1977年9月25日刚卸任中央情报局局长8个月的老布什以私人身份访问中国，时任中情局中国情报分析官的李洁明（Jim
Lilley）得以随行。布什此行受到了时任副总理的邓小平的接见，在李洁明的建议下布什还去了西藏，这使得李成为第一位访问西藏的美国政府官员。
访问结束后，李洁明写了份简报，时任中情局副局长（主管国家情报分析）的Robert R. Bowie认为这份简报很有意思，推荐给中情局局长Stansfield M. Turner阅读，并建议列入“总统每日简报”中，而且最好是Turner带上李洁明向卡特汇报。
李洁明在简报中提到：
“此次中方陪同官员，包括多名高阶情报官员，比我以往见过的所有中方官员都有坦率直接。他们对共产党的某项政策开玩笑和自嘲，即兴谈话时不受官方教条的约束，可以不受意识形态影响的谈论中国历史。他们急于了解美国文化，音乐、习俗和游戏等，比如我们教他们玩骰子、拉米牌，还有一个晚上都在欣赏音乐。”
“在四川省，中国人口最多的省份，那里的人们承认生产遇到问题，但都归咎于四人帮的破坏。事实上我们观察到那里落后的生产工具和方式，懒惰的劳动力和可怜的生产安全措施。但我夜间在四川的城市里散步时没有发现去年施勒辛格（按：James
Rodney Schlesinger作为前美国国防部长于1976年9月访华）所报告的紧张气氛。
在西藏我们见到了当地最高长官任荣，我问了他关于从北边修进藏铁路和中印边境局势的问题。任没有坦率回答铁路的问题，但对于印度的表态比公开场合发言要强硬的多。我的印象是中共利用军队对西藏实施了严密的控制，虽然藏人对此不满但也无能为力。”
“我们与邓小平的会见持续了一个半小时，邓被很多观察家认为是中国最有权势的人物。邓看起来确实自信，有闯劲，有手腕。会谈中他不看稿子，很少咨询手下人员，说话很有权威，在场的中国人对他高度敬畏。邓说到：
他不反对同苏联谈判，但美国在谈判中被苏联占了便宜，这是在姑息苏联。（我认为邓是在表示中方也可以和苏联谈判）。
欧洲的共产主义运动发展情况不值得担心。邓说他对欧洲共运历史很了解，如果西欧的共产党追随苏共路线，就会被视为傀儡而被当地人民拒绝；相反如果他们拒绝服从苏共，则可以成长为独立的共产党，这就是件好事。
对台湾问题，邓重复了中方立场。他虽然展现了耐心，但也警告说美国拖得越久就越不利。他还要布什给万斯（按：Vance是时任国务卿，1977年8月下旬曾访华）传话，让万斯不要误解认为中方在台湾问题上立场是灵活的。不过邓说中方愿意在联合国进行谈判，美国驻华联络处认为这是一个重要的信号。”
“布什和同行的石油公司老板Lietdke向邓小平和中国外贸部长提议中美在石油探测、精炼和运输方面开展大型合作。布什认为这对处理苏联问题有重大意义，中方先是说目前的中美关系不利于开展这种合作，但接着就改口索要关于此事的书面规划。”
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Approved For Release 2004/03/17: CIA-RDP80M00165A000500350003-9
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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Deputy for National intelligence 10/18/1977
NOTE FOR : The Director
You
might be interested in reading this brief report by Jim Lilley on his trip to China.
(CROSSOUT)
Robert R. Bowie
D/ DCI/(CROSSOUT)
Attachment
(handwritten note) POSSIBLE
PRESIDENTIAL BRIEFING
ITEM? AND/OR TAKE
LILLEY WITH YOU?
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Next 1 Page(s) In Document
Exempt
Page 3- Page 5
4. Observations of Chinese Officials (Cadres):
The Chinese cadres accompanying us (seven of them including the high level
intelligence official) were more open and forthcoming than any officials I have
encountered in my long exposure to the Chinese. This was characterized by the
following:
a. Humor and some sarcasism
about the party line in China.
b. Improvised conversation
unbound by inflexible dogma. For instance, discussions of Chinese history were
often free of ideology.
c. Desire to acquire knowledge of our culture. They were interested in
American music, habits and games. For instance, we taught them dominoes and gin
rummy and had a bang-up musical evening with them. I suggest this augers well
for future DDO development of Chinese officials.
5. Visits to Remote Areas:
a. In the most populous province of China, Szechwan, the Chinese
admitted their serious problems in production and disruptions. They blamed it all
on the "Gang of Four". This did not obscure their more basic problems
of primitive machinery and methods, deplorable safety measures, indolent work
force.
b. I took the opportunity to take long walks through reported
troubled cities in Szechwan late at night. I did not detect the tension that
the Schlesinger party reported last year.
c. I believe that I'm
the first US Government official to visit Tibet. I met the Chinese, Jen Jung, who runs this huge region and
talked directly with him. I questioned him on the progress of their railroad
from the north and about their border situation with India. He was not forthcoming on the railroad. He
did take a belligerant tone on India,
certainly more so than reflected in public statements. My impressions are that Tibet is under a tight
Chinese grip backed by military power. Although the Tibetans may resent this
there isn’t much they can do about it. I will report details of all these observations to
Domestic Contact Division.
6. Vice Premier Teng
Hsiao-ping: We spent an hour and a half with Teng who is
considered by many analysts to be the most powerful man in China. Teng came
across to me as a confident, aggressive and skillful leader. He talked authoritatively
without notes and he only occasionally referred to his staff. Great deference was shown to him by the Chinese
present. There was a
patronizing tone to much of what he said. He made these points:
--He had nothing against
negotiations with the USSR but he made it clear that he thought the Soviets
bested the US in strategic negotiations. (I believe Teng was indicating the
Chinese too could negotiate with the Russians.) He did attack the trend of
"appeasement" in the US.
--Eurocommunism did not overly disturb the Chinese. Teng said that he was well
aware of the history of the European communist movement. Teng took the
simplistic view that if West Europe parties followed the Soviet line they would
be exposed as puppets and rejected by the people. If they refused to obey the
orders of Russia then this could lead to the development of independent
communist parties, a desirable thing.
--On Taiwan, Teng repeated, the
standard position of the PRC. He did convey a sense of patience but with the
warning that the longer the US took to solve the problem the more unfavorable
the US position became. He passed the message via Bush to Vance that his
concern that Vance had misrepresented the Chinese position by terming it
flexible was a thing of the past.
Teng said the Chinese were
prepared to proceed with negotiations at the UN (USLO considered this an
important signal).
7. Bush and the-Chairman of
Pennzoil, Hugh Liedtke, made a major proposal to Teng and later to the Minister
of Foreign Trade on a massive arrangement between China and the US on the
exploration, refining and transportation of oil. Bush considered the proposal
to have strategic implications for dealing with the Soviet problem. The Chinese
first made noises that the state of relations between US and China was not
conducive for such an arrangement but later asked for the proposal in writing
which Liedtke intends to provide.
(CROSSOUT)
James R. Liliey
出处：美国DNSA
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