1976年7月13日，时任副总理的张春桥会见了年已76岁的美国参议院少数党（共和党）领袖斯科特（Hugh Scott），会谈中张春桥表现极为强硬，声称要用刺刀解决台湾问题，但他也偶尔幽默了两下。
中方是以中国人民外交协会的名义邀请斯科特来访的，所以会见的主陪是人民外交协会副会长周培源。此次会见的译员是施燕华，但唐闻声（Nancy Tang）和王海容分别以外交部美大司副司长和副部长的身份参加会见，人民外交协会的副处长范国祥（1986年后曾先后任裁军事务大使、常驻联合国日内瓦办事处和瑞士其他国际组织代表）。但据人民日报报道，人民外交协会的副秘书长马家骏也参加了会见，不知为何没有出现在这份会谈记录中。
此前，1972年4月斯科特以美国参议院共和党领袖的身份与参议院民主党（多数党）领袖曼斯菲尔德（Mike Mansfield）联袂访华，当时到访了北京和上海，但没有见到张春桥，在北京会见他们的是周恩来、周培源和乔冠华，唐闻声、资中筠作为工作人员参加了会见。当时张春桥虽然身兼上海市革委会主任一职，却不在上海，他已经常住北京，很少回上海，1972年2月尼克松访华时张春桥曾专门回到上海接待尼克松。
斯科特说他曾经当过教师，所以对教育事业很感兴趣，此次来访已经参观了北京大学、东城区五·七干校，印象深刻。张春桥笑着问干校是不是像集中营？斯科特说不是，干校里每个人都看起来很忙碌和快乐，我问过他们都是自愿来的吗，他们说是。张春桥说干校是文化革命的重要成果之一。
张春桥又说上次（1972年）你来时我们在批判林彪，这次你来我们在批判邓小平，所以你看我们就是好斗。斯科特回应说你们有你们的批评方式，我们也有我们的批评方式，双方大笑。
斯科特说他对中国文化很感兴趣，称最近出土的秦始皇陵兵马俑是自1946年图坦卡蒙墓发掘以来的最重大发现。
张春桥说斯科特看来对亚洲文物是个专家。斯科特说谈不上专家，但确实读过中国历史，比如知道杨贵妃的故事。张春桥就说但杨贵妃没有历史贡献，而秦始皇对历史贡献很大。斯科特说秦始皇是伟大的一统中国者，对吧？张春桥说中国的统一从来没有像现在这般坚固，但只剩下台湾还没有被解放。由此双方开始了对台湾问题的长时间争执，因为台湾问题是中共国和美国迟迟未建交的最大障碍所在。
斯科特说现在邻近总统大选，是一个不确定期。大选结束后，胜利的一方肯定会采取行动实现中美关系正常化。依据美国的政治制度，中美建交必须要符合民意。最近中国杂技团访美大受欢迎，很多美国小孩也拿起碗碟来想练习杂技，虽然摔碎了很多瓷器（china），但却撒下了中美友谊的种子。张春桥回应说，8亿中国人的意愿是坚定的不会改变，那就是一定要解放台湾。我们并不否认仍然在为军事解决台湾问题做准备，就像最近还在福建地区进行了小规模军事演习，这让台湾感到不安。
斯科特说，为了避免下一任领导人轻易改变上一任的做法，中美建交必须获得民意的高度认同。张春桥说不能这样把责任推卸给美国人民，因为中美不建交不利于美国人民的利益。历史上和现在中美人民之间一直是友好的，不应为现在的问题承担责任。
斯科特说虽然现在中美关系进展较慢，但长远来说一定会有一个最终的和平解决方案。张春桥敏感的问和平是指中美之间还是中国和台湾的蒋经国政权之间？斯科特说是指中美之间。张春桥说“我不明白。难道你认为中美会因为台湾而打仗吗？台湾完全是我方的内政问题，和平解决的可能性非常小，对此我们是有很多经验的，战争是更可靠的解决方案。”
张春桥后来来说“台湾问题已束缚住美国的脖子。美国为了自己的利益考虑应去掉这个套索。但如果你们做不到，那解放军可以斩断这个套索，这对中美两国人民都有利。中国人民在台湾问题上不欠美国的帐，是美国占领了台湾。我们现在愿意慷慨地用刺刀来帮助美国解套，这话好像不中听，但事实如此。”斯科特问“用刺刀解决问题是什么意思？”张春桥说“（武力）推翻蒋经国政权。”斯科特说那可不好，虽然美方不愿介入中方内部事务，但将遵守承诺保护台湾的安全。
张春桥说“你知道蒋经国政权的媒体骂我是张匪吗？”斯科特说“我国报纸也给我起了很多外号。”张春桥说“那是你的内政，我管不到。我要告诉你的是我们的内战还没有结束。我们并没有和平解放的经验。北京一般被认为是和平解放，但怎么实现的呢？那时华北都已解放，只剩下北京孤城，当时我们大兵压境，而且城内的人也组织起来要欢迎解放军。”张还说中美上海公报没有说到要和平解放台湾。
斯科特问张对中美建交之前的两国关系发展有何看法，张说台湾问题是最大障碍，不过中美在国际问题上有很多共同点。斯科特表示赞同，并提到苏联最近在安哥拉的表现以及美方的应对。张春桥不提苏联的名字，而是用北极熊代替，说它不会适应非洲的气候，终将被赶走。张说是美国人从安哥拉逃跑了，所以苏联人进入。斯科特不同意这种说法。张春桥就打比喻说你们或许认为北极熊太饿了就送他点吃的。斯科特不知道这是在比喻，就说美国同样卖给中国粮食。张春桥很讽刺地说“这倒是很平等。”斯科特说美方认为粮食不应该作为外交政策的工具。张春桥反驳说“你们有口号叫粮食为了和平，这就是外交政策的工具。”斯科特解释说美国是有卖粮食，但也经常免费赈济国外灾荒，比如印度，如果这是外交政策的工具，那显然没有起到效果。张回应说美国卖给中国那点粮食对中国没起到多大作用，即便美国把全部粮食储备给了中国，分到8亿中国人头上，每人也只是一点。斯科特解释说美国的政策是自由买卖粮食对所有国家开放，并恭维说中国实现粮食自给是了不起的成就，尤其是与印度形成鲜明的对比。
斯科特又问张如何看待扩展中美经贸往来，张说现在的政治局面决定了我们只能维持现状，在中美关系正常化前不会有大的增加。
会谈结束前张张春桥要求此次会谈的内容要保密，最后张问起斯科特接下来在中国的行程，斯科特说明天离开北京，将先后访问洛阳、大连、苏州和上海。
美国驻中国联络处主任Gates会见时也在场，他感到斯科特受到了张春桥的欺负，就在最后为斯科特做了一些解释。Gates显然对张春桥的表态很不安，当天就把情况报告给美国国务院，并于次日（即7月14日）呈报会谈的原始详细记录，14日晚国务卿基辛格就召集相关人员分析张春桥的态度。负责东亚和太平洋事务的副助卿William H.
Gleysteen称张春桥tough as nails，而且根据张近来连续接待外宾可以判断他在外交事务上发言权在增加。基辛格的看法是1.张春桥的说法并不新鲜，1974年11月时毛泽东就对他说过类似的话，只是毛当时还说了“我们可以等上100年。”2.中方比美方更期待中美建交；3.张春桥口头强硬恰是因为他们现在没做什么。7月17日美国国务院就此发给Gates一份详细的分析，安慰Gates不要紧张。https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/d150#fn9
斯科特7月10日到达北京，7月12日会见外交部长乔冠华，（见《乔冠华外长会见并宴请美国参议院共和党领袖斯科特和夫人》，《人民日报》1976.7.13）；7月14日至16日访问洛阳（见《中美“牵手”40年：洛阳见证对外开放历史（上）》，《洛阳日报》2012.2.21）；接下来去大连，获邀参观了为防御苏联袭击而修建的隧道（见1976年7月28日卡特总统与斯科特谈话记录）；7月22日到24日到访上海然后回美（据《上海外事志》）。
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
Tuesday, July 13, 1976
3:15 PM to 5:15 PM
Sinkiang Room
Great Hall of the People
SUBJECT: Verbatim Transcript of Meeting
Between
Senator Scott and
Vice
Premier Chang Chun-chiao
PARTICIPANTS:
Chinese side:
Chang Chun-chiao, Vice Premier
Shih Yen-hua, Interpreter
Chou Pei-yuan, Vice President, Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs (CPIFA)
Wang Hai-jung, Vice Foreign Minister
Tang Wen-sheng, Deputy Director, American and Oceanic
Affairs Department, Foreign Ministry
Fan Kuo-hsiang, Deputy Division Chief, CPIFA
Cheng Wan-chen, Staff, CPIFA
3 Notetakers
American side:
Senator Hugh Scott
Ambassador Gates
Robert Barnett, Director, Asia Society
Richard Quick, Administrative Assistant to Senator Scott
Terence Shea, Department of State
Charles W. Freeman, Jr., Department of State
Donald Keyser, US Liaison Office, Notetaker
____________________________________________
Chang Chun-chiao: I understand that this is the second time you have come to China.
Senator Scott: Yes, this is my second trip to the People's Republic of China.
Chang: Last time I had no chance
to meet you.
Scott: That is my misfortune. I
have met your Foreign Minister. My meetings with your distinguished Prime Minister, Mr. Chou
En-lai, were very useful. Senator Mansfield and I were very happy to have had
that opportunity.
Chang: Premier Chou is already dead.
We all remember his contributions to the Chinese
people and to the improvement of Sino-US relations.
Scott: Our party (misconstrued by interpreter as Republican Party) wants to extend condolences on the death of your
Mr. Chu Teh.
Chang: Thank you. It has been
several years since 1972--your first visit to China. You
haven't been to other parts of China. Have you seen any changes in Peking?
Scott: Yes, changes which have been to the benefit of the people. There has been improvement in transportation. I have seen a common dedication to your system of
society. There also seems to be more awareness of visits
from Westerners. We feel
that we are recognized now. We have all been moved by the cordiality of the
Chinese people. We are told that you will continue to make great progress in
health and education. I'm especially interested in education, although that is
not my specialty. I'm a lawyer. I was once a teacher, once in the US and once
in England. I was therefore very interested in and paid much attention to your
teaching at Peking University which we have visited. Our visit to your excavations
today has also given us a new awareness. We
were very impressed by our visit today to a May 7 Cadre School.
Chang: Did it look like a concentration camp? (smiling)
Scott: No, everyone seemed busy and happy.
Chang: This is one of the important measures taken by
the Chinese since the Cultural Revolution.
Scott: We asked if all were volunteers and they said
yes. We were shown
the kind, of work they did in building and in cultivating crops. You grow bigger squash than ours.
Chang: Yes. So the May 7 Cadre School is
doing very well. The last time you came to
China we were criticizing Lin Piao. Now we are criticizing Teng during your
second visit. So you see that we like to struggle.
Scott: You have your criticisms and we have ours (laughter) --This is part of our two
different systems.
Chang: There is great
disorder everywhere.
Scott: Yes, there is always great
disorder everywhere even though the people pray for the
mandate of heaven.
Chang: This is because of
contradictions.
Scott: Regarding your earlier
question, I have seen a significant improvement in the
quality and quantity of your arts and crafts. There appear
to be even more than four years ago in your stores.
Chang: Yes, there has been
relatively quick development in this field.
Scott: In America we are great admirers of Chinese craftsmanship and works of
art. I was interested in the recent
discovery of the tombs of Chin Shih Huang, which is certainly one of the most
significant discoveries since the 1946 opening of Tutankhamen's tomb.
Chang: The tomb of Chin Shih Huang has not yet been excavated. The
excavations are from around the tomb.
Scott: Then there must be even more marvelous discoveries to come.
Chang: Senator Scott is quite an expert on Asian cultural relics.
Scott: To be called an expert is only to know a little more than someone else. For many
years I've studied Chinese history. I know about Yang Kuei-fei. There have been
many instances of struggle, disruption, and divisiveness within your country.
Struggle always continues.
Chang: Yes, you are right. Yang Kuei-fei made no historic contributions
but Chin Shih Huang made great contributions in history.
Scott: Yes, she (Yang Kuei-fei)
was as full of trouble as calories. He (Chin Shih Huang)
was known as the great unifier of China. Right?
*
Chang: The unity of China has
never been as consolidated as it is now. At present only
Taiwan is not liberated — so we can't say that China is totally unified.
Scott: But with 800 million people, I'm sure that you have already achieved much development. You must feel very proud at taking so many people and unifying them.
We
are presently in a period of uncertainty until November because
of the Presidential campaign. But as the New York Times
said editorially only 48 hours ago, the foreign policy of President Ford and
Governor Carter toward Asia are substantially the same. Both are committed to
the Shanghai Communique. Neither can move substantially now, as the victor
could do after the election.
We have had changes occurring in our system, notably during the last
four years. For example, there has
been an increasing assumption of authority — under our Constitution — by the
Congress. I will give you one
example where I voted against President Ford. Regarding the President's power
to declare war, hereafter in this kind of military action the President must
advise, consult with, and give reasons for his action. Then it could be cancelled by the Congress after a certain number of
days. The President vetoed this Bill but Congress overrode it. Hereafter no
President can move alone without taking into consideration the impact of public
opinion as expressed through their representatives in the Congress. Without
approval of the Congress through consultation, there can be no action by the
President.
Another development in the same period of time has manifested itself.
The Congress has assumed more authority in foreign policy decisions. But it also supports the President in his desire for a
strong national defense. In
previous years the national defense budget was often cut 10-12 percent by the
Congress, but last year the Congress approved 99.4 percent of the budget
requested by the President. This indicates that the Congress is more and more
interested in a strong national defense and is willing to use the power of
appropriations.
I have ...(noted)...your reference to Taiwan. I will explain what seem
to you to be contradictions. Our
movement toward implementation of normalization depends upon conditioning of
public opinion. We must
condition the opinion of people who until the Nixon visit were conditioned the
other way. You must condition the thinking of 800 million people. We must
condition 200 millions' thought from one view to another. In my view, improved
communications, exchange of knowledge, techniques and skills — we believe
commerce also
plays a role — are very important to this process of conditioning. As we change direction we must change with the approval of
the people. There is an old French
saying — perhaps Nancy can interpret it — which says that the Prime Minister
looked out the window, saw that many people were marching, said that there are
my people, I am their leader,
I must hurry to their head. We have noted that whenever you send delegations
to the United States they are always received with enthusiasm, in big places
and in small. They are received with warmth and enthusiasm, in big places and in small. When our people come here they
always return with great praise for the kindness and hospitality of the Chinese
people. We believe that this will change opinion more than what a leader says. When your Chinese gymnasts and jugglers came
to the US, many American children began to pick up dishes and try to juggle
them. In their play they smashed a lot of china — of porcelain. But even though
we have lost a lot of porcelain we have gained friendship. What our country-to- country relationship comes
down to is these children's future.
Do you have any questions? I'm willing to answer anything.
Do you have any questions? I'm willing to answer anything.
Chang: Since you started with Taiwan, I'd also like to say a few words on this issue. You have said much which is needed to change the direction of thinking. We have not changed
on our side. Because the 800 million Chinese people are in agreement on this
issue, all the Chinese
people want to liberate Taiwan. Are there those who don't favor liberation of
Taiwan? Yes, but they don't belong to the category of "the people" —
they are Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo elements. Chiang Kai-shek
fought against us to his death, but the question is still unresolved. The
Senator knows that between Fukien and Taiwan there is still artillery fire.
Scott: I'm aware of this. I'm also
aware –that though it is a very small thing--we have withdrawn a few observers from Quemoy and Matsu.
Chang: They should have left long ago. (Smiling to his colleagues
present.)
Scott: Over time there has already
been a substantial reduction. There have already been 4000 troops
withdrawn. There has
not been a total removal of American forces. But that process (of
reduction) is not reversible.
Chang: At present we are still
making preparations. This
is no military secret. In
recent days in Fukien we have conducted small-scale military exercises. Taiwan is
very nervous.
Scott: That's news to me. They don't tell me
anything. Our presence remaining on Taiwan is already so slender that after the election we will continue to move toward your views. But I speak as a private citizen. I don't know who will be President.
Chang: Mr. Senator, how long do you think this issue will be
dragged on? How long will you discuss it as a private citizen? Our position is very
clear: We want to settle the Taiwan issue by
following the Japanese formula, which has three points. They are: 1) severance of diplomatic
relations with
Taiwan; 2) withdrawal of all military forces from Taiwan; and 3) abrogation of
the treaty with Taiwan.
Scott: I don't know who will be President, Ford or Carter. I would
expect reasonable movement after the inauguration. But I can't predict; I'm not a resident of their minds. Your late Premier Mr. Chou said: "We are a patient people." In our attempt
to condition the opinion of the American people, we hope that we can find a way to assure that
things done by one leader can't be undone by a future leader. We want this to be done in a peaceful context. Only when the American people are behind us and only when American understanding of our objectives has undergone a marked change can we act
to prevent undoing a policy by a future leader. In our internal affairs we do
have problems. In
a democratic society the problem is to convince the people.
Chang: You can't place this responsibility on the American people. Failure
to settle this issue, as the Senator has said, is not in the interest of the
American people. The American and Chinese peoples have always been friendly, in
history and now. So the American people shouldn't be held responsible for the
present state of affairs.
Scott: I think that is very generous, a very understanding statement. What I would like
to see in 1-2-3 years is a situation where we could say we have finally worked
out an agreeable solution rather than to have the relationship founder because
we have stopped trying to understand each other. Mr. Barnett has written very learnedly on the matter, as have many
others. This will have an ultimate effect of conditioning the American public to accept our moves. There is a saying
from "Aesop's Fables": "I
can't see how
long it will take you to get to the next country until I first see how fast you walk."
Chang: So then we must wait and see.
Scott: I'm afraid so. But in the long run we will
have great
satisfaction in an ultimate peaceful solution.
Chang: "ultimate peaceful solution?"(Sarcastically) Does
this refer to US-China relations or to relations between China and the Chiang
Ching-kuo regime on Taiwan?
Scott: I spoke of the US and China. Because we believe that an ultimate settlement is
in the interests of the parties involved, the Shanghai Communique did not require
that any of these things occur at a given hour or by a clock. These were
preconditions stated by the Chinese side in the Shanghai Communique. We cannot
and do not encourage
any adventurism on the part of Chiang Ching-kuo. We would not like to see anything
come from such nervousness as you say exists on Taiwan now.
Chang: I
don't understand. Do you think that the US and China
should fight war over Taiwan? Taiwan is totally our domestic issue. There is
very little possibility of a peaceful settlement. We have much experience in
this respect. It is more reliable to settle this question through a war.
Scott: I think I am being misunderstood. I agree that the relationship between China and Taiwan is an internal relationship. I
myself have fought in two wars — both times on your side — and I think that it
is difficult to justify any war. I doubt that
either side could justify to its people going to war for this cause. I am
extremely anti-war. I've been shot at. This is the best
reason to oppose war. We should solve our problems after discussion and
understanding. The American people have not yet said yes or no to the Japanese formula. The last thing they would consider is
a war. The American people have a horror of war (the translater rendered this
as the American people are afraid of war). I think our policy should be as
Premier Chou stated: Don't go to war except in defense of one's
territories. Even here peaceful solutions are more likely and more desirable.
Chang: Taiwan is also part of our
territory. But I think we have already used up a lot
of time. There is no need to argue. Our position is very clear and it is
unchanged. Much still remains to be seen. This year you will not settle this
issue.
Scott: I can't predict, because I
don't know who will be President or who will be in
Congress. Perhaps there will be as many as 100 or even 150 new members of the
Congress. When you have new members there are apt to be changes in policy. But
not changes so as to affect America's Asian policy.
Chang: But we are very clear on
Taiwan. Since the issue of
Taiwan has arisen, this is a noose around the neck of the US. It is in the
interests of the American people to take it off. If you don't, the People's
Liberation Army (PLA) will cut it off. This will be good both for the American
and Chinese peoples. With
regard to Taiwan, the Chinese people are not in debt to the United States. The US has occupied Taiwan. We
are generous and ready to help the US solve the problem by our bayonets —
perhaps that doesn't sound pleasant but that is the way it is.
Chang: To overthrow the Chiang clique.
Scott: No. That doesn't sound pleasant. Our
policy is not to interfere in your internal affair — but we
stand ready to back up our commitment to Taiwan. We believe it would be in default of the Shanghai
Communique if there were a resort to arms. Any such action would arouse 215
million Americans. I would continue to urge progressing along the path of
peace. While we recognize your rights, I ask you to recognize our difficulties.
Chang: You talk about our rights
(discussing this with a wave of the hand). This you
must do, of course. It is our internal affair and there is no need to ask
others to recognize our rights. Did
you know that in Chiang Ching-kuo's press I am called "Bandit Chang"?
Scott: My papers
call me many things.
Chang: That is your affair and I would not interfere. However,
I want to show you that our civil war has not stopped. We don't have the
experience that you can peacefully liberate some place. For
example, Peking could be said to have been liberated by peaceful means.
But
how was this carried out? At that time the whole of North China was already
liberated and only Peking- was not yet liberated. Our armed forces were
prepared outside the city of Peking. And even our people inside Peking were
organized to welcome the PLA. (Turning to Chou Pei-yuan) for example, at Peking
University many had prepared to welcome the PLA.
Chou Pei-yuan: What about Tientsin?
Chang: No, Tientsin was liberated by fighting. So perhaps there is only that
kind of "peaceful" liberation; the kind that
occurred in Peking. Our adversary is the same. We know them well. We consider
our policy from the practical viewpoint.
Scott: Our discussions have primarily been about peaceful formulas such as the Japanese formula. We have not discussed your primarily
internal question.
Chang: With regard to the Shanghai Communique, we likewise hope that it will be implemented. We are still willing to act in
accordance with it. (Responding to a clarification of Senator Scott’s point by
Tang Wen-sheng) The Shanghai Communique has nothing in it about peaceful
liberation.
Scott: I didn't say there was.
Such a communique would hardly speak of war as an alternative to peace. This is your civil war.
Chang: The Shanghai Communique recognizes only one China.
Scott: Yes.
Chang: Both sides should continue
to act in accord with the Shanghai Communique.
Scott: That is what
I am discussing. As the Shanghai
Communique evolves, may
I ask what you envision as the
continuing
relationship between China and the US pending normalization?
Chang: Now, according to certain circumstances, both sides
can do more. But the biggest problem is unsettled. That is Taiwan. So far we
have only spoken about Taiwan. But in the international arena
both sides have many points in common.
Scott: I'm glad that you have
mentioned this. We believe it important to maintain
stability in Europe, to have a strong NATO, to have a strong national defense,
and to oppose hegemony. I can give you
an illustration. Angola was a very unfortunate thing. The President and the
Secretary of State were frustrated by the unwillingness of Congress to support
their policy. These things do happen to us from time to time. Congress
sometimes delays implementation of policy — this is a source of frustration.
The Executive was opposed to the intervention of a superpower. But the
Legislative body feared that to support the President might have led to a
commitment of American forces.
I didn't agree.
Chang: In
Angola, my view is that you didn't handle it very beautifully.
You messed it up. The Polar Bear went to Angola. This can educate the African
people.
Scott: It was bad timing for the Polar Bear.
Chang: The climate in Africa is unsuited to the Polar
Bear. Someday he will be driven away.
Scott: Our view is the same as yours. The presence of that superpower after a while becomes counterproductive and countries will turn against it.
Chang: Well, since you ran away
the Polar Bear entered. This will educate the African people. We are optimistic that the African people will see it. The climate in the southern hemisphere is not
good for the Polar Bear.
Scott: We believe that we didn't
run away but never entered.
Chang: On your side you seem to think that the
Polar Bear is too hungry so you feed
it your grain. This is
very interesting.
Scott: We sell our grain to you too.
Chang: (With heavy irony) That is very equal.
Scott: We believe that food should not be used as an instrument
of foreign policy.
Chang: You have
the slogan "Food for Peace”. This is an instrument
of foreign policy.
Scott: Yes, people everywhere are dissatisfied
with their government if they are hungry. We have aided the hungry in more than half of the nations of the world. In
so doing we have made the taxpayer foot the bill. The American taxpayer must
give 20 to 40 percent of his income in taxes. Most of these taxes go to
giveaway programs. We sell
grain, but we also give much away as over the years in India. We do this for
free. If this was an instrument of foreign policy, it certainly didn't work.
Chang: What I was just referring to
was your attitude toward the Polar Bear. I did
not come today prepared to discuss your food policy with you. But I can make
some comments. As for your sale of grain to China, I'll be honest. The amount sold to China can't play much role. Even
if you gave away your whole food reserves to China and its 800 million people,
what would this prove? In each bowl we would have only a few grains.
Scott: We
recognize, of course, that China is sustaining
and able to feed its people. We believe in trade and in a willingness to buy and sell with all. Where disasters and
serious hunger have occurred, we have given food. The
general policy of the US is to be prepared to buy and sell with all countries.
One of the great miracles of
the modern world is that China not only can feed all its people but also so
obviously raise standard of living — in violent contrast to the administration
of India, for example. So we admire you.
Chang: It is not because the Indian people
cannot resolve
their problems but because of their government and
system.
Scott: I am inclined to agree with you. We might have different
solutions for the problems of the system, but I agree with you that it is the
system. What do you think of
continuation and expansion of trade relations with the United States? We have
welcomed and will continue to welcome trade with you.
Chang: I'm afraid that is impossible under current circumstances
to have this (i.e. trade) on a large scale. We think that it is all right to maintain the present state of affairs.
What do you think?
Scott: Balance of payments has to
be considered.
Chang: This is not the factor. The present political
situation has decided that we
can only maintain the current level. I'm afraid that there can't be much
progress before normalization of relations.
Scott: We stand ready to both buy
and sell. We respect
your judgments.
Chang: This big market of 800
million people provides us much room for maneuver. We
mainly rely on our own strength to solve our problems. Any other country would
find it difficult to meet the needs of our country. In the trade field we
depend on internal trade. Our foreign trade occupies only a small percentage of
our trade. Of course we don't rule out the necessity to supply each other's
needs under necessary conditions.
Scott: Would it be appropriate for
Mr. Barnett to ask a question regarding ASEAN? He
is an expert on ASEAN and has spent time in those countries.
Chang: There is not much time. But
please ask the question.
Barnett: I travelled through Southeast
Asia and noted the movement toward a concept of a
zone of peace, freedom and neutrality. I have heard the satisfaction of those
countries that the PRC had given its support to that concept. I would be
interested in your attitude toward ASEAN, particularly toward the concept of
neutralization.
Chang: This question Foreign
Minister Chiao discussed with you yesterday. But I will answer you. China
supports their desire for neutrality and supports their desire to expel
hegemony. But in our view that won't be easy. Don't you agree? I have never been
there myself.
Barnett: I hope they won't have too
much difficulty in opposing
hegemony. It will take time for real unity and understanding among themselves
but the prospects are good.
Chang: Yes, what I said is true,
they will have difficulties between themselves and outside forces may
intervene. China will not intervene in their affairs.
Scott: We really appreciate the
time you have given us. We know how busy you are. I hope that you will
agree with my wish to convey our discussions to the
President — who is also my personal friend.
Chang: I can't object to your
conveying these discussions to your President. But I hope that our discussions
will not be published.
Scott: I think that we can only
publish that we held frank and candid discussions. Among the subjects we
discussed were Taiwan, commerce, and some foreign policy matters. I don't want
to violate any confidence.
Chang: I don't know what you mean
by "violation of confidence."
Scott: Discussing the substance of our talks.
Ambassador Gates: I'd like to say
that as you know,
Mr. Vice Premier, it is the policy of the U.S. Government to carry out
the principles of the Shanghai Communique. Two Presidents have stated this pubicly and privately. Only the timing and formula remain indefinite. The Senator is a
political leader. He has discussed from that point of view. From our side, when
we deal with treaty arrangements, this ultimately requires the consent of
Congress. I think that is what the Senator is trying to say. What he hopes will
happen is that a favorable consensus will develop. When that times comes.
Scott: We are seeking a strong
majority approval in
Congress. We do not want a one vote majority which will then result in
dispute.
Chang: This is the affair of the
United States. But the three conditions set by China
for normalization of relations should be met in their entirety. Anyone wishing
to prevent this will be held responsible by history.
Ambassador Gates: We understand
your position. You have made it very clear.
Chang: Are you leaving tomorrow?
出处：美国DDRS- 286414
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