在1970年席卷全国的一打三反运动中，广东台山县冲蒌公社的邓清山无辜被捕并被判刑15年。像邓清山这样的例子在当时可谓是非常普遍，但不知是何机缘（恐怕不只因为台山是侨乡，当地人与海外联系很多），1976年在香港出版的中文刊物《黄河》详细介绍了邓清山落难的情节。1978年大赦国际（amnesty international）出版了一份名为《Political Imprisonment in the People’s
Republic of China》（中国人民共和国的政治犯情况）的报告，其附录列举了5名中国政治犯的详细情况，邓清山有幸名列其中，另外3名汉人分别是大名鼎鼎的林希翎、王明道、李正天，还有一位藏族人是1960年被中共判处无期徒刑的僧侣向巴洛桑（Chamba Lobsang）。
1980年2月英国外交部研究司的Frair同大赦国际联系以了解邓清山的详细情况，大概是为了同中共交涉释放邓所用。8月19日大赦国际的Arlette Laduguie回信提供了邓被捕时的详细地址为冲蒌公社北就村南和大队，还说虽然不知道该处属于广东哪个县，但相信中国当局可以根据公社的名称追踪到所在县的名称。
根据大赦国际1978年的报告（见附件）：
1970年“一打三反”运动刚开始时邓清山就被所在生产大队列为打击目标，主要原因是他出身不好。大队一开始没有搜集到不利于邓的材料，倒是有几个经常和邓在一起的小青年被揭发曾经偷过鱼，他们因此被关到学习班里，要求谈对邓的认识。对这几个小青年的进一步调查发现其中一人和某妇女有所谓不正当性关系，另有一人曾经对别人讲过商纣王及其妃子的故事，这被认为是影射攻击毛泽东和江青。这两名青年就被调查组拎出来单独审讯，并被威胁到不揭发邓清山他们就会被定为坏分子或反革命。在这种压力下，前者揭发说邓曾讲过“毛泽东是蛇精变的，所以每年蜕皮时就要下水游泳”，后者则交代是从邓那听到的商纣王的故事。这两人的口供就成为邓被抓的最主要证据，又经过公社、县公安局和（佛山）专区公安局的三次核查，邓案终于被确定下来。几个月后专区的官员回到邓原来的生产队征求当地群众和干部对邓的判刑意见，有的群众不知道说什么好，甚至喊出要枪毙邓；不过大队的中共支书倒是有点悔过的意思，他说邓既然认罪、态度也配合，应该给予宽大。1970年11月邓清山被宣布因攻击毛泽东而判刑15年，剥夺政治权利3年。
amnesty international
International Secretariat, 10
Southampton Street, London WC2E 7HF, England
Telephone: 01-836 7788
Telegrams: Amnesty London Telex: 28502
_________________________________________________
AL/SB 19 August 1980
Mr Friar,
Research Department,
China
Foreign &
Commonwealth Office
London
SW1A 2AH.
Dear Mr. Friar,
You may remember contacting me in February
this year regarding Deng Qingshan, a prisoner in the PRC whose case is
summarized in the Appendices of Amnesty International's report on Political
Imprisonment in the PRC. I have now received the information you required about
the place where he was arrested in 1970 in Guangdong province. It is:
( 邓清山 ) 南和大队
北就村
冲蒌公社
The name of the county was not specified,
but I imagine that the Chinese authorities should be able to trace it with the
name of the people's commune given above.
I hope this information can still be of
use to help in the release of Deng Qingshan.
Yours sincerely,
Arlette Laduguie
Asia Research Department
出处：英国外交部档案FCO21/1800
附件：邓清山的资料，摘自1978《An Amnesty International report : Political
Imprisonment in the People’s Republic of China》页158-162
APPENDIX IV
Deng Qingshan
Deng Qingshan's
background and the circumstances which led to his arrest during the 1970
"one-strike, three-anti" campaign were described earlier.1
Information about his case was published in 1976 in Huang He, a Chinese-language review published in Hong Kong.2 The account
below is based on this report and on additional information given by direct
witnesses of the affair. Although Amnesty International is not in a position to
check the specific details of this account, similar cases of arbitrary arrest
at that period have been reported and some accounts of the "one-strike,
three-anti" campaign elsewhere are like this one.
In 1970, shortly after the
"one-strike, three-anti" campaign began in his production brigade,
Deng Qingshan was made the "target" of the campaign because of his
"bad" background. This decision was taken by the brigade's cadres and
was not made public. It was the outcome of three days of meetings between the
following people:
the brigade's Party members
members of the "Security Protection
Committee"
the production teams' leaders (rural
brigades are subdivided into production teams)
members of the Youth League (the youth
organization of the Communist Party)
the brigade's political propagandist
(Maozedong fudaoyuan).
After these meetings, an investigation team
was formed in the brigade, comprising the Party Secretary, the head of the
Security Protection Committee, the head
of the militia, some members of the "team in charge of carrying out the class
struggle" (douchadui) and some people responsible or taking notes.
They all settled in Deng's production team
for a few days. Members of the team first talked to individual "poor
peasants" and "activists" about the class struggle and the need
to find class enemies. Soon their actions and speeches created a tense
atmosphere in the production team. People did not know exactly who was going to
be the "victim" but understood clearly that it was a serious affair.
The team then displayed several slogans:
"We should drag out the class enemies" . . . "You had
better confess now" . . . "Confession deserves clemency, resistance
deserves severity" . . . and "mobilization" continued in various
ways. Two or three days later, a big meeting was organized for all members of
the production team. They were told that there was a
"counter-revolutionary" among them whom everyone should denounce, but
the name of the counter-revolutionary was not disclosed. People were frightened
and started thinking of what they could report about others. They were asked to
write down whatever they knew which seemed wrong to them. Those who could not
write well were given help. The meeting lasted a long time because many people
who presented their papers to the Party Secretary were told that they were not
"good enough" and had to be rewritten.
Finally, 81 denunciation papers were
collected; most of them unimportant. However, some of them concerned several young people in the village who, in one of the papers,
were accused of having once stolen a fish and were said to be often in Deng's
company.
These young men were taken to the brigade's
headquarters by the investigation team and a "study class"3 was
organized for them. They were urged to confess their "illicit
relationship" with a "counter-revolutionary". As they were
unable to say anything, Deng's name was then mentioned and they were asked to
say what they knew of him.
Meanwhile, some members of the
investigation team went back to the production team to ask the peasants to
denounce these young men. The previous process was repeated and in the new denunciations the investigators found accusations
against two of the young men. One was denounced for having had an "illicit
sexual relationship" with a woman and the other for telling a story to
some peasants about the Emperor or the Zhou dynasty and his concubine, from which
it was deduced that he compared Mao Tsetung with the tyrannical Emperor and
Mao's wife with the cruel concubine.
Once this information was brought back to
the brigade, these two young men were taken aside by
the investigators. The first was threatened with being labeled a "bad
element" unless he made up for his crime by "exposing" Deng.
Frightened, he testified that Deng had once told him that Mao had been
transformed from a snake into a man, and, every year, had to go swimming at the
time when the skin changed. To a Chinese mind, this would sound more
like a peasant's story than one told by an educated youth and it seems unlikely
that Deng was its author. Nevertheless the statement was written down, signed
and finger-printed by the young man. The other young
man was in his turn threatened with being branded a "counter
revolutionary" for slandering Chairman Mao with the story of the Zhou
Emperor. He then accused Deng of having told the story and he, too,
signed and finger-printed a statement. The two of them were then allowed to go
home. The other young men who had been taken with them to the brigade were then
asked to confirm the charges, which they did, for fear of being kept longer in
the "study class". Their testimony was also written down and their
finger-prints taken.
This completed the first part of the
preliminary investigation; the evidence of two "crimes" committed by
Deng plus witnesses had been found. The second part began with the return of
the investigation team to Deng's production team, where the "masses"
were again mobilized. Twelve "poor peasants" were found to confirm
the charges against Deng and to give additional details. They also made statements
which they signed and finger-printed and a first dossier (shumian zuixing
cailiao) was written, including the following information:
1. Deng's
background and class origin
2. his
two "crimes"
3. the
places and times at which the "crimes" were committed
4. the witnesses to each of the
"crimes"
5. Deng's acceptance or rejection of the above
facts.
Deng was then arrested by the militia,
taken to the brigade for interrogation and told to confess. He did not yet know
precisely what he was accused of. The cadres gave him the dossier to read. Under
point 5, he could write either "conforms with the facts" (shushi) and
"I admit my crimes" (renzui) or "does not conform with the
facts" (bu shushi). Deng was urged to write something. He had, in fact,
little choice, because refuting evidence given by 12 "poor peasants"
was an impossible challenge and the only other alternative-admitting the
crimes- would make him a "counter-revolutionary".
At first,
therefore, he refused to say or write anything. A "struggle meeting"
was then called-the whole brigade stopped working for an entire day to attend
it. Deng was confronted with the young men and the 12 "poor peasants"
who had denounced him and who, more than anybody else, were adamant that he should
admit the crimes. In this situation nobody would dare to speak in his defence.
Deng was pushed, insulted, even beaten and yet did not confess. Finally, the
brigade's Party Secretary threatened to write on the dossier that Deng had
"resisted to the very end"-a powerful threat in China as the official
policy of "leniency to those who confess, severity to those who
resist" is well known to everyone. At that point, Deng had no choice but
to sign the statement and he wrote "renzui" ("l admit my
crimes").
A "recommendation for arrest" was
then written by the brigade cadres and sent with the dossier to the commune's
"Security Defence Group". At the same time Deng was sent to the
commune and his case was no longer the responsibility of the brigade cadres.
This was the starting-point of a process of
reinvestigation which was carried out in three stages. Investigators from the
commune were sent to Deng's production team to interrogate the witnesses,
especially about factual inconsistencies in the dossier. The commune's investigators,
however, began their investigation by assuring the peasants repeatedly that
they were "confident in the masses and in the Party's grass-roots"-a
guarantee or protection for the witnesses who confirmed their statements. The
dossier on Deng which was finally compiled by the commune contained fewer
inconsistencies than the brigade's dossier.
The commune in turn sent its own dossier of
recommendations to the county Public Security authorities who, after again
investigating the case along the same lines, issued an "arrest
warrant". Deng mean-while had been transferred to the county's detention
center and was now formally "arrested". As the case was considered
important, the county authorities handed the dossier to the higher authorities
in the district (zhuanqu).
The third reinvestigation was therefore
made by officials from the district Public Security Bureau. This time a more
detailed investigation was made. However, in order not to intimidate the
witnesses, the district investigators explained again to the peasants that
"they were confident in the masses, in the Party's grass-roots and were
standing at their side". New details about the crimes were therefore
discovered which made the final dossier better and fuller. It was sent by the district
to Deng's production brigade for approval. The brigade's Party Secretary and
the member responsible for Public Security signed it. The district's dossier
did not include the original dossiers prepared by the brigade, commune and
county, which were never seen again.
Several months later, preparations were
made for passing judgment on Deng. Some officials from the district came to the
production brigade for "consultations with the masses", and copies of
Deng's dossier were distributed to the production teams. In addition to information
about the case, some space was reserved in the dossier for the "opinions
of the masses" and for the "opinion of' the Party's grass-roots".
A meeting was organized for this purpose, but people did not quite know what to
say and proposed all sorts of things; some shouted "execution". The
brigade's Party Secretary, on the other hand, seemed to feel some remorse and
wrote on the dossier: "[Deng] admitted his crimes, cooperative attitude,
[he] deserves clemency".
The district officials left the brigade
after having collected the "opinions or the masses" and judgment was
decided upon outside the brigade. In November l970, a district Public Security
Bureau public notice announced sentences passed on a number of offenders. Deng
was on the list. He had been sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment with three
years' deprivation of civil rights after release, for slandering Chairman Mao
on several occasions between 1967 and 1969. He is reported to have been sent to
a labour camp. His present fate is unknown.
Notes
1.See Chapter I, pp. 12-13, for more
details on Deng's background and on the "one-strike, three-anti"
campaign.
2. "The case of one
counter-revolutionary", Huang He, No. 1, 1976. Translated in English in
the Review Minus 8, July-August 1976, and in French in Esprit, July-August
1977.
3. See Chapter II, p.70, note 15, about
these "study classes".
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