同港英接头的线人（文件中称informant）名叫 K.C. Jay，其全名待查。Jay同中共在香港势力关系密切，比如该档案提到Jay告诉港英最近他被点名要求向周恩来提供对香港局势的分析报告。很可能是港英首先主动接触他以了解共产党情况的，但似乎中共方面也知道Jay在同港英接头，所以我猜测Jay是共产党和港英的中间人。
I arranged to see Mr. K. C. Jay at 4.30 p.m. on Thursday, 25th September.
2. Referring back to a previous discussion when I had mentioned the Universal Federation of Travel Agents' Associations conference, I reiterated the H.K.G's position vis-a-vis this conference: that it had been privately organized and was by no means an official function. I also gave Jay brief detail of the position concerning applications for visas in respect of East Europeans. Jay said that the position was thoroughly understood and that he was quite sure that there would be "no trouble": He had explained the position both to local communists and to Peking some time ago but had received no adverse reaction.
3. Jay said that after some thought he had dispatched his report to CHOU En-lai some days ago. He had commented at length on the present situation and suggested that it was now time for China to take positive steps to show that her intentions towards Hong Kong were friendly: in particular, Jay had mentioned:-
(a) the advisability of releasing Anthony Grey before 3rd October when WONG Chak is due for release. It was Jay's advice that such a move would be favorably regarded by the rest of the worlds;
(b) although there had been some improvement in the tone and content of the local communist press, nevertheless at times the communist newspapers were very critical of the H.K.G and probably libelous: Jay felt that the H.K.G. was particularly sensitive on this score and would only be really convinced that China intended good relations if and when the newspapers behaved themselves properly. (In reporting this, Jay suggested to me that this in many ways was the most difficult recommendation for the Chinese to accept but that he quite genuinely expected to see an improvement over a period of time.);
(c) the problems and difficulties on the border: Jay had strongly advised that early action should be taken by the military to ensure that there was no violation of British territory and that nuisance activities such as the firing of firework rockets should be stopped.
4. Throughout the interview Jay was in a very confident mood: this may have been partly due to his obvious pleasure in having been asked to provide a special report on the local situation for Prime Minister CHOU En-lai. Jay read into this request a further indication that CHOU was in the ascendency once again in Peking. At the time of the 9th Party Congress CHOU had been criticized for bothering about such a small matter as Hong Kong: the fact that CHOU was now specifically asking for advice on future policy in Hong Kong indicated to Jay that CHOU felt strong enough to be able to ignore would-be critics in Peking. According to Jay, correspondence from the Prime Minister's office tended to show that CHOU was strongly supported now by the military and that, as reported before, LIN Piao was continuing to curry favour with CHOU. Jay said that, whilst it was true that MAO had been unwell for some time, he did not believe that MAO was dying or even seriously ill.
5. Jay expressed serious concern at the present situation in China. If the situation in Peking were not quickly resolved he felt that in particular there would be trouble in South China: already report had been received of the serious situation in Kwangsi and there seemed little doubt that the position in Kwang-tung was deteriorating. Jay expressed the hope that the H.K.G was prepared to meet the consequences of the internal strife in Kwangtung and Kwangsi which he felt on present indications to be almost certainly worsening. According to Jay, there were still a large number of Tao Chu supporters in important positions in the region and in communist circles there had been much discussion and speculation that these people were preparing for the overthrow of the present leadership in South China.
6. AS for Hong Kong, Jay was firmly of the opinion that the H.K.G was in a very strong position - "In your overall policy you can now afford to be quite firm - very firm". With the deterioration in the situation in China and the full appreciation that Hong Kong is considered to be of great value to China, it was Jay's opinion that local Hong Kong communists would be very hesitant before causing trouble. Jay came back to this "quite firm - very firm" theme on several occasions during the discussion: towards the end he did suggest, however, that if possibilities occurred in which the H.K.G could show some friendship or desire to improve relationships, then this might be considered, but only in the context of the overall firm policy. Jay said that he had been very pleased indeed to see the newspaper report in which it was alleged that Mr. Anthony Crosland and others had refused an invitation from the Chinese Charge d'Affaires in London to attend the 1st October celebrations: Jay thought that this refused would have shown the Chinese that the British were not over-anxious to be friendly and would probably encourage the Chinese to believe that something more positive had to be done before Britain would publicly accept the hand of friendship.
7. Other matters discussed were:-
(1) South China Iron Works: Jay said that he expected a reply from Peking in the near future. Meantime, LI Cho-chih had again complained about the low offer made by the H.K.G. but Jay allegedly had told LI that the H.K.G. was obviously doing China a favour and that if LI and others did not recognise this, the simple answer was to reject the offer and attempt to se11 the land themselves.
(2) Sand: Jay said that he had not yet had the opportunity of discussing this matter with China Resources but he had discussed it at length with Li Cho-chin. Apparently LI had indicated that he was aware that there had been a proposal for an increase in the cost of "compensation", but he was quite sure that the proposal had come from Henry FOK himself. Indeed, on hearing the proposal, LI had not bothered to find out from whom the increased cost would be obtained - he had assumed that in view of the very substantial profits made by FOK, the increased "compensation" would come from him. On reflection, LI had become quite concerned about the proposal and suggested that it was not in keeping with previous policy; he gave as example the proposal that there should be an increase in the price of water to the H.K.G. (please see my last report). According to Jay, LI had then commented that it seemed a pity that the H.K.G had originally insisted on using Henry FOK's services. Jay enquired whether there would be any objection in the future if others were asked to tender in addition to FOK: LI said that there was certainly no objection to this but when Jay suggested that he would pass this advice on to me, LI allegedly said that this might not be advisable; that it might even be a "threat" to my future career as "clearly those in authority wanted FOK to continue as the sand contractor". I informed Jay that this was utter nonsense: that I had been asked to make enquiries about the proposed increase in the cost of sand and that in any event the consideration and award of tenders such as this was done on a completely impartial and honest basis.
26th September, 1969.
c.c. J. Murray, Esq. ( F.C.O )
J. B. Denson, Esq. ( PEKING)