1958.9.29合肥市某化铁炉发生手榴弹爆炸事故

按：冤有头，债有主，这起事故显然与毛泽东发起大炼钢铁运动有关。

～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～

中国共产党合肥市委员会（通报）

_______________________________________________

总号 （58）190          机密程度

_______________________________________________

主送    各县委，各机械工厂党组织。

_______________________________________________

抄送   市委常委，工交部，冶金指挥部，重工业局党组，存档。

（共印 35份）

_______________________________________________

本件1页  中共合肥市委    58年9月29日印发

 _______________________________________________

中共合肥市委关于肥东机械

加工厂化铁炉发生手榴弹爆炸事故的通报

今日下午，肥东县委电话报告：肥东县粮食局机械加工厂化铁炉发生手榴弹爆炸事故，炸伤二人，其中一人左胳膀炸掉，小腹炸裂，生命非常危险，为此特规定所有机械厂的化铁炉，必须对废铁、铁屑熔化时，进行严格检查，以防止，炮弹、炸弹、子弹等爆炸物混入发生爆炸事故，希立即指定专人进行彻底检查，严格贯彻执行，不能再发生类似事故。

中共合肥市委员会

1958年9月29日

出处：合肥市档案馆001-01-0067-006

1963.9.26合肥“五反”运动中发生逃跑、破坏的情况

中共合肥市委文件

（63）117

_______________________

市委轉发市委增产节約和

“五反”运动办公室关于“五反”运动中

发生逃跑破坏情况的报告

各区委，市委各部委，市直各党組（委），各党委、总支、支部，并报省委：

现将市委增产节约和“五反”运动办公室关于“五反”运动中发生逃跑、破坏情况的报告轉发給你們。“五反”运动是一場十分尖锐、激烈的阶級斗爭，一些坚决的敌人，必然要进行垂死的掙扎，千方百計地进行抵抗和破坏。各单位对此必須有足夠的认识，坚决貫彻党的政策和指示，切实加强对职工羣众的阶級和阶級斗爭的教育，提高革命警惕性，克服麻痹思想。并望你們参照报告中提出的意見，采取适当措施，防止类似事件的发生。特别是在国庆节日期间，更要注意加强这方面的工作。

如有不当，请省委指示。

中共合肥市委

一九六三年九月廿七日

 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

关于“五反”运动中发生逃跑、破坏情况的报告

市委：

自开展增产节約和“五反”运动以来，我市已发生犯罪分子逃跑事件六起，纵火破坏事件一起，現将情况报告如下：

1、合肥竹器社采购員刘宗发（男，二十八岁，肥西人，家庭成份贫农，工人出身），自一九六二年十月至一九六三年四月担任采购工作期間，貪污公款五百零四元五角三分，盗卖毛竹得款七百三十元八角。并与人合伙在一九六二年六月套购钢絲布八公尺做筛罗出售，获利一百五十元；一九六二年十一月在佛子岭以合肥竹器社名义套购毛竹一百二十根，企图运住寿县販卖，运至霍山时被供銷社发現予以没收。今年四月，社領导发觉其問題后，将其由外地調回。刘回社后，不老实交帳，經常不經請假擅自回家，于五月十四日晚潛逃。后經多方調查，六月六日在江西景德鎮市鵝湖公社将其追捕归案。刘逃跑时，曾盗有盖有“中共合肥竹器厂支部”、“合肥竹器厂”、“合肥竹器厂供銷办公室”公章的空白信笺多張，并利用党支部的空白信笺，冒充党員，化名刘万海，到各单位联系工作，了解竹器社人員有关問題。当被查获时，还当場撕毁两張介紹信，企图銷毁罪証。

2．合肥橡胶厂采购員朱炳成（男，29岁，江苏省南通人，家庭成份地主，本人学生出身），在駐沪采购期间，以涂改发票、多領款少报帳等手段，先后貪污公款二千六百零四元五角九分，并长期和劳改释放分子、暗娼王惠芳姘居。今年四月，厂領导发現其問题后，当即調其回厂报帳。朱在回厂报帳期間于四月五日潜逃。朱逃跑后，进行投机倒把活动，从上海搞絲綢到河南开封等地贩卖，和暗娼王惠芳姘居。朱和王在无锡乡下隐藏时，还聚众赌博。此外，朱还随身带有毒药，企图不明。八月三十日，上海市公安局将朱捕获，九月十八日带回合肥。

3．东市区文化舘付館长程克涌（男，二十五岁，肥东人，学徒出身，五七年一月参加工作，六〇年一月入党），利用工作之便，挪用公款三百多元。程系有妇之夫，但和原北市付食品加工厂干部朱启秀利用业余演出相識发生腐化致怀孕，并共谋打胎未逞。机关党支部发現上述問题后，曾找其个別談話，程亦承认了錯誤事实，并表示願意檢查交待。此后，机关对程教育抓得不紧，对程的活动也不了解。机关以为程在社会主义教育工作組，而工作组以为机关另行分配了工作。直到八月十六日甘肅玉門市車站派出所来电，才知程已偕朱潜逃。

4．和平鞋帽厂工人王明泉（男，三十五发，肥东人，家庭成分中农，本人出身工人），乘工厂派其往上海、杭州等地采购之机，挪用公款六百九十五元八角，并借代购磚瓦、木料为名，騙取肥东卅埠熊业富、柳木巷居民沈思财、該厂职工賈成荣等人民币七百三十五元。领导发觉其問题令其交待时，态度极其恶劣，王亲兄在台灣，堂姪在香港，因此，于八月二十四日晚潜逃，九月二十三日，广州市公安局将其在逃往香港途中捕获。

5．合肥市机电修配社电机门市部电工芦广（男，三十二岁，江西吉安人，家庭成份工商业，本人出身学生）。曾任伪勤务兵、青年军，国民党員，并有特务嫌疑，解放以来，一贯表现不好，仇恨新社会，抗拒改造。—九五〇年曾因伪造户口被判刑一车，服刑期间越狱逃跑。一九五四年又因盗窃国家物资被判一年六个月徒刑，芦在机电修配社工作期间，有重大盗窃国家、集体资材和投机倒把嫌疑，于九月三日晨畏罪潜逃，下落不明。

6．合肥市医药公司西药批发部主任刘咸仁（男，三十一岁，肥西人，家庭成份富农，本人工人出身，中共医药公司总支宣傅委员、第二支部支部书記），于九月四日晨携带行李等物畏罪潜逃。刘主要犯罪事实有：(1)盗卖葡萄糖五百斤，磺胺嘧啶十一市斤，价值一千四百六十五元八角二分，(2)据不完全统計，六一年下半年至六二年上半年走“后门”供应麻黄素（控制供应药品）十三万四千—白余片，宝塔糖十五万三千七百五十粒。六二年上半年市区凭供应卡每个小孩只供应十粒宝塔糖，但刘于六二年五月十日一次就卖给肥东庙塘大队私人开业医生王保初宝塔糖一百四十瓶（二万一千粒），到自由市煬高价出售，(3)六一年五月至逃跑时，先后和刘尚珍、王俊、刘华芳等三人（均未婚）腐化。在王俊怀孕后，又私自以党支部名义写介绍信，带王到肥东众兴公社医院、肥东县医院、店埠公社医院打胎。

7．合肥市寄售合作商店会计赵维本（男，三十九岁，南京市人，家庭成分城市贫民，学生出身），領导发現其有贪污嫌疑后，决定調动其工作，要其将帐目交清。赵在交帳中，故意拖延，并于九月十三日上午突然要請假去南京看病，当晚要走，九月十三日深夜，赵潜入商店楼上会計室纵火，然后跳窗逃走，企图銷毁帳册单据。幸被及时发現扑灭，但已燒毁部分帳册单据。赵在作案后，逃至南京市浦口鎮相好的女友家里，已被公安部門查捕归案。

从上述事件看来，完全說明“五反”运动这場阶級斗爭是十分尖锐、十分激烈的，一些坚决的敌人，必然要千方百計地进行抵抗破坏和垂死掙扎。对此，我們应該有充分的认识。但是，如果我們有关单位警惕性較高，事先能夠进行一些必要的工作，对可能发生的問题，采取一些預防措施，对有危險的人，进行适当的控制，有些事件是可能防止和避免的。建議各单位对这方面的情况能夠认真进行一次檢查，加强今后工作，防止再次发生类似事件。为此，我們提出以下几点意見：

一、必須坚决按照党的政策办事，反复细致地宣傳解释党的政策，在运动的第二、三阶段，要号召有貪污盗窃、投机倒把行为的人老实地交代自己的問题，告訴他們只有自动坦白交代，好好檢討，彻底退赔，决心洗手不干，表現好的，才能争取宽大处理。

二、加强政治思想教育，紧紧掌握思想动态，进行必要的预防工作。对运动中主动坦白的貪污盗窃、投机倒把分子，不論問题大小，首先应当由領导上向其交代政策，稳定情绪，解除顾虑。对有嫌疑的人，要适当注意其思想动态和活动，采取相应的預防措施。对重大案件和有逃跑、行凶报复和破坏可能的，应加以适当控制。

三、对已发生的事件，要分別情节做出处理。对行凶报复、毁灭証据的，要及时查清事实，按法律手續，严肃处理；对畏罪逃跑的，应組織力量，迅速追回。其中因不了解政策或者問题不是很严重，追回后应向其交代政策，进行教育，安定情緒，待經过核实材料，在运动后期按照政策进行处理。

四、要經常向广大干部和群众进行阶級和阶級斗爭的教育，提高革命警惕性，克服麻痹思想，加强保卫保密工作，严防阶级敌人进行破坏活动，以确保国家和人民的生命财产不受損失和“五反”运动的順利进行。

以上报告如无不妥，請批轉各单位加以注意和掌握。

市委增产节約和“五反”运动办公室

一九六三年九月二十六日

_____________________________________________________________

报：省委。

发：各区委，市委各部委、市委常委，市直各党组（委），各党委、总支、支部。

共印三五〇份

_____________________________________________________________

中共合肥市委办公室   一九六三年九月二十八日印

 ___________________________________________________________

出处：合肥市档案馆001-01-0230-027

1969.9.25港英政府与亲共线人接头

同港英接头的线人（文件中称informant）名叫 K.C. Jay，其全名待查。Jay同中共在香港势力关系密切，比如该档案提到Jay告诉港英最近他被点名要求向周恩来提供对香港局势的分析报告。很可能是港英首先主动接触他以了解共产党情况的，但似乎中共方面也知道Jay在同港英接头，所以我猜测Jay是共产党和港英的中间人。

Jay说在中共九大（1969年4月）时周还被批评拿香港这种小事情来讨论，但现在周却特意询问他对香港局势的看法，Jay认为这显示周恩来的权力比以前更稳固了。Jay还说来自周恩来办公室的消息说周得到了军方的支持，因为林彪对周有好感。毛泽东虽然身体不好，但不至于重病或将死。

Jay密切关注中国大陆现状，他说广西、广东局势都不好，再加上中共完全意识到香港的重要价值。Jay因此认为在港的共产党势力很难挑起事端，并建议港英方面借机采取强硬的对华政策。他说即便香港愿意在某方面对大陆示好，也应建立在总体的强硬基础之上。

～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～

SECRET

Political Adviser

I arranged to see Mr. K. C. Jay at 4.30 p.m. on Thursday, 25th September.

2.  Referring back to a previous discussion when I had mentioned the Universal Federation of Travel Agents' Associations conference, I reiterated the H.K.G's position vis-a-vis this conference: that it had been privately organized and was by no means an official function. I also gave Jay brief detail of the position concerning applications for visas in respect of East Europeans. Jay said that the position was thoroughly understood and that he was quite sure that there would be "no trouble": He had explained the position both to local communists and to Peking some time ago but had received no adverse reaction.

3.   Jay said that after some thought he had dispatched his report to CHOU En-lai some days ago. He had commented at length on the present situation and suggested that it was now time for China to take positive steps to show that her intentions towards Hong Kong were friendly: in particular, Jay had mentioned:-

(a)  the advisability of releasing Anthony Grey before 3rd October when WONG Chak is due for release. It was Jay's advice that such a move would be favorably regarded by the rest of the worlds;

(b)  although there had been some improvement in the tone and content of the local communist press, nevertheless at times the communist newspapers were very critical of the H.K.G and probably libelous: Jay felt that the H.K.G. was particularly sensitive on this score and would only be really convinced that China intended good relations if and when the newspapers behaved themselves properly. (In reporting this, Jay suggested to me that this in many ways was the most difficult recommendation for the Chinese to accept but that he quite genuinely expected to see an improvement over a period of time.);

(c)  the problems and difficulties on the border: Jay had strongly advised that early action should be taken by the military to ensure that there was no violation of British territory and that nuisance activities such as the firing of firework rockets should be stopped.

4.   Throughout the interview Jay was in a very confident mood: this may have been partly due to his obvious pleasure in having been asked to provide a special report on the local situation for Prime Minister CHOU En-lai. Jay read into this request a further indication that CHOU was in the ascendency once again in Peking. At the time of the 9th Party Congress CHOU had been criticized for bothering about such a small matter as Hong Kong: the fact that CHOU was now specifically asking for advice on future policy in Hong Kong indicated to Jay that CHOU felt strong enough to be able to ignore would-be critics in Peking. According to Jay, correspondence from the Prime Minister's office tended to show that CHOU was strongly supported now by the military and that, as reported before, LIN Piao was continuing to curry favour with CHOU. Jay said that, whilst it was true that MAO had been unwell for some time, he did not believe that MAO was dying or even seriously ill.

5.   Jay expressed serious concern at the present situation in China. If the situation in Peking were not quickly resolved he felt that in particular there would be trouble in South China: already report had been received of the serious situation in Kwangsi and there seemed little doubt that the position in Kwang-tung was deteriorating. Jay expressed the hope that the H.K.G was prepared to meet the consequences of the internal strife in Kwangtung and Kwangsi which he felt on present indications to be almost certainly worsening. According to Jay, there were still a large number of Tao Chu supporters in important positions in the region and in communist circles there had been much discussion and speculation that these people were preparing for the overthrow of the present leadership in South China.

6.   AS for Hong Kong, Jay was firmly of the opinion that the H.K.G was in a very strong position - "In your overall policy you can now afford to be quite firm - very firm". With the deterioration in the situation in China and the full appreciation that Hong Kong is considered to be of great value to China, it was Jay's opinion that local Hong Kong communists would be very hesitant before causing trouble. Jay came back to this "quite firm - very firm" theme on several occasions during the discussion: towards the end he did suggest, however, that if possibilities occurred in which the H.K.G could show some friendship or desire to improve relationships, then this might be considered, but only in the context of the overall firm policy. Jay said that he had been very pleased indeed to see the newspaper report in which it was alleged that Mr. Anthony Crosland and others had refused an invitation from the Chinese Charge d'Affaires in London to attend the 1st October celebrations: Jay thought that this refused would have shown the Chinese that the British were not over-anxious to be friendly and would probably encourage the Chinese to believe that something more positive had to be done before Britain would publicly accept the hand of friendship.

7.    Other matters discussed were:-

(1) South China Iron Works: Jay said that he expected a reply from Peking in the near future. Meantime, LI Cho-chih had again complained about the low offer made by the H.K.G. but Jay allegedly had told LI that the H.K.G. was obviously doing China a favour and that if LI and others did not recognise this, the simple answer was to reject the offer and attempt to se11 the land themselves.

(2) Sand: Jay said that he had not yet had the opportunity of discussing this matter with China Resources but he had discussed it at length with Li Cho-chin. Apparently LI had indicated that he was aware that there had been a proposal for an increase in the cost of "compensation", but he was quite sure that the proposal had come from Henry FOK himself. Indeed, on hearing the proposal, LI had not bothered to find out from whom the increased cost would be obtained - he had assumed that in view of the very substantial profits made by FOK, the increased "compensation" would come from him. On reflection, LI had become quite concerned about the proposal and suggested that it was not in keeping with previous policy; he gave as example the proposal that there should be an increase in the price of water to the H.K.G. (please see my last report). According to Jay, LI had then commented that it seemed a pity that the H.K.G had originally insisted on using Henry FOK's services. Jay enquired whether there would be any objection in the future if others were asked to tender in addition to FOK: LI said that there was certainly no objection to this but when Jay suggested that he would pass this advice on to me, LI allegedly said that this might not be advisable; that it might even be a "threat" to my future career as "clearly those in authority wanted FOK to continue as the sand contractor". I informed Jay that this was utter nonsense: that I had been asked to make enquiries about the proposed increase in the cost of sand and that in any event the consideration and award of tenders such as this was done on a completely impartial and honest basis.

(J. Cater)

26^th September, 1969.

c.c. J. Murray, Esq. ( F.C.O )

   J. B. Denson, Esq. ( PEKING)

   D.S.B.

   H.S.G

   E.S.S

出处：英国外交部档案FCO_21_541

1977.9.10国家计委提出增加市场供应、减少购买力的措施

为了实现中共领导华国锋和李先念关于回笼货币、增加供应的指示，国家计委约集轻工、农林、物资、商业、外贸、供销、财政等部开会，商定了一些措施。其中关于增加生产轻工业产品的主要办法是使用外汇购买一些原材料，略微加工后即可提高质量变成高级商品，投放到市场高价出售以回笼货币，比如：

在利用超产的烟叶六十万担，增加生产卷烟五十万箱时，要进口盘纸、锡纸、过滤嘴，多生产一些（带过滤嘴的）高级烟。

利用进口的粮食，把国内一部分仓底粮、下脚粮、高粱和白薯干等替换下来，增产白酒十万吨，并尽可能多搞高级酒。

利用进口的原糖，拿出粮食做饴糖、淀粉等填充料，并由各地挤出少量花生、芝麻、核桃、松子、果脯、板栗、榛子、瓜子等辅料，再进口—部分奶油、玻璃纸、锡纸，制成高级糖果。

利用已经进口的涤纶棉，计划外增产的确良一亿米。

趁国外电视显象管很便宜，十二吋黑白管子每个只要十美元，买回来在国内装成整机，高价出售。

还打算进口少量原材料，增产一部分布鞋、皮鞋、人造革包、折叠钢丝床、钢椅、灯泡、电池、电表、闹钟、玩具、奶粉等商品。

    ～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～

关于进—步安排市场供应几项措施的报告

国务院：

上个月，先念同志在商业部、财政部关于市场供应和货币情况的两个报告上，作了“再加—把劲，把轻工市场搞得更好”，“再提出有力措施”的批示，我们立即约请轻工、农林、物资、商业、外贸、供销、财政等部门的同志，就增加市场商品供应，控制货币投放问题，先后议了多次，提出几项措施。现报告如下：

遵照华主席关于“安排好市场，安排好人民生活”和“不仅不增发票子，还要想办法回笼一些票子”的指示，今年年初计划会议时，我们对市场供应问题，注意作了研究。为了保证全年市场供需平衡，采取了增加轻工业品生产、增加农副产品收购、压缩社会集团购买力、清理商业外贸库存和增加部分商品进口等措施。安排结果，全年社会商品可供量达到XX元。当时考虑到，商品库存需要补充，生产和收购计划有的可能落空等因素，当年社会商品零售额拟定为XX元，略大于社会购买力XX元的匡算数字。这样计算，商品供应和社会购买力是平衡的。估计抓得好，有可能做到年终不发票子，并略有回笼。这些，都已分别列入了年度计划。

今年以来，市场情况总的说是好的，特别是进入四月以后，轻工业生产逐月上升，农产品收购也有好转。但是，由于“四人帮”干扰破坏的影响，由于煤、电和某些原材料供应不足，今年一季度轻工生产欠产不少，一到七月有若干轻工产品没有达到计划进度。今年春夏，不少地方农业遭受自然灾害，夏粮减产，粮、油、猪、蛋、鱼等农副产品收购计划完成得不够好。年初拟定的增产增购措施，有—部分没有实现。另—方面，现在看来，我们原计算的社会购买力，可能算小了。我们只算了当年形成的购买力，对人们手中原来持有的货币考虑不够。当前市场上的实际情况是：商品少了，票子多了，供求关系仍然偏紧。今年—至七月，国家商品收购和商品销售，和去年同期比较，多数是增加的，但副食品供应不足，若干主要轻工业品，如肥皂、洗衣粉、火柴、煤油、电池、纸张、自行车、缝纫机等供不应求；国家商品库存总值是增加的，但主要商品库存继续下降，除了上列品种以外，粮、油、布、酒等下降幅度也很大。商业部估算，从目前情况看，全年商品供应和购买力之间，大体还有××元的差额。银行估算，今年后几个月进入农副产品收购旺季，加上调整工资等因素，还需继续投放，年终有可能要增发—部份货币。

搞好市场供需平衡，做到不发票子，并有回笼，这对稳定市场，稳定物价，稳定货币，促进生产，安定和改善人民生活，有重大意义。现在，各行各业嘟在大干快上，干部和群众的干劲很大，只要紧紧抓住深入揭批“四人帮”这个纲，进一步肃清他们的流毒和影响，领导重视，措施有力，认真去抓，做到市场平衡是完全可能的。群众干劲越大，越应当关心群众生活，把市场供应安排好。

平衡市场供需，无非是两个方面：一是千方百计地增加商品货源；二是尽可能压缩货币投放和社会购买力。大家初步研究，建议采取以下几项措施：

一、尽快把轻工业生产抓上去。现在到年底还有三、四个月，请各地切实加强对轻工业生产的领导，搞好企业整顿，开展增产节约，力争全面完成和超额完成今年的生产计划。欠产的要千方百计补上；完成计划进度的要争取多超。轻工业需要的煤、电和原材料，要切实保证，不要再挤了。要求各省、市、自治区认真检查—下本地区轻工业生产和市场供应的情况，全面地作一次补充安排；利用当地条件，积极发展各种地方产品和小产品，在保证完成上调任务的前提下，就地取材，就地生产，就地供应，提高自给水平。通过这些办法，争取今年年内各增产商品五千万至一亿元，投入市场。京、津、沪、江苏、辽宁、山东等省市，条件较好，要努力多搞。所有轻工业企业，都要充分发动群众，提高产品质量，降低燃料、动力和原材料的消耗，并订出具体指标，采取有力措施，保证实现。

二、积极组织农副产品收购。现在农副产品收购旺季已经到来，要求各地加强这—工作的领导，深入发动群众，贯彻党的经济政策，反对资本主义颁向，合理安排人力，安排收购网点，把应该收和可能受的农副产品都收购上来。猪、牛、羊、禽、蛋、鱼等副食品，要抓紧收购保证完成国家收购计划和调拨计划，及时供应城市。棉、油、糖、麻、烟、茶、羊毛等也要尽可能多收购。要抓好小秋收，动员各方面的力量，掀起—个小秋收热潮，及时组织采集，及时收购和调运。一些传统的野生资源，凡是没有达到历史上收购较好水平的，要力争达到；已经达到的，要努力超过。

三、再安排一批轻工市场物资的增产。利用国内超产的烟叶六十万担，计划外地产卷烟五十万箱，同时努力提高质量，进口—部分盘纸、锡纸、过滤嘴，多生产一些高级烟。利用已经进口到货的粮食××吨，把国内一部分仓底粮、下脚粮、高粱和白薯干等替换下来，增产白酒十万吨，并尽可能多搞高级酒。利用已经进口的原糖×吨，拿出×吨粮食做饴糖、淀粉等填充料，由各地挤出少量花生、芝麻、核桃、松子、果脯、板栗、榛子、瓜子等辅料，再进口—部分奶油、玻璃纸、锡纸，制成高级糖果。利用已经进口的涤纶棉×吨，计划外增产的确良一亿米。这四种商品，原料基本上有了，只是增加一些辅料和包装物料，把质量提高一下，就可多回笼××元。大家还打算使用国内原料，进口少量原材料，增产一部分布鞋、皮鞋、人造革包、折叠钢丝床、钢椅、灯泡、电池、电表、闹钟、玩具、奶粉等商品。现在国外电视显象管很便宜，十二吋黑白管子每个只要十美元。建议再买××只回来，在国内装成整机，使用外汇××美元，可以回笼××元。以上各项总共可以回笼货币××元。进口部分原材料、辅料和半成品，共需外汇××美元。

这项措施，对改善今年国庆节到明年元旦、春节的市场供应，是有好处的。如可行，拟请轻工、商业部门尽快组织落实，必要时开个紧急小会。轻外贸部抓紧组织进口。有些进口物资，—时进不来，可以先从现有库存中调剂解决。

四、加强社会主义市场的统一管理。要重申，所有机关、团体、部队、企业、事业单位，—律不许到农村自行采购农副产品。所有工业企业生产的各种产品，除有规定以外，要—律交给商业部门，统一收购，统一销售。生产企业不许抵价自销，更不许削价私分。今后，削价私分的要照价补赔；主持削价私分的负责人要从严论处。要加强农村集市的管理，向城乡资本主义发动进攻。坚决打击贪污盗窃、投机倒把，反对商品“走后门”。

五、进一步压缩社会集团购买力，积极组织非商品性货币回笼。国务院关于压缩集团购买力的文件下达后，各地贯彻情况不平衡。有的比较重视，效果显著；有的行动不快，贯彻不力。国务院已经批准召开—次压缩集团购买力的座谈会，检查执行情况，交流和推广经验。各地区要及早采取有力措施，把能够压的尽量压下来，力争做到在原来计划的基础上，多压缩两亿元。

非商品性货币回笼潜力很大。一九七一、一九七二年非商品性收入每年增加近十亿元，这几年一般仅增加两、三亿元。国务院关于加强电影、戏剧管理的通知下达以后，有些地方和单位注意了，但不花钱，白看戏，白看电影的现象还不少。其他服务行业，有的还未充分发挥作用，不但钱收不上来，而且群众不方便，反映很大。建议有关部门和各地区再抓一下，争取今年文化服务收入多增加一、二亿元。

六、动员干部职工归还借支款。近几年，在“四人帮”煽起经济主义妖风的影响下，不少单位的干部职工随意借支公款的现象相当严重。银行估计，全国这种借支款大约在三十亿元以上。建议在做好政治思想工作的基础上，动员干部带头，归还借款。要求今年内能够收回欠款五亿元。农村干部、社员个人向生产队借支也很多，加上社员个人向信用社借款，估计有七十亿元。年终分配时，也应当在不影响正常生活的情况下，动员他们归还一部分。

七、确保财政收支平衡，并有结余。财政平衡是保证信贷平衡、控制货币发行，保证商品平衡、市场稳定的重要条件。要继续抓紧增收节支，加强财政管理，严肃财经纪律，坚决制止“挤、摊、占”，坚决打击贪污盗窃，坚决制止铺张浪费等不正之风。要努力降低企业成本费用，扭转企业亏损。对财政支出，要抓得紧紧的，不经批准，不得随意上基建项目，不得随意花钱。去年十月国家采取了冻结存款的办法，收到了效果，也得到各方面的拥护。检验这笔钱转作企业流动资金，不再解冻使用。要严禁年终突击花钱，堵塞漏洞。

八、严格控制货币投放。银行是国家信贷中心、结算中心、现金中心，所以单位的经济活动和货币收支，都要通过银行来进行。一定要加强银行的信贷管理，发挥银行的监督作用。不准用银行贷款和企业流动资金搞基本建设和其他开支，不准随意动用农村信用社存款。要重申，贷款必须有计划、有物资保证，并按时归还，超计划贷款必须经领导机关批准。现在大量使用的“实物收据”的办法，流弊太大，助长采购人员满天飞，助长到处抢购物资，随意花钱，甚至贪污浪费，必须坚决取消。一定要加强现金管理。据估计，现在各单位库存现金比一九六四年增加了两倍。要求今年银行对库存现金限额普遍重新核定—次，把多余的不必要的库存现金收上来。今年年内收回三、四亿元。对农村集体经济也要考虑逐步实行现金管理，大宗收支通过转账结算。

银行还要做好城镇储蓄工作。今年调整工资以后，吸收储蓄存款的工作要跟上，力争第四季度城镇储蓄存款比去年同期增加两亿元。

采取以上措施，大约可以增加商品货源××元，可以减少社会购买力××元。这些措施实现了，就可以大体做到市场供需基本平衡，做到基本上不发票子或者略有回笼。当然，有些商品特别是副食品，短期内供应紧张的情况，还不可能有明显改变。同时，上面这些措施在执行当中，有的可能要拖到明年才能见效，有的也可能要打折扣。但是，只要各有关部门、各地区，大家认识一致，协同动作，及早动手，及时安排，并且狠抓落实，狠抓督促检查，这些措施绝大部分是可以实现的，把今年市场搞得更好一些，并为明年市场供应打下有利基础也是可能的。市场搞好了，人民高兴，对调动各方面的积极性，大干社会主义，促进国民经济的新跃进是有利的。

以上报告，妥否，请批示。

国家计划委员会

一九七七年九月十日

出处：张家口市档案馆

1984.9.6美国获悉胡耀邦昨日会见日本读卖新闻社长情况

1984年9月6日美国国务院经由两条渠道获悉昨天中共中央总书记胡耀邦与日本《读卖新闻》社社长小林与三次会谈时的内容，一方面日本驻北京大使馆向美国驻北京大使馆提供了会谈详细记录，另一方面美国驻东京大使馆将日本报纸的报道摘抄下来。

胡耀邦说，朝鲜半岛局势虽有缓解，但没有取得大的进展。中共国外交部私下对日本人说很怀疑朝鲜会不会接受韩国的体育对话提议。在纽约即将召开的联合国大会期间，中共国外长吴学谦将同苏联外长葛罗米柯进行会晤，虽然会谈不会有重大结果，但预期中苏1985年贸易额会达到40到50亿瑞士法郎。

关于内政问题，胡耀邦说中共中央全会将于十月份举行，议题主要是经济改革而非人事变动，不过秋季时随着干部年轻化政策的推进会有一些部委和省份的官员会挪位。十月的中共中央全会上将决定何时举办“全国大会”。美国驻华使馆评价到：日本人并不确定如何理解这个词，猜测可能是指一次特别党代会，因为现在还没有到召开下一次例行全国代表大会的时候。（按：1984年10月20日，中共十二届三中全会通过《关于召开党的全国代表会议的决定》，决定于次年9月份召开全国代表会议）

如果达赖喇嘛想回到中国那欢迎，如果不想回来也可以，总之不着急。胡耀邦说已经见过达赖喇嘛的代表，并对代表说如果达赖喇嘛回来只能住在北京而非西藏。达赖喇嘛回来后只能获得相应的宗教地位，而不能维持原有的统治方式，但他会被西藏历史记住。虽然原本达赖喇嘛的地位比班禅喇嘛高些，但既然他1959年后离开中国就不那么熟悉情况了，而且在第三国又做过很多不适当的事情，那么他回来后的政治地位就不会高过班禅喇嘛。

 ～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～

O 061013Z SEP 84

FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6961

SUBJECT:    HU YAOBANG'S MEETING WITH JAPANESE

1. (c) - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE JAPANESE EMBASSY HAS GIVEN US A READOUT OF GENERAL SECRETARY HU YAOBANGS MEETING WITH JAPANESE JOURNALISTS. ACCORDING TO THE JAPANESE, HU NOTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME EASING OF THE KOREAN SITUATION, BUT NO MAJOR IMPROVEMENT, AND THE JAPANESE HAVE BEEN TOLD PRIVATELY BY THE MFA THAT CHINA DOUBTS WHETHER THE NORTH WILL ACCEPT THE SOUTH'S  LATEST SPORTS TALK PROPOSAL. HU EXPECTS NO RESULTS FROM THE WU-GROMYKO MEETING IN NEW YORK, BUT SINO-SOVIET TRADE IN 1985 MAY REACH 4 TO 5 BILLION SWISS FRANCS. THERE IS GOOD REASON TO HOPE THAT AN AGREEMENT ON HONG KONG WILL BE INITIALED IN SEPTEMBER.THIS WILL NOT HARM THE INTERESTS OF THIRD COUNTRIES. HU DECLINED TO COMMENT ON THE POSTPONEMENT OF THE HONECKER VISIT. PARTICIPATION IN THE 1988 SEOUL OLYMPICS IS NOT BEING EXAMINED RIGHT NOW. ON INTERNAL MATTERS, THE PARTY PLENUM WILL BE HELD IN OCTOBER, AND THE MAIN THEME WILL BE ECONOMIC REFORMS. HU REPORTEDLY SAID THAT THE PLENUM WOULD NOT MAKE PERSONNEL CHANGES. BUT LATER IN THE FALL SOME CENTRAL AND PROVINCIAL CHANGES WILL TAKE PLACE, AS PART OF THE "YOUTHIFICATION" POLICY. ON TIBET, CHINA WOULD WELCOME THE DALAI LAMA BACK, BUT HE WOULD HAVE TO LIVE AND REMAIN IN BEIJING; HIS STATUS WOULD BE NO HIGHER THAN THAT OF THE PANCHEN LAMA. END SUMMARY.

3. JAPANESE EMBOFF HAS GIVEN US A READOUT OF HU YAOBANG'S SEPTEMBER 3 MEETING WITH YOMIURI PRESIDENT KOBAYASHI, ADDING SOME DETAILS NOT COVERED IN THE XINHUA REPORT. THE SUBSTANCE OF HU'S COMMENTS WERE AS FOLLOWS:

4. KOREA:  THE MAIN ISSUE IS HOW TO BRING ABOUT LONG-TERM STABILITY.   THE INTERESTS OF MANY COUNTRIES ARE INVOLVED, MAKING THE SITUATION COMPLICATED, SO IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO ANSWER THE QUESTION OF HOW TO BRING ABOUT LONG-TERM STABILITY.  SINCE THE BEGINNING OF 1984, "THROUGH EACH SIDE'S EFFORTS" (JINGGUO GEFANGDE NULI) THERE HAS BEEN SOME EASING OF THE SITUATION, BUT IT IS REGRETTABLE THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO MAJOR IMPROVEMENT.  CHINA CONTINUES TO SUPPORT KIM IL-SUNG'S PROPOSAL FOR TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATIONS AND PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION. "IF CHINA, JAPAN, AND THE UNITED STATES MAKE EFFORTS TOGETHER TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA FROM THE SIDELINES, IT WILL SURELY BE IN THE INTERESTS OF WORLD PEACE." (COMMENT: JAPANESE EMBOFF SAID THEY FOUND THIS A RATHER VAGUE FORMULATION. AS AN ASIDE, HE SAID THAT THE JAPANESE DCM HAD ON SEPTEMBER 5 MET WITH ASSISTANT MINISTER LIU SHUQING, TO INFORM THE CHINESE THAT THE ROK WOULD BE SENDING A LETTER TO THE NORTH PROPOSING RESUMPTION OF SPORTS TALKS. LIU HAD REPLIED THAT CONTACTS BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES WOULD BE A "GOOD THING." NEVERTHELESS, LIU SAID, CHINA HAS SOME DOUBTS WHETHER THE NORTH WILL ACCEPT THIS SPORTS PROPOSAL, AND FEELS THAT FOR THE TIME BEING THERE WILL BE NO GREAT PROGRESS. THE JAPANESE WERE STRUCK BY LIU'S PESSIMISTIC TONE, BUT NOTED THAT HU'S COMMENTS ABOUT THE EFFORTS OF BOTH SIDES WAS A SMALL PAT ON THE BACK FOR PRESIDENT CHUN. END COMMENT.)

6. SINO-SOVIET TRADE: CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION RECENTLY EXCHANGED LISTS OF PRODUCTS THAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO SELL EACH OTHER IN 1985.  THE AMOUNT WHICH CHINA PROPOSED TO SELL WAS GREATER THAN THE AMOUNT THAT THE SOVIETS PROPOSED.  IF THE LIST IS COMPLETED BY BOTH SIDES, SINO-SOVIET TRADE IN 1985 WILL REACH FOUR TO FIVE BILLION SWISS FRANCS.

7. HONG KONG:  HOWE DID A "GOOD JOB" WHEN HE VISITED IN JULY. HIS VISIT SOLVED THE DIFFICULT ISSUES WHICH FACED BOTH SIDES AT THE TIME. AFTER HOWE'S VISIT, THE TEMPO OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ACCELERATED. UNLESS SOME "OTHER FACTOR APPEARS" WE HAVE GOOD REASON TO HOPE THAT BOTH SIDES WILL INITIAL AN AGREEMENT ON HONG KONG DURING SEPTEMBER. AS FOR THIRD-COUNTRY INVESTMENTS IN HONG KONG, "WE DECLARED MANY TIMES THAT RESTORATION OF CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY OVER HONG KONG WOULD NOT HARM THE INTERESTS OF ANY OTHER COUNTRIES. SO YOU CAN BE REASSURED (#) (NIMEN YAO FANG XIN)." THE SUCCESS OF THE HONG KONG NEGOTIATIONS COULD SERVE AS AN EXAMPLE FOR SOLVING OTHER PROBLEMS BETWEEN COUNTRIES, AND THAT MAKES IT A "GRATIFYING MATTER" (KEXI DE SHIQING) .

8. HONECKER VISIT: THIS HAS NOT BEEN CANCELLED, IT HAS BEEN POSTPONED. I DON'T KNOW THE REASONS, AND FROM A DIPLOMATIC POINT OF VIEW IT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE FOR ME TO COMMENT. BOTH SIDES FACE GREAT DIFFICULTIES, BUT I DON'T KNOW WHERE THEY COME FROM. I HOPE THEY WILL FIND A WAY TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM.

9. SEOUL OLYMPICS:  "THIS WILL TAKE PLACE FOUR YEARS FROM NOW, SO WE ARE NOT EXAMINING THIS ISSUE YET."

10. PARTY PLENUM: THE PLENUM WILL TAKE PLACE IN OCTOBER. THE MAIN THEME WILL BE ECONOMIC REFORMS. "WE WILL NOT TOUCH ON PERSONNEL MATTERS." THEREFORE FOREIGN MINISTER WU WILL CONTINUE AS FOREIGN MINISTER FOR THE TIME BEING. (COMMENT: WU HAS TOLD THE JAPANESE HE WILL ACCOMPANY PRESIDENT LI XIANNIAN TO SPAIN, PORTUGAL, AND MALTA IN NOVEMBER. END COMMENT.) HU ALSO SAID THAT DURING THIS OCTOBER PLENUM "WE WILL DECIDE TO HOLD THE NEXT NATIONAL PARTY CONGRESS' (QUAN GUO DA HUI) . (COMMENT: THE JAPANESE ARE NOT EXACTLY SURE HOW TO INTERPRET THIS RATHER CRYPTIC STATEMENT. THEY WONDER WHETHER IT MAY BE A REFERENCE TO THE POSSIBLE CONVENING OF AN EXTRAORDINARY PARTY CONGRESS, AS IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO PLAN FOR THE NEXT REGULAR PARTY CONGRESS. END COMMENT) .

11.  TIBET:   IF THE DALAI LAMA WANTS TO COME BACK TO CHINA, CHINA WILL WELCOME HIM.  IF HE DOESN'T WANT TO COME BACK, THAT'S FINE ALSO. "THERE'S NO HURRY." WE HAVE GIVEN TIBET AUTONOMY, BUT DURING THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION SOME COMRADES HAMPERED THE AUTONOMY OF TIBET BY FOLLOWING A LEFTIST COURSE. BUT NOW WE HAVE CORRECTED THE WRONG POLICY AND WE SHOULD NOT REPEAT THE SAME MISTAKES. I MET ONCE WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DALAI LAMA. I TOLD THEM THAT THE DALAI LAMA WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO GO BACK TO TIBET IF HE RETURNED TO CHINA. IF HE WANTS TO COME TO CHINA, HE SHOULD STAY IN BEIJING. HIS WAY OF GOVERNING TIBET IS NOT APPROPRIATE TO THE PRESENT CHINESE SITUATION, OR TO THE PRESENT SITUATION IN TIBET. IF HE RETURNS, HE CAN ONLY HAVE THE STATUS OF A RELIGIOUS PERSON, BUT HE "WILL REMAIN IN THE HISTORY OF TIBET." HIS STATUS WILL BE THE SAME AS THAT OF THE PANCHEN LAMA. ORIGINALLY THE DALAI LAMA'S STATUS WAS HIGHER THAN THE PANCHEN LAMA'S, BUT SINCE THE DALAI LAMA LEFT CHINA IN 1959, HE IS NO LONGER FAMILIAR WITH THE SITUATION HERE. MOREOVER, HE HAS SAID MANY INAPPROPRIATE THINGS IN THIRD COUNTRIES, AND WE HAVE TO TAKE THIS INTO CONSIDERATION AS WELL. HU NOTED FOR HIS GUESTS THAT IN SEPTEMBER 1985, CHINA WOULD CELEBRATE THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TIBET AUTONOMOUS REGION. MANY IMPORTANT PERSONAGES FROM THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WILL PARTICIPATE IN THIS CELEBRATION.

12. PERSONNEL CHANGES:  IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION WITH EMBASSY INTERNALISTS, ANOTHER JAPANESE EMBOFF GAVE A MORE DETAILED PRESENTATION ON PERSONNEL CHANGES. HE SAID THAT HU TOLD THE JAPANESE OURNALIST THAT CHINA HAS A POLICY OF PROMOTING YOUNGER PEOPLE IN GOVERNMENT. DURING THE AUTUMN, THERE WILL BE CHANGES IN CENTRAL ORGANIZATIONS AND AMONG THE LEADERSHIP IN THE PROVINCES. THE FACT THAT PEOPLE LEAVE THEIR JOBS DOES NOT MEAN THEY HAVE POLITICAL TROUBLES, BUT THAT THEY ARE TOO OLD. HU WENT ON TO SAY THAT THERE WILL BE CHANGES AMONG THE VICE-MINITERS IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY: THREE VICE- MINISTERS WOULD BE CHANGED -- HAN XU, GONG DAFEI, AND WEN YEZHAN. THEY WOULD BE REPLACED BY THREE ASSISTANT MINISTERS -- LIU SHUQING WOULD TAKE GONG DAFEI'S POSITION, ZHOU NAN WOULD TAKE AN UNSPECIFIED SLOT (WE ASSUME IT WOULD BE WEN'S), AND ZHU QIZHEN WOULD TAKE HAN XU'S POISTION AS THE SENIOR PERSON HANDLING NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS. GONG DAFEI WILL RETIRE, HAN XU WILL BECOME AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES, AND WEN YEZHAN'S FUTURE WAS NOT SPECIFIED.  (COMMENT: AFTER THE MEETING, THE JAPANESE SOUGHT MFA CONFIRMATION, AND WERE TOLD THAT HU'S STATEMENTS "WERE NOT CORRECT", BUT THEY DID CONFIRM THAT GONG DAFEI WOULD BE RETIRING. EMBASSY ASSUMES THAT MFA HAS BEEN DISINGENUOUS - BUT TECHNICALLY CORRECT - ON GROUNDS THAT THESE DECISIONS HAVE NOT YET BEEN OFFICIALLY PROMULGATED.

THE JAPANESE DCM WAS TOLD BY LIU DURING HIS MEETING THAT HE WOULD "NOT BE GOING ANYWHERE," A REFERENCE TO THE RUMORS ABOUT POSSIBLE ASSIGNMENT TO MOSCOW. END COMMENT.)

 HUMMEL

出处：U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2010-04412 Doc No. C17629203， 解密日期 08/20/2012

_______________

___________________________________________

O 060904Z SEP 84

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1331

SUBJECT:  HU BAO YANG INTERVIEW WITH JAPANESE NEWSPAPER OWNER

1.  PRC PARTY GENERAL SECRETARY HU BAO YANG GAVE AN EXCLUSIVE NINETY-MINUTE INTERVIEW TO THE PRESIDENT OF ONE OF JAPAN'S LARGEST NEWSPAPERS ON SEPT. 5.  FULL TEXT OF THE INTERVIEW WILL BE POUCHED TO ADDRESSEE POSTS. COMMENTS THAT MAY BE OF PARTICULAR INTEREST INCLUDE THOSE ON THE UPCOMING CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING, THE PRC-UK HONG KONG NEGOTIATIONS, TENSIONS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND GENERAL COMMENTS ON PRC-USSR AND PRC-JAPAN RELATIONS. THE INTERVIEW WITH YOMIURI SHIMBUN PRESIDENT KOBAYASHI APPEARED IN THE SEPT. 6 PRESS HERE.

2 . FUTURE CHINESE PARTY CONFERENCES.   PERSONNEL MATTERS WOULD NOT BE ON THE AGENDA OF THE THIRD PLENARY SESSION OF THE CCP CENTRAL COMMITTEE, INSTEAD AGENDA ITEMS WOULD BE ECONOMIC REFORM AND WHETHER OR NOT TO HOLD THE PARTY'S 13TH NATIONAL CONGRESS NEXT YEAR. THE PLENARY SESSION MEETING WOULD BE HELD THIS OCTOBER, HU SAID. ON POSSIBLE PERSONNEL RESHUFFLES IN THE STATE COUNCIL, HU STATED FOREIGN MINISTER WU WOULD STAY ON THE JOB AS WOULD VICE MINISTERS YAO GUANG AND QIAN QISHEN. ZHOU NAN, LIU SHUQING AND ZHU QICHEN HAD RECENTLY BEEN APPOINTED VICE MINISTERS.

3. HONG KONG.  TWENTY-TWO ROUNDS OF NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN HELD SO FAR, AND FOREIGN SECRETARY HOWE DID GOOD WORK DURING HIS VISIT IN JULY. HE SETTLED A "CERTAIN PROBLEM" WHICH HAD BEEN VIEWED AS DIFFICULT AT THE TIME, AND SINCE THEN THE TEMPO OF THE TALKS HAD STEPPED UP.  PRESUMING NOTHING UNEXPECTED OCCURS, PROSPECTS FOR INITIALLING AN AGREEMENT BY THE END OF SEPTEMBER WERE GOOD. "SOME SAY THE SINO-BRITISH NEGOTIATIONS

ARE PROVIDING A MODEL FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES BETWEEN NATIONS. "

4. SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS.  ASKED ABOUT THE REPORTED MEETING OF CHINESE AND SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTERS AT THE UNGA AND THE POSTPONED VISIT OF SOVIET FIRST DEPUTY PREMIER ARKHIPOV, HU REPLIED THAT THE TWO FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD MEET AND THAT CHINA WISHED TO HOLD TALKS WITH THE USSR AT THE UNGA.  HE DID NOT EXPECT MANY RESULTS, HOWEVER, NOR DID HE KNOW WHAT WOULD HAPPEN WITH REGARD TO ARKIPOV'S VISIT.

5. KOREA. FROM CHINA'S POINT OF VIEW THERE HAD BEEN SOME EASING OF TENSION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR "THROUGH THE EFFORTS OF VARIOUS CIRCLES," BUT REGRETTABLY NO BIG PROGRESS. CHINA COMPLETELY SUPPORTED THE TRIPARTITE TALKS (NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA AND THE US) PROPOSED BY KIM IL SUNG AND A PEACEFUL AND AUTONOMOUS UNIFICATION OF KOREA. HU THEN ADDED THAT CHINESE, US AND JAPANESE EFFORTS TO PROMOTE PEACE IN KOREA WOULD BE HELPFUL.

6.  PRC-JAPAN TIES.  HU WAS CONVINCED THAT CHINA-JAPAN RELATIONS WOULD CONTINUE TO IMPROVE BUT NOTED THAT NOT EVERYBODY SHARED HIS CONVICTION.

7.  ON OTHER ISSUES HU SAID THE DALAI LAMA WOULD BE WELCOMED BACK TO TIBET AS LONG AS HE ACCEPTED A SIMILAR STATUS TO THAT OF THE PANCHEN LAMA. HE DECLINED TO COMMENT ON THE HONECKER VISIT TO THE FRG, BUT SURMISED IT RAN INTO "SOME DIFFICULTY" AND HOPED THAT THAT WOULD EVENTUALLY BE SETTLED.

MANSFIELD

出处：U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2010-04412 Doc No. C17629183 解密日期08/20/2012