1980年6月12日，时任日本首相的大平正方在竞选活动中突然死于心肌梗塞，有五十多个国家的政府领导人出席了日本政府在7月9日为他举办的葬礼，其中就包括美国总统卡特和中共国总理华国锋。他们两人都在大平正芳去世前不久分别正式会见过他，5月初大平正芳访美，5月底华国锋访日。
7月10日早上卡特与华国锋举行了一个小时的会谈，这是两国建交以来的第一次首脑会晤，却发生在第三国。在会谈开始，华国锋就说虽然他收到了卡特在1979年初通过邓小平副总理转交给他的访问邀请，但因国事繁忙他抽不出时间访美，所以这次能在日本同卡特总统见面，他觉得很重要。卡特也说等几个月后美国大选结果出来后，中美应该商定首脑互访事宜，并希望他到时能到中国会见华国锋总理。不过两个月后华国锋的总理职务就被邓小平、陈云废除了，又过两个月后卡特就在竞选总统连任时失败了。就这样，主持中共国与美国建交的两位政府首脑都没能在任内实现访问对方国家的愿望。
从会谈备忘录看，华国锋和卡特的发言比例超过2：1，主要都是华国锋在讲述中国对苏联所引起的各种国际问题的看法，卡特则做出相对简略的回应。若干值得注意的内容如下：
他们俩都认为中美的分歧和差异是次要的，而在战略和历史问题上的共同利益是主要的，尤其是在应对苏联入侵阿富汗和苏联支持越南入侵柬埔寨问题上。卡特说苏联的南向扩张不应视为维持现状，应遭到全世界的抵制。
卡特说为应对越南对泰国的攻击，美国已经加快速度把泰国采购的武器空运过去。华国锋说他在电视上看到了美国空军把105毫米榴弹炮交付泰国的镜头，现在支持泰国是件很重要的事情，中方赞赏美国加紧运送武器的工作。
华国锋说苏军入侵阿富汗和越南侵略柬埔寨并不是偶然事件，而是苏联向南战略扩张的结果，很大原因是苏联想控制印度洋和中东石油产区。华说CIA已经预测到苏联石油产量自1985年起将会下降，所以苏联认为有必要控制产油区。华说苏联在中东的利益扩张会比在欧洲容易，因为毕竟在欧洲有北约组织和苏联的华沙条约势力直接对抗。不仅如此，如果苏联通过越南控制了柬埔寨的话，那接下来就会阻断马六甲海峡，以此隔断中东与太平洋地区的联系。通过控制中东，苏联就可以迂回地战胜欧洲，到时西方别无选择只能与苏联开战，那时候的代价就更高昂了，所以现在阿富汗和柬埔寨就成了反对苏联扩张的第一线。
卡特说东盟（ASEAN）正在团结起来对付苏联和越南的威胁，中国和印度的外交往来令美方感到鼓舞，但很遗憾印度承认了越南在柬埔寨扶植的韩桑林傀儡政权。华说很高兴听到美方对印度做法的遗憾立场，印度是不结盟运动的创始国，不结盟的意思就是反对外部势力干扰内政，而印度承认越南武力扶植的韩桑林政权就意味对不结盟的背叛，这损害了印度自己在不结盟运动中的形象。华国锋还认为印度之所以在最后时刻承认韩桑林政权，是因为接受了苏联给予的16亿美元军援。
卡特说我们不应该不采取行动以至于印度滑向苏联一方，同时美方在试图提醒西欧国家意识到苏联入侵柬埔寨的严重性时遇到一些挫折。
华国锋说中方会尽力帮助泰国，就像现在越军有29个师被中方拖在中越边境。不过中国和美国在如何看待红色高棉问题上有分歧，红色高棉已经承认过去犯了些错误，但现在仍然是反抗越南入侵的主力。印度承认柬埔寨韩桑林政权就等同于不承认红色高棉，后果会严重。华国锋希望美国在即将召开的联合国大会投票时继续承认红色高棉。
卡特说美中两国在柬埔寨问题上没有重大分歧，美国不会承认韩桑林政权，但红色高棉的波尔布特臭名昭著，这让美国公众和国会意见很大。美国国务卿马斯基说问题的焦点在波尔布特而不是红色高棉，华国锋说波尔布特已经不再是红色高棉的首脑了。
华国锋解释说中方无意建立一个亲中政权，之所以重视柬埔寨完全是因为其战略意义，红色高棉已经表态只要越南撤出柬埔寨，就会举行在联合国监督下的自由选举，由柬埔寨人民决定政权归属。
华国锋还希望美国增加对巴基斯坦的援助，并就伊朗问题发表了看法，中方反对伊朗扣留美国人质，但也要看到伊朗反对苏联入侵阿富汗。卡特说美方注意到伊朗要求苏联撤出驻伊朗的2000余名顾问人员。
为卡特担任翻译的是美国国务院的Vivian Chang，当年10到11月份习仲勋任团长的中国省长代表团访美时她担任随团翻译，附件是她与习仲勋（左）、吴冷西（右）在夏威夷的珍珠港的合照。
_____________________________________________________________________
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF
CONVERSATION
SUBJECT: Summary of the President's
Meeting with
Premier Hua Guofeng of the Peoples' Republic of China
PARTICIPANTS: President Jimmy Carter
Secretary of State
Edmund Muskie
Zbigniew
Brzezinski, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Michael Mansfield,
U.S. Ambassador to Japan
Michael Armacost,
Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Bureau for East Asia and Pacific
Affairs
Donald Gregg,
National Security Council Staff Member
Vivian Chang,
Interpreter, Department of State
Premier Hua
Guofeng
Deputy Foreign
Minister Han Nianlong
Minister Counselor
(Deputy Chief of Mission of the PRC Embassy in Japan) Wang Xiaoyun
Deputy Director of
Asian Affairs of the Foreign Minister Xiao Xiangchuan
Sun Ping,
Notetaker
Chun Hui,
Interpreter Director of Secretariat of Foreign Ministry
DATE,TIME July 10, 1980; 9:15 - 10:15 a.m.
AND PLACE: Tokyo, Japan
Following departure
of the press,
Premier Hua opened the substantive portion of the meeting by describing
his strong respect for the late PM Ohira. Hua noted that he had been in
Japan in late May and had held productive talks with PM Ohira. Hua said
that on the day of his departure from Tokyo, PM Ohira had come to bid him
good-bye, and then had gone on to a strenuous day of campaign speech-making.
Ohira was hospitalized that night, and Premier Hua learned of his
untimely passing after his return to the PRC. Premier Hua
noted that PM Ohira had made a strong contribution to the development of ties
between Japan and the PRC, and that he had been a far-sighted statesman. Hua
said that PM Ohira had described his May 1 visit to Washington, and that he had
expressed satisfaction with the talks he had held with President Carter. Hua
described Ohira's death as a loss to both the Japanese and Chinese people, and
said that he would long be remembered. (C)
Premier Hua
then said that he was happy to have a chance to meet with President Carter. He
recalled that the President had issued an invitation for Hua to visit the U.S.
when Vice Premier Deng was in Washington. Hua
said that the press of official duties had kept him from accepting the
invitation, and that he felt it important to meet at this
time. (C)
Hua
said that he appreciated President Carter's decision to normalize relations
with the PRC 18 months ago. He said that he had been pleased with the development of
U.S. - PRC relations over that time. Hua noted that a few differences exist between the U.S. and the PRC, but said
that this was a normal and natural thing, as even a single country or a family
will have differing viewpoints as to how certain problems should be approached.
Hua said he felt that the differences between our two countries are
minor, and that they will work themselves out. (C)
President Carter
cited his own close ties with the late PM Ohira, and said that his death had
been a tragedy. The President said that Ohira had frequently mentioned
the advantages he saw in the development of close ties between the U.S.
and the PRC. President Carter said that the U.S. and
the PRC have
made steady progress in
developing their relations over the past 18 months. Even though some
differences do exist, the President said that
our countries share a common viewpoint on strategic and historical issues,
where our interests are the same. The President
noted that in his appearance on Japanese television a few minutes earlier, he
had told the Japanese people that he believes the development of close U.S.-PRC
ties will contribute to peace, stability and progress in the Western Pacific
region. The President noted that our countries share
common opportunities and common problems, especially in terms of responding to
recent Soviet actions such as the attack on Afghanistan and Soviet support to
the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea. These moves, the
President noted, add a new dimension to our problems. The President
said that this Soviet thrust to the
South should not be accepted by the other countries of the world and viewed as
maintaining the status quo. He said we should continue to oppose the Soviet
moves. (C)
The President
said that in response to the recent SRV attack into Thai territory, we had
expedited shipment by air to Thailand of some weapons they had ordered. PM
Hua said that he had watched on television the
delivery of 105mm howitzers by U.S. aircraft. He said that it was
important to support Thailand, and that the PRC appreciated what the U.S. had
done to expedite the shipment of arms. (C)
The President
replied that the volume of the aid was not great, but that the symbolism of the
action had been important. (C)
President Carter
then turned to Afghanistan, and briefly described the state of the resistance
effort. He noted that much of the Afghan army has defected to the freedom
fighters, taking their weapons with them. (C)
Premier Hua
said that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the attack on Kampuchea had
not happened by chance. Hua described the attack on Afghanistan as a
premeditated plan by the Soviets, designed to give them control of the country.
Hua then sketched the events in Afghanistan that led up to the Soviet
attack. He noted that three Afghan presidents had been murdered in a short
time. He said that this was a series of events almost without parallel, and
that the murders had been the direct result of Soviet intervention. Hua
said that the attack into Afghanistan was part of a thrust to the South by the
Soviets, and that if they succeed in controlling Afghanistan, they will then
move on toward the Indian Ocean and the oil-producing regions of the Middle
East. Hua
noted that the American CIA has predicted that Soviet oil production will
decline, starting about 1985, and that the Soviets feel the need to seize oil
producing regions. Hua commented that
even if the Soviet oil production were not to decline, they would still
undertake the same sort of strategic effort. (S)
Premier Hua
then sketched his view of the Soviet strategy for the Middle East. He cited the
use of Cuban proxies in Ethiopia and South Yemen. He said that the Soviets are
taking advantage of the Arab-Israeli split to sow dissension among Arab
nations. Hua said that Afghanistan was part of this strategy, and that
the Soviets are confident that they can succeed in achieving their objectives
in the Middle East. Hua noted that it is easier for the
Soviets to advance their interests in the Middle East than in the European
area, where Warsaw Pact forces are directly confronted by the NATO alliance.
(S)
Turning to Iran, Hua
said that the Soviets are also trying to exploit the situation there. He noted
that the Iranian government lacks authority, and that there are 300,000 to
400,000 weapons scattered throughout Iran that the Soviets hope to acquire
through activities of the Tudeh party. Hua said that the Soviets hope to
cause trouble by starting other proxy wars. He mentioned Saudi Arabia, where
there are influential groups of Palestinians, and said that things would be
"hot" in the
Middle East throughout the 1980s. (C)
Premier Hua
then spoke of Southeast Asia, where he said that the Vietnamese are like the
Cubans in acting as Soviet proxies. He cited the fact that the Soviets now have
the use of harbors at Danang and Cam Ranh Bay, and that they are using the
airport in Saigon. Hua said he believes that if
the Soviets consolidate their control (via the Vietnamese) of Kampuchea, they
will then try to block the Strait of Malacca, making the vital
link between their strongholds in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean and the
Pacific. If the Soviets were to consolidate these efforts, Hua said he
believed that their expansion and preparations for war would have been
completed, and that the Soviets could then move "without scruples." Hua
said that with control of the oil- producing region of the Middle East, the
Soviets "would have outflanked
Europe," and that the West would have no choice but to fight. He quickly
added that to fight under such conditions would mean paying a heavy price and
that it would be an unduly delayed
response to Soviet strategy. (S)
Hua
said that the first line of defense against the Soviets should be in Afghanistan and Kampuchea.
He said that the PRC hopes
that the "Middle East question" can be solved quickly. Hua
noted his satisfaction with the recent ASEAN Foreign Ministers' meeting in
Kuala Lumpur where the ASEAN FM also met with their counterparts from the U.S.,
Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, and said that the SRV attack into
Thailand had produced more
unity in ASEAN. President Carter said that
the development of
ASEAN's strength and unity had been an encouraging development. He said that
the Philippines and Australia were also clearly aware of the Soviet threat. The
President said that the U.S. has been encouraged by the
diplomatic exchanges between the PRC and India, but that we were disappointed
by Indian recognition of the Heng Samrin puppet regime in Kampuchea.
Hua replied that he had been pleased to note that the U.S. had regretted
the Indian move. (C)
The President
said that in the long run good relations between the PRC and India,
and India and the
U.S. are important, and that we should not let
India move closer to the Soviet Union without any action on our part.
The President said that the U.S.is trying to
arouse Western European consciousness of the threat to them which the Soviet
attack on Afghanistan represents. He noted that the U.S. was having some
difficulty in accomplishing this goal. The President
said that the U.S. will in the Indian Ocean through use of facilities in Oman
and Kenya. The
President said that we might also use facilities in
Somalia, but that this option was still under review. (C)
Premier Hua referred back to the subject of aid to Thailand. He said that the PRC is making every effort to assist the
Thais, including
shipments of "natural resources." He said that he had discussed this
matter with Prime Minister Prem during their current visit to Tokyo. Hua said that the PRC was taking pressure
off Thailand by
tying down 29 SRV infantry divisions along the Sino-Vietnamese border.
Hua said he had also told the Thais that the PRC would "side with
them" if Vietnam made another large-scale attack into Thailand." (S)
Premier Hua
said that one difference between the PRC and the U.S. lay
in our views of the Democratic Kampuchea movement.
He said that in the Chinese view, the DK remains the main force of resistance
to SRV control of Kampuchea. Hua said that the DK has reviewed
and admitted some of its past mistakes. He deplored the Indian decision to
recognize the Heng Samrin regime, which amounts to a derecognition of the DK,
and said that if this became the start of a trend, the results would be damaging to
efforts to block SRV control
of Kampuchea. The Vietnamese attempted but were not successful in eliminating the
Khmer Resistence Forces during the dry season. The U.S. position on this issue
is important. Hua also noted that humanitarian aid from the
international organizations to the Kampuchean refugees has been stopped. He
said that if Kampuchea is to be part of the first line
of defense against Soviet expansionism, the Kampucheans need support. Hua said
that he hoped that the U.S. would keep these points in mind during the upcoming
UN General Assembly vote on the DK credentials issues. He urged the U.S. to continue to vote for the
DK. (C)
President Carter
replied that we do not have significant differences with regard to the
Kampuchean situation. The President
said that we cannot recognize the Heng Samrin regime, and that the Pol Pot (DK) have a terrible
reputation. The President said that this makes it
difficult to deal with American public opinion and the Congress on this issue. The
President said that he and Secretary
Muskie will prepare the U.S. Congress for a U.S. position that will prevent a
transfer of credentials to the Vietnamese puppet regime. The President added
that he would have the Secretary call Secretary General Waldheim to urge
expeditious implementation of the request from the ten nations at the ASEAN
meeting that aid to the refugees be resumed. The President said that the
U.S. would consult closely with the PRC before voting on the DK credentials
issue at the UN in September. (C)
Premier Hua
expressed his thanks for this statement. He said that the PRC
does not, as some allege, want to establish a pro-PRC government in Kampuchea.
He said that the PRC was approaching the Kampuchean problem only in terms of its strategic
implications. Hua noted that the DK has said that if
the Vietnamese were to withdraw from Kampuchea, free elections should be held
under UN auspices to decide on how the
Kampuchean people want to be governed. Hua said that the
first objective is to stop Soviet aggression and expansion in Kampuchea. (C)
Premier Hua
said he had discussed the PRC view of the situation in Pakistan with Senator
Byrd, as well as with Dr. Brzezinski. Hua said that aid
to Pakistan should be increased. (C)
Secretary Muskie,
referring back to the DK credentials said that the U.S. does not favor the
"empty seat formula," that would amount to a Soviet victory. Secretary
Muskie said that our major problem was with Pol Pot, and not as much with
the DK movement as a whole. (C)
Premier Hua said
that Pol Pot is no longer head of the DK. President Carter
said that this is understood. (U)
Premier Hua
again urged that American aid to Pakistan be increased. He
deplored India's recognition of Heng Samrin, and said that India changed her
mind at the last minute and did not attend the recent ASEAN meeting because of
the SRV attack into Thailand. Continuing to criticize the Indians, Hua said
that India had helped to found the non-aligned
movement, which was created to oppose the imposition of external influence on
one country by another. India’s vote for Heng Samrin, Hua
said, meant that they were voting for a regime imposed by force —a violation of
the principles of the non-aligned movement. (C)
President Carter
said that he agreed with this statement. Hua said that India's image will suffer great loss, and that
by their
vote they had missed
an opportunity to play a greater role in
the non-aligned
movement. Hua said it was interesting to speculate as to why the Indians
had taken the step of recognizing Heng Samrin. He said that it was
directly related to the $1.6 billion dollar military aid agreement India had
just signed with the Soviets. He said that in
this way, India was acting under foreign pressure, and that its reputation
would suffer as a result. (C)
Returning to the
subject of Pakistan, Hua said that he had met General Zia recently, and
that Zia said he hoped for more aid from the U.S. Hua paid tribute to
the two Islamic conferences, which he said had been helpful. He cited the three-man
committee set up by the Islamic Conference as performing good work. Hua said that the Soviets
have been putting pressure on Pakistan, even threatening it with
"another dismemberment." Hua
praised Pakistan's courage
in standing up to the Soviet pressure. President Carter
said that he agreed the Pakistanis have been courageous. (C)
Referring to Iran, Hua
said that the PRC has stated its opposition to the holding of the hostages. He
said that he believes the Soviet attack into Afghanistan also threatens Iran.
He noted that the Iranians have called upon the Soviets to withdraw from
Afghanistan, and that the Iranians have said they will support the Afghan
rebels if the Soviets do not pull out. Hua noted that the Iranians are
keeping their word on this matter. Iran has refused to recognize the Soviet
puppet regime in Kabul, and at the
recent Islamic conference, the Iranians accepted six Afghan rebel groups as part of their own delegation. President Carter noted that the Iranians have also told the Soviets to reduce their presence in Iran, and that some of the 2,000 Soviet “advisors" will have to move out. (C)
President Carter, noting the time, said that the Japanese Prime
Minister was waiting
to say good-bye, so that the meeting would have to draw to a close. The
President said that the visit had shown the value of exchanging views with the
Chinese leadership, and
that, a few months after the U.S. election, the U.S. and
the PRC should discuss the dates for exchanging visits by our Heads of State. He said that he
hoped to see Premier Hua in China. Premier Hua
responded simply, "welcome." (C)
The meeting ended
after brief arrangements had been made for dealing with the press. (U)
出处：美国DDRS-274788
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