R FOR INTELLIGENCE
SC No. 10078/65/a
18 AUG 1965
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant
to the President
for National Security
Affair
The White House
SUBJECT :
Taipei's Capabilities to Attack the Mainland
I think that you may be
interested in the attached memo on Chinese Nationalist capabilities to attack
mainland China. The existence of Taipei's forces in being is an element in the balance
of power in Asia, and a restraining factor on Chinese Communist intervention in
Southeast Asia. The Nationalists have frequently suggested that their forces be
exploited for the long-awaited counter attack on the mainland. The memorandum
may, therefore, provide useful background for possible discussions of this subject
in the near future.
RAY S CLINE
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Attachment
SC No. 10078/65
Copy No. 6
________________________________________________________________
SC NO. 10078/65
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current
Intelligence
18 August 1965
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Probable Effects in China
and Taiwan
of a GRC Attack on the
Mainland
Without
massive US support for the GRC across the board, including direct military
participation in the operation itself, Chiang Kai-shek's proposal to Land on
the South China coast, cut the main lines of communication between China and
North Vietnam, and seize Kwangtung Province has very little chance of success.
A Kwangtung
Expeditionary Force (KEF) launched from Taiwan and relying on unaided GRC
capabilities would be small. Within a
radius of approximately 250 miles the Nationalists are believed capable of putting
four divisions ashore--about 50,000 troops-- and supporting them for perhaps 30
days. At any greater distance from
Taiwan GRC capabilities would be sharply reduced. The GRC task force would have to overcome
determined opposition by Communist motor torpedo boats
and light patrol craft--of the type that sank two Nationalist ships off
the coast south of Kinmen on 6 August.
The GRC air force could provide only marginal air cover for
assault elements landing on the northern coast of Kwangtung and probably only
intermittent support south of Swatow (see map showing GRC air force radius of
action) . Once on the beach, GRC troops would be face to face with vastly
superior Communist ground forces.
In the Canton
Military Region alone the Chinese Communists have more than 300,000 regular troops--infantry, artillery, and
armor--grouped in five armies. In
addition the Communists have six border defense divisions in this area. These
units, and the bulk of the more heavily armed regular troops, are deployed on
or near the coast where they would be immediately available to oppose GRC
landings. Communist troops would have air support from fighter and bomber units
which, although probably inferior to GRC air force in quality, would have the
advantage of fighting from nearby bases and would have numerical
superiority. (see map)
Unless
one assumes that major Chinese Communist military units would immediately
defect and join forces with the GRC invaders--something we consider extremely
unlikely--a successful hit-and-run commando raid in strength is the best result
that could be hoped for. Even this
would be a chancy operation which could easily turn into a debacle involving the
destruction or capture of the greater part of the attacking force. The repeated failure of small-scale (about 30-man) butcher
and bolt raids by GRC commando teams between late 1962 and mid-1964 points up
the risks of attempting coastal landings.
The net effect of
these raids, of which there were 33 in 1963 and 25 during the following year, appears
to have been to improve Chinese Communist detection capabilities. The teams encountered only the first line of
Communist coastal defense, local militia add Public Security units. These forces displayed no inclination to
cooperate with the raiding teams, which were killed, taken prisoner, or driven
off in a matter of hours. We have no reason to believe
that the end result of a larger operation by unsupported GRC troops would be
substantially different, although it might take more time.
If the GRC
succeeded in putting a sizable force ashore, local defense units would probably
resist to the best of their ability in an effort to buy time for the deployment
of regular troops. These would be quickly concentrated and committed to contain
and ultimately to destroy the invaders.
There is little doubt that Communist troops would be able to achieve
this objective. The PLA is an effective combat
force, well trained and heavily indoctrinated. It performed creditably in
Korea, demonstrated its ability to fight and win during the 1960 campaign against
GRC irregular formations--stiffened by Special Forces units sent from
Taiwan--operating in Burma near the Chinese frontier, and more recently in the
1962 border war with India.
The
private GRC estimate of the chances for success in an operation lacking US
support is probably not very different from our own, and it seems clear that
Chiang Kai-shek has a more ambitious scenario in mind. At a minimum he probably envisions massive US
backing for the operation up to the beach, with the expectation that if things
do not go well once his troops are ashore the US will enlarge its commitment by
direct participation (at least in the air) in the campaign on the mainland.
With US
naval and air support up to the water's edge the prospects for a GRC landing in
force would be considerably better, but the outlook for success in the ultimate
objective of seizing and holding all or most of Kwangtung Province is dim at
best. Even the largest expeditionary force the GRC
could muster and put ashore with US assistance would be heavily outnumbered by
the reinforcements the Communists could quickly deploy from the strategic
reserve to back up their forces already in place in South China.
During 1963 the GRC worked out a detailed plan
for an amphibious attack against Kwangtung.
The operation involved 538,000 men--army, navy, and air force--the bulk
of the entire Nationalist military establishment. Only a skeleton garrison
force of regular troops, strengthened by a call-up of reserves, would be left
behind to defend Taiwan and the Offshore Islands. The plan was carefully reviewed by a top
level Sino-American committee which included Admiral Alan Kirk--then US
Ambassador in Taipei—and COMUSTDC Vice Admiral Charles Melson.
Examination of
the proposed operation revealed serious deficiencies in
many key areas. The GRC did not have enough
amphibious lift for the operation or trained crews to man additional landing
ships if these were provided by the US. The Nationalist navy lacked
sufficient ships for beach preparation and fire support missions. They did not have enough tactical aircraft
with the range required for interdiction and close support missions, nor an adequate
pool of trained pilots to replace combat losses. All the armed services were found to be short
of trained specialists, especially key technicians for logistics units required
to support sustained operations. The total GRC deficit in all categories of
supply needed for the operation amounted to approximately a million and a half
tons.
Admiral Melson
commented that if these deficiencies were eliminated the GRC expeditionary force
could probably seize a beachhead and take over the port of Swatow but would be
unable to break out of their initial lodgement without assistance from US
troops. It is questionable how long GRC
troop morale would hold up if the expeditionary force remained bottled up
inside a Swatow perimeter. The senior officers and NCO's in the GRC armed forces
are mainlanders and would probably remain strongly motivated. The majority of
the rank and file, however--approximately 85 percent of the riflemen in the
line---are Taiwan-born, have no stake in reconquering mainland China, and might
lose heart quickly under continuous heavy pressure.
The Communists
would react swiftly to cope with an invasion. The PLA, a land army of some 2.3
million men, is the backbone of Peiping's military strength. Nearly one third
of this force is already deployed along the China coast
from Shanghai to the DRV border---a total of approximately 634,000 men. These troops include 30 regular infantry
divisions, nine artillery divisions, one armored division, and 12 border
defense divisions. Forces in the area of the GRC landing would be committed at
once to blunt the initial thrust and contain the invasion until reinforcements
in overwhelming strength could be deployed from the strategic reserve in north
and northeast China.
The
Communist troop build-up in the Taiwan Straits area during June 1962 provides
some indication of the speed with which additional forces could be brought in. Apparently in
response to what Peiping interpreted as a possible threat of US-supported action
by the Nationalists, the Communists moved six infantry divisions and one
artillery division into Fukien Province in about one week's time, raising the
order of battle strength there from 194,000 to 311,000. (see map)
Additional
air support for defending Communist forces in Kwangtung could probably be marshaled
with equal speed. During the 1962 build-up four
fighter regiments were deployed to backup fields in a matter of days. Chinese Communist
air strength now within operational range of the Kwangtung coast includes 390
jet fighters and 25 jet light bombers.
This force could be augmented in short orders. Peiping has a total of 1,700
jet fighters and 275 jet light bombers and there are at least seven unoccupied but
usable airfields in South China to which additional air regiments could be
deployed. Much of the Chinese Communist air force is
obsolete by Western standards, but would nonetheless be effective against
invading troops lacking local superiority.
The GRC
belief that a large-scale invasion would trigger mass desertions from the ranks
of the PLA appears to have little basis. The armed forces have always received preferential
treatment and continuous, high pressure political indoctrination. Even during
1960-62, the years of greatest popular unrest on the mainland during and just after the "leap forward" economic disaster there
was no evidence of significant disaffection in the PLA. Apart from about 14,000 Chinese prisoners of
war captured in Korea-many of whom were one-time Nationalist soldiers--who
elected to go to Taiwan rather than return to Communist controls in early 1954, there have been only a handful of low level defectors from
the armed forces. Moreover, soldiers are seldom tempted to abandon a
victorious standard, and unless the Nationalists were able to inflict a series
of surprise defeats on Communist forces from the outset of the invasion a mass
turnover of major Communist units appears very unlikely.
GRC
hopes for a popular uprising which would hamper the Communist defenders and aid
the Nationalist cause also appear illusory. All our evidence concerning the state of
popular attitudes in coastal areas of southern China indicates that a
large-scale invasion would not spark a revolt at the present time.
The degree of
popular disaffection that exists in the mainland population is sometimes
exaggerated by observers outside China. There was
considerable unrest in 1960-62 when several successive crop failures
created semi-starvation conditions in many areas. Recent
travelers and refugees from southern coastal areas, however, consistently
report that the food situation there bas improved substantially.
Communist
instruments of control--the police and public security forces---probably are
basically loyal to the regime. Low-level party officials bear the brunt of
public censure for regime failures and have been subjected to a harsh new
"purification" campaign during the past year. Their morale has probably
dropped but extremely few have defected, suggesting that their situation has
not yet destroyed basic loyalty in this key group.
Southerners in general have
always resented governments of any kind imposed on them from the north, and probably see little to choose between the Communists and the
Nationalists. They have many reasons to dislike the present regime, with
its stifling political controls and record of economic failure, but by all the evidence the Chinese Nationalists still remain
deeply discredited in their eyes.
The GRC could,
therefore, probably expect little or no help from the civilian population. At
best the majority of the people would remain neutral while the issue was in
doubt, waiting to throw in their lot with the winning side. At worst, the
population might be convinced by Communist propaganda that the landing was a foreign
invasion by "imperialist" forces and rally patriotically behind the
regime.
Communist
military reaction would probably not be limited to simply repelling the GRC
invasion in Kwangtung. The Offshore Islands would almost certainly come under
military pressure. Heavy artillery attacks would probably be the first step, followed by
an attempt to seize some or all of the islands if the Communists concluded that
a quick victory over reduced garrison forces was possible. Large-scale
amphibious attacks on Taiwan itself would probably not be attempted but
commando raids might be launched from the mainland against military installations
clearly associated with the GRC attack. GRC naval installations in the Penghu
(Pescadores) Islands and at Tsoying, and port facilities in Kaohsiung might be
targets for such operations. The Communists might also attempt to bomb airbases
in southern Taiwan used by the GRC air force to support the invasion
forces. In any such attacks, however, the
Communists would probably try to avoid actions which would increase the enmity
of the Taiwanese population.
One of
Peiping's major objectives would probably be to turn the Taiwanese against the
Nationalist government and if possible to promote a "patriotic" revolt
against the GRC and its "imperialist masters" in the US. Communist propaganda would portray the GRC
invasion as a ruthless exploitation of Taiwanese "comrades" to serve
the interests of foreigners.
The Taiwanese
population holds little love for mainland Chinese of any political coloration
and has no sympathy for Communism. For this reason, Peiping's calls for a
rising to "reunite" Taiwan with the mainland would probably have little
appeal. It seems likely, however, that the combination of military reverses
which would discredit the GRC leadership and mounting casualties--largely
Taiwanese-- would increase dissidence among the population to a point which would
gravely threaten the stability of the Nationalist government. Morale of the
ruling mainlander elite, sustained in part by the dream of eventual return to
the mainland as conquerors, would almost certainly plummet.
Peiping would exploit the invasion attempt domestically
to strengthen its position by appeals to Chinese patriotism, seeking to
re-awaken enthusiasm for regime programs across the board as part of a National
effort to repel foreign aggression. Victories over the attacking forces would be played up as
evidence of Communist power, and new proof that Mao's dictum "all
imperialists are paper tigers" is correct. Abroad, Chinese
Communist propaganda would seize on an unsuccessful US-supported GRC attack to
bolster the idea that Chinese hegemony in East Asia is the "wave of the
future." At the same time, Peiping's propaganda would underscore the
threat to world peace created by "US aggression" in order to
discredit the US and stimulate deterrent pressure on Washington from US allies
and neutral nation.
The Chinese Communists could be expected to back
up menacing propaganda statements charging that the US was starting an
"Asian war" by troop movements and other threatening military
demonstrations designed to show that Peiping was capable of enlarging the
conflict at any point along an arc extending from Korea to the Indian Border. It
is probable, however, that Peiping would hold off on any such escalation and
concentrate on destroying the GRC landing force or driving it into the sea.
出处：美国DDRS-279131
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