美国驻中国联络处主任Gates会见时也在场，他感到斯科特受到了张春桥的欺负，就在最后为斯科特做了一些解释。Gates显然对张春桥的表态很不安，当天就把情况报告给美国国务院，并于次日（即7月14日）呈报会谈的原始详细记录，14日晚国务卿基辛格就召集相关人员分析张春桥的态度。负责东亚和太平洋事务的副助卿William H. Gleysteen称张春桥tough as nails，而且根据张近来连续接待外宾可以判断他在外交事务上发言权在增加。基辛格的看法是1.张春桥的说法并不新鲜，1974年11月时毛泽东就对他说过类似的话，只是毛当时还说了“我们可以等上100年。”2.中方比美方更期待中美建交；3.张春桥口头强硬恰是因为他们现在没做什么。7月17日美国国务院就此发给Gates一份详细的分析，安慰Gates不要紧张。https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/d150#fn9
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
Tuesday, July 13, 1976
3:15 PM to 5:15 PM
Great Hall of the People
SUBJECT: Verbatim Transcript of Meeting
Between Senator Scott and
Vice Premier Chang Chun-chiao
Chang Chun-chiao, Vice Premier
Shih Yen-hua, Interpreter
Chou Pei-yuan, Vice President, Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs (CPIFA)
Wang Hai-jung, Vice Foreign Minister
Tang Wen-sheng, Deputy Director, American and Oceanic
Affairs Department, Foreign Ministry
Fan Kuo-hsiang, Deputy Division Chief, CPIFA
Cheng Wan-chen, Staff, CPIFA
Senator Hugh Scott
Robert Barnett, Director, Asia Society
Richard Quick, Administrative Assistant to Senator Scott
Terence Shea, Department of State
Charles W. Freeman, Jr., Department of State
Donald Keyser, US Liaison Office, Notetaker
Chang Chun-chiao: I understand that this is the second time you have come to China.
Senator Scott: Yes, this is my second trip to the People's Republic of China.
Chang: Last time I had no chance to meet you.
Scott: That is my misfortune. I have met your Foreign Minister. My meetings with your distinguished Prime Minister, Mr. Chou En-lai, were very useful. Senator Mansfield and I were very happy to have had that opportunity.
Chang: Premier Chou is already dead. We all remember his contributions to the Chinese people and to the improvement of Sino-US relations.
Scott: Our party (misconstrued by interpreter as Republican Party) wants to extend condolences on the death of your Mr. Chu Teh.
Chang: Thank you. It has been several years since 1972--your first visit to China. You haven't been to other parts of China. Have you seen any changes in Peking?
Scott: Yes, changes which have been to the benefit of the people. There has been improvement in transportation. I have seen a common dedication to your system of society. There also seems to be more awareness of visits from Westerners. We feel that we are recognized now. We have all been moved by the cordiality of the Chinese people. We are told that you will continue to make great progress in health and education. I'm especially interested in education, although that is not my specialty. I'm a lawyer. I was once a teacher, once in the US and once in England. I was therefore very interested in and paid much attention to your teaching at Peking University which we have visited. Our visit to your excavations today has also given us a new awareness. We were very impressed by our visit today to a May 7 Cadre School.
Chang: Did it look like a concentration camp? (smiling)
Scott: No, everyone seemed busy and happy.
Chang: This is one of the important measures taken by the Chinese since the Cultural Revolution.
Scott: We asked if all were volunteers and they said yes. We were shown the kind, of work they did in building and in cultivating crops. You grow bigger squash than ours.
Chang: Yes. So the May 7 Cadre School is doing very well. The last time you came to China we were criticizing Lin Piao. Now we are criticizing Teng during your second visit. So you see that we like to struggle.
Scott: You have your criticisms and we have ours (laughter) --This is part of our two different systems.
Chang: There is great disorder everywhere.
Scott: Yes, there is always great disorder everywhere even though the people pray for the mandate of heaven.
Chang: This is because of contradictions.
Scott: Regarding your earlier question, I have seen a significant improvement in the quality and quantity of your arts and crafts. There appear to be even more than four years ago in your stores.
Chang: Yes, there has been relatively quick development in this field.
Scott: In America we are great admirers of Chinese craftsmanship and works of art. I was interested in the recent discovery of the tombs of Chin Shih Huang, which is certainly one of the most significant discoveries since the 1946 opening of Tutankhamen's tomb.
Chang: The tomb of Chin Shih Huang has not yet been excavated. The excavations are from around the tomb.
Scott: Then there must be even more marvelous discoveries to come.
Chang: Senator Scott is quite an expert on Asian cultural relics.
Scott: To be called an expert is only to know a little more than someone else. For many years I've studied Chinese history. I know about Yang Kuei-fei. There have been many instances of struggle, disruption, and divisiveness within your country. Struggle always continues.
Chang: Yes, you are right. Yang Kuei-fei made no historic contributions but Chin Shih Huang made great contributions in history.
Scott: Yes, she (Yang Kuei-fei) was as full of trouble as calories. He (Chin Shih Huang) was known as the great unifier of China. Right?
Chang: The unity of China has never been as consolidated as it is now. At present only Taiwan is not liberated — so we can't say that China is totally unified.
Scott: But with 800 million people, I'm sure that you have already achieved much development. You must feel very proud at taking so many people and unifying them.
We are presently in a period of uncertainty until November because of the Presidential campaign. But as the New York Times said editorially only 48 hours ago, the foreign policy of President Ford and Governor Carter toward Asia are substantially the same. Both are committed to the Shanghai Communique. Neither can move substantially now, as the victor could do after the election.
We have had changes occurring in our system, notably during the last four years. For example, there has been an increasing assumption of authority — under our Constitution — by the Congress. I will give you one example where I voted against President Ford. Regarding the President's power to declare war, hereafter in this kind of military action the President must advise, consult with, and give reasons for his action. Then it could be cancelled by the Congress after a certain number of days. The President vetoed this Bill but Congress overrode it. Hereafter no President can move alone without taking into consideration the impact of public opinion as expressed through their representatives in the Congress. Without approval of the Congress through consultation, there can be no action by the President.
Another development in the same period of time has manifested itself. The Congress has assumed more authority in foreign policy decisions. But it also supports the President in his desire for a strong national defense. In previous years the national defense budget was often cut 10-12 percent by the Congress, but last year the Congress approved 99.4 percent of the budget requested by the President. This indicates that the Congress is more and more interested in a strong national defense and is willing to use the power of appropriations.
I have ...(noted)...your reference to Taiwan. I will explain what seem to you to be contradictions. Our movement toward implementation of normalization depends upon conditioning of public opinion. We must condition the opinion of people who until the Nixon visit were conditioned the other way. You must condition the thinking of 800 million people. We must condition 200 millions' thought from one view to another. In my view, improved communications, exchange of knowledge, techniques and skills — we believe commerce also plays a role — are very important to this process of conditioning. As we change direction we must change with the approval of the people. There is an old French saying — perhaps Nancy can interpret it — which says that the Prime Minister looked out the window, saw that many people were marching, said that there are my people, I am their leader, I must hurry to their head. We have noted that whenever you send delegations to the United States they are always received with enthusiasm, in big places and in small. They are received with warmth and enthusiasm, in big places and in small. When our people come here they always return with great praise for the kindness and hospitality of the Chinese people. We believe that this will change opinion more than what a leader says. When your Chinese gymnasts and jugglers came to the US, many American children began to pick up dishes and try to juggle them. In their play they smashed a lot of china — of porcelain. But even though we have lost a lot of porcelain we have gained friendship. What our country-to- country relationship comes down to is these children's future.
Do you have any questions? I'm willing to answer anything.
Do you have any questions? I'm willing to answer anything.
Chang: Since you started with Taiwan, I'd also like to say a few words on this issue. You have said much which is needed to change the direction of thinking. We have not changed on our side. Because the 800 million Chinese people are in agreement on this issue, all the Chinese people want to liberate Taiwan. Are there those who don't favor liberation of Taiwan? Yes, but they don't belong to the category of "the people" — they are Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo elements. Chiang Kai-shek fought against us to his death, but the question is still unresolved. The Senator knows that between Fukien and Taiwan there is still artillery fire.
Scott: I'm aware of this. I'm also aware –that though it is a very small thing--we have withdrawn a few observers from Quemoy and Matsu.
Chang: They should have left long ago. (Smiling to his colleagues present.)
Scott: Over time there has already been a substantial reduction. There have already been 4000 troops withdrawn. There has not been a total removal of American forces. But that process (of reduction) is not reversible.
Chang: At present we are still making preparations. This is no military secret. In recent days in Fukien we have conducted small-scale military exercises. Taiwan is very nervous.
Scott: That's news to me. They don't tell me anything. Our presence remaining on Taiwan is already so slender that after the election we will continue to move toward your views. But I speak as a private citizen. I don't know who will be President.
Chang: Mr. Senator, how long do you think this issue will be dragged on? How long will you discuss it as a private citizen? Our position is very clear: We want to settle the Taiwan issue by following the Japanese formula, which has three points. They are: 1) severance of diplomatic relations with Taiwan; 2) withdrawal of all military forces from Taiwan; and 3) abrogation of the treaty with Taiwan.
Scott: I don't know who will be President, Ford or Carter. I would expect reasonable movement after the inauguration. But I can't predict; I'm not a resident of their minds. Your late Premier Mr. Chou said: "We are a patient people." In our attempt to condition the opinion of the American people, we hope that we can find a way to assure that things done by one leader can't be undone by a future leader. We want this to be done in a peaceful context. Only when the American people are behind us and only when American understanding of our objectives has undergone a marked change can we act to prevent undoing a policy by a future leader. In our internal affairs we do have problems. In a democratic society the problem is to convince the people.
Chang: You can't place this responsibility on the American people. Failure to settle this issue, as the Senator has said, is not in the interest of the American people. The American and Chinese peoples have always been friendly, in history and now. So the American people shouldn't be held responsible for the present state of affairs.
Scott: I think that is very generous, a very understanding statement. What I would like to see in 1-2-3 years is a situation where we could say we have finally worked out an agreeable solution rather than to have the relationship founder because we have stopped trying to understand each other. Mr. Barnett has written very learnedly on the matter, as have many others. This will have an ultimate effect of conditioning the American public to accept our moves. There is a saying from "Aesop's Fables": "I can't see how long it will take you to get to the next country until I first see how fast you walk."
Chang: So then we must wait and see.
Scott: I'm afraid so. But in the long run we will have great satisfaction in an ultimate peaceful solution.
Chang: "ultimate peaceful solution?"(Sarcastically) Does this refer to US-China relations or to relations between China and the Chiang Ching-kuo regime on Taiwan?
Scott: I spoke of the US and China. Because we believe that an ultimate settlement is in the interests of the parties involved, the Shanghai Communique did not require that any of these things occur at a given hour or by a clock. These were preconditions stated by the Chinese side in the Shanghai Communique. We cannot and do not encourage any adventurism on the part of Chiang Ching-kuo. We would not like to see anything come from such nervousness as you say exists on Taiwan now.
Chang: I don't understand. Do you think that the US and China should fight war over Taiwan? Taiwan is totally our domestic issue. There is very little possibility of a peaceful settlement. We have much experience in this respect. It is more reliable to settle this question through a war.
Scott: I think I am being misunderstood. I agree that the relationship between China and Taiwan is an internal relationship. I myself have fought in two wars — both times on your side — and I think that it is difficult to justify any war. I doubt that either side could justify to its people going to war for this cause. I am extremely anti-war. I've been shot at. This is the best reason to oppose war. We should solve our problems after discussion and understanding. The American people have not yet said yes or no to the Japanese formula. The last thing they would consider is a war. The American people have a horror of war (the translater rendered this as the American people are afraid of war). I think our policy should be as Premier Chou stated: Don't go to war except in defense of one's territories. Even here peaceful solutions are more likely and more desirable.
Chang: Taiwan is also part of our territory. But I think we have already used up a lot of time. There is no need to argue. Our position is very clear and it is unchanged. Much still remains to be seen. This year you will not settle this issue.
Scott: I can't predict, because I don't know who will be President or who will be in Congress. Perhaps there will be as many as 100 or even 150 new members of the Congress. When you have new members there are apt to be changes in policy. But not changes so as to affect America's Asian policy.
Chang: But we are very clear on Taiwan. Since the issue of Taiwan has arisen, this is a noose around the neck of the US. It is in the interests of the American people to take it off. If you don't, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) will cut it off. This will be good both for the American and Chinese peoples. With regard to Taiwan, the Chinese people are not in debt to the United States. The US has occupied Taiwan. We are generous and ready to help the US solve the problem by our bayonets — perhaps that doesn't sound pleasant but that is the way it is.
Chang: To overthrow the Chiang clique.
Scott: No. That doesn't sound pleasant. Our policy is not to interfere in your internal affair — but we stand ready to back up our commitment to Taiwan. We believe it would be in default of the Shanghai Communique if there were a resort to arms. Any such action would arouse 215 million Americans. I would continue to urge progressing along the path of peace. While we recognize your rights, I ask you to recognize our difficulties.
Chang: You talk about our rights (discussing this with a wave of the hand). This you must do, of course. It is our internal affair and there is no need to ask others to recognize our rights. Did you know that in Chiang Ching-kuo's press I am called "Bandit Chang"?
Scott: My papers call me many things.
Chang: That is your affair and I would not interfere. However, I want to show you that our civil war has not stopped. We don't have the experience that you can peacefully liberate some place. For example, Peking could be said to have been liberated by peaceful means.
But how was this carried out? At that time the whole of North China was already liberated and only Peking- was not yet liberated. Our armed forces were prepared outside the city of Peking. And even our people inside Peking were organized to welcome the PLA. (Turning to Chou Pei-yuan) for example, at Peking University many had prepared to welcome the PLA.
Chou Pei-yuan: What about Tientsin?
Chang: No, Tientsin was liberated by fighting. So perhaps there is only that kind of "peaceful" liberation; the kind that occurred in Peking. Our adversary is the same. We know them well. We consider our policy from the practical viewpoint.
Scott: Our discussions have primarily been about peaceful formulas such as the Japanese formula. We have not discussed your primarily internal question.
Chang: With regard to the Shanghai Communique, we likewise hope that it will be implemented. We are still willing to act in accordance with it. (Responding to a clarification of Senator Scott’s point by Tang Wen-sheng) The Shanghai Communique has nothing in it about peaceful liberation.
Scott: I didn't say there was. Such a communique would hardly speak of war as an alternative to peace. This is your civil war.
Chang: The Shanghai Communique recognizes only one China.
Chang: Both sides should continue to act in accord with the Shanghai Communique.
Scott: That is what I am discussing. As the Shanghai
Communique evolves, may I ask what you envision as the
continuing relationship between China and the US pending normalization?
Chang: Now, according to certain circumstances, both sides can do more. But the biggest problem is unsettled. That is Taiwan. So far we have only spoken about Taiwan. But in the international arena both sides have many points in common.
Scott: I'm glad that you have mentioned this. We believe it important to maintain stability in Europe, to have a strong NATO, to have a strong national defense, and to oppose hegemony. I can give you an illustration. Angola was a very unfortunate thing. The President and the Secretary of State were frustrated by the unwillingness of Congress to support their policy. These things do happen to us from time to time. Congress sometimes delays implementation of policy — this is a source of frustration. The Executive was opposed to the intervention of a superpower. But the Legislative body feared that to support the President might have led to a commitment of American forces.
I didn't agree.
Chang: In Angola, my view is that you didn't handle it very beautifully. You messed it up. The Polar Bear went to Angola. This can educate the African people.
Scott: It was bad timing for the Polar Bear.
Chang: The climate in Africa is unsuited to the Polar Bear. Someday he will be driven away.
Scott: Our view is the same as yours. The presence of that superpower after a while becomes counterproductive and countries will turn against it.
Chang: Well, since you ran away the Polar Bear entered. This will educate the African people. We are optimistic that the African people will see it. The climate in the southern hemisphere is not good for the Polar Bear.
Scott: We believe that we didn't run away but never entered.
Chang: On your side you seem to think that the Polar Bear is too hungry so you feed it your grain. This is very interesting.
Scott: We sell our grain to you too.
Chang: (With heavy irony) That is very equal.
Scott: We believe that food should not be used as an instrument of foreign policy.
Chang: You have the slogan "Food for Peace”. This is an instrument of foreign policy.
Scott: Yes, people everywhere are dissatisfied with their government if they are hungry. We have aided the hungry in more than half of the nations of the world. In so doing we have made the taxpayer foot the bill. The American taxpayer must give 20 to 40 percent of his income in taxes. Most of these taxes go to giveaway programs. We sell grain, but we also give much away as over the years in India. We do this for free. If this was an instrument of foreign policy, it certainly didn't work.
Chang: What I was just referring to was your attitude toward the Polar Bear. I did not come today prepared to discuss your food policy with you. But I can make some comments. As for your sale of grain to China, I'll be honest. The amount sold to China can't play much role. Even if you gave away your whole food reserves to China and its 800 million people, what would this prove? In each bowl we would have only a few grains.
Scott: We recognize, of course, that China is sustaining and able to feed its people. We believe in trade and in a willingness to buy and sell with all. Where disasters and serious hunger have occurred, we have given food. The general policy of the US is to be prepared to buy and sell with all countries. One of the great miracles of the modern world is that China not only can feed all its people but also so obviously raise standard of living — in violent contrast to the administration of India, for example. So we admire you.
Chang: It is not because the Indian people cannot resolve their problems but because of their government and system.
Scott: I am inclined to agree with you. We might have different solutions for the problems of the system, but I agree with you that it is the system. What do you think of continuation and expansion of trade relations with the United States? We have welcomed and will continue to welcome trade with you.
Chang: I'm afraid that is impossible under current circumstances to have this (i.e. trade) on a large scale. We think that it is all right to maintain the present state of affairs. What do you think?
Scott: Balance of payments has to be considered.
Chang: This is not the factor. The present political situation has decided that we can only maintain the current level. I'm afraid that there can't be much progress before normalization of relations.
Scott: We stand ready to both buy and sell. We respect
Chang: This big market of 800 million people provides us much room for maneuver. We mainly rely on our own strength to solve our problems. Any other country would find it difficult to meet the needs of our country. In the trade field we depend on internal trade. Our foreign trade occupies only a small percentage of our trade. Of course we don't rule out the necessity to supply each other's needs under necessary conditions.
Scott: Would it be appropriate for Mr. Barnett to ask a question regarding ASEAN? He is an expert on ASEAN and has spent time in those countries.
Chang: There is not much time. But please ask the question.
Barnett: I travelled through Southeast Asia and noted the movement toward a concept of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality. I have heard the satisfaction of those countries that the PRC had given its support to that concept. I would be interested in your attitude toward ASEAN, particularly toward the concept of neutralization.
Chang: This question Foreign Minister Chiao discussed with you yesterday. But I will answer you. China supports their desire for neutrality and supports their desire to expel hegemony. But in our view that won't be easy. Don't you agree? I have never been there myself.
Barnett: I hope they won't have too much difficulty in opposing hegemony. It will take time for real unity and understanding among themselves but the prospects are good.
Chang: Yes, what I said is true, they will have difficulties between themselves and outside forces may intervene. China will not intervene in their affairs.
Scott: We really appreciate the time you have given us. We know how busy you are. I hope that you will agree with my wish to convey our discussions to the President — who is also my personal friend.
Chang: I can't object to your conveying these discussions to your President. But I hope that our discussions will not be published.
Scott: I think that we can only publish that we held frank and candid discussions. Among the subjects we discussed were Taiwan, commerce, and some foreign policy matters. I don't want to violate any confidence.
Chang: I don't know what you mean by "violation of confidence."
Scott: Discussing the substance of our talks.
Ambassador Gates: I'd like to say that as you know,
Mr. Vice Premier, it is the policy of the U.S. Government to carry out the principles of the Shanghai Communique. Two Presidents have stated this pubicly and privately. Only the timing and formula remain indefinite. The Senator is a political leader. He has discussed from that point of view. From our side, when we deal with treaty arrangements, this ultimately requires the consent of Congress. I think that is what the Senator is trying to say. What he hopes will happen is that a favorable consensus will develop. When that times comes.
Scott: We are seeking a strong majority approval in
Congress. We do not want a one vote majority which will then result in dispute.
Chang: This is the affair of the United States. But the three conditions set by China for normalization of relations should be met in their entirety. Anyone wishing to prevent this will be held responsible by history.
Ambassador Gates: We understand your position. You have made it very clear.
Chang: Are you leaving tomorrow?