1967年9月8日中情局派出一架U2飞机执行紧急任务，对中共国（communist China，简称ChiCom）的6个飞机场进行侦察拍照。飞机于凌晨三点进入中共国领空，位置在上海东北方向45海里处，但很快就被共军的地对空导弹击落，地点在上海西南方向65海里处（浙江嘉兴）。(按：1967年09月08日黃榮北上尉至江蘇上空執行偵察任務，在浙江省嘉興市被解放軍空軍用仿製SA-2的紅旗二號防空飛彈擊落身亡，见中文维基百科“黑猫中队”页面https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E9%BB%91%E8%B2%93%E4%B8%AD%E9%9A%8A ）
下面这份中情局报告的主要内容就是关于事发前后对航线附近区域的导弹阵地搜索情况。根据该报告，中情局的特别行动办公室（Office of Special Activities，简称OSA）早就和国家图像处理中心（National Photographic Interpretation Center，简称NPIC）有合作关系，在每一次U2飞机执行任务前24小时由OSA向NPIC提供预定航线，由NPIC对已拍摄图片进行分析，检索在航线两侧30海里内、预定侦察目标和可疑地点的50海里半径内是否有导弹阵地，如有可疑结果，则需改变航线甚至停飞。
9月8日凌晨3点多NPIC在收到OSA电话通知该架U2飞机（编号373）已被导弹击落后立即召集分析员再次进行了照片分析。两组分析员分别对某较大可疑区域进行检索，四名分析员对某核心区域进行检索，结果都没发现导弹阵地的图像。直到9月19日才有国防报情报局（Defense Department Intelligence，简称DDI）的分析员率先从最新的KH-4卫星拍照中发现嘉兴机场有一处疑似萨姆2号导弹阵地，不过虽然这组照片本来就是对嘉兴机场的重点拍照结果，但因为清晰度不够高还不能确认这就是萨姆导弹阵地。
在这起事故后，中情局特别行动办公室（OSA）决定暂停U2飞机执行任务，在改装某些重点零部件后再恢复任务，并且此后的航线要避开中共主要机场至少15海里，还要严格限制对U2航线的知情范围。
～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～
OCTOBER
5, 1967
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director
for Plans
SUBJECT: Request for
Assistance in Investigation of Loss of (CROSSOUT) U-2, 8 September 1967
1. Preliminary conclusions
regarding the loss of an IDEALIST/TACKLE U-2 in Che-chiang Province, eastern
China Mainland; on 8 September 1967, indicate that the aircraft was most probably
brought down by ChiCom surface-to-air missile fire. The approximate coordinates
where the loss occurred are 30°38' N, 120°25' E, and
approximately 65 miles southwest of Shanghai.
(CROSSOUT)
CARL E. DUCKETT
Deputy Director
For
Science and Technology
Attachment:
1 (as stated) NSA, USAF reviews completed
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_____________________________________________________________
22 SEP 1967
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director
for Science and Technology
SUBJECT : Analysis of
TACKLE Mission C297C
1. This memorandum is for information only.
2. This study results from an exhaustive
analysis of all available data which are pertinent to the loss of Article 373 on 8 September 1967, and
represents the coordinated views of the Office of Special Activities, Office of
Scientific Intelligence and the Office of ELINT.
3. Facts:
a. The mission was flown in response to (CROSSOUT)
for coverage, on an urgent basis, of seventeen Chinese Communist
(ChiCom) airfield targets.
b. The mission aircraft departed (CROSSOUT) on 8
September. The route was designed to cover six of the 17 highest priority
targets. The mission aircraft penetrated ChiCom
territory at approximately 0302Z at a point on the China coast approximately 45 nautical miles northeast of Shanghai. Attachment 1 depicts the planned route of
flight, and the actual route of flight (CROSSOUT).
c. Within the twenty-four hour period prior to mission
launch, and again shortly after loss of the mission aircraft, NPIC completed a
detailed SAM search of all available photography of the area within fifty nautical
miles of the last reported position of the mission aircraft. With the exception of the previously reported SAM sites
located at Shanghai, NPIC was unable to detect any new SAM sites. (Attachment
2). On 19 September 1967 the Imagery Analysis
Staff of DDI reported discovery of a probable SAM site at Chia Hsing Airfield.
Their report was based on an extensive examination of
KH-4 photography dated with special emphasis on the Chia Hsing Airfield.
A copy of their report is included herein as Attachment 7.
(CROSSOUT)
(Next 2 pages In Document
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b. TACKLE
overflight operational missions will be suspended until these modifications
have been accomplished and satisfactorily flight tested (approximately six
weeks for critical items).
c. Upon resumption of TACKLE operational
missions, and until the threat is better defined, mission routes will be
designed to keep the mission aircraft at least fifteen
nautical miles from high priority ChiCom Airfield targets.
d. An examination of present (CROSSOUT) will be
conducted to determine if (CROSSOUT) assignment can provide better data for
subsequent post-mission analysis.
e. Efforts will be made to withhold mission information
from all except those who have a confirmed need-to-know.
(CROSSOUT)
PAUL N. BACALIS
Brigadier General, USAF
Director of Special
Activities
Attachments - 7
1. Route Map
2. NPIC Report
3. Resume of (CROSSOUT) Activity
4. OSI Assessment of ChiCom SAM Threat
5. Proposed Modifications to (CROSSOUT)
6. OEL review of Efforts to Collect (CROSSOUT)
7. Top Secret Message - Cite (CROSSOUT)
(CROSSOUT)
Director of
Scientific Intelligence
(CROSSOUT)
Director of ELINT
cc: Deputy Director for Intelligence
IDEA/OSA/ (CROSSOUT) aea (21 Sep 67)
Distribution:
#1, 2 DD/S&T
3, 4,5 D/OSI
6, 7, 8 D/OEL
9 DD/S&T Registry
10,11 D/SA
12 IDEA/OSA
13 RB/OSA
14 DDI
(Next 1 page In Document Exempt)
_____________________________________________________________
8 September 1967
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Resume of NPIC Searches for SAM Sites in China in Support Of
OSA
1. NPIC and OSA have long had formal
arrangements for NPIC searches of photography to locate SAM sites in Communist
China. On 23 March 1967 a revised Memorandum of Understanding entitled "SAM
Search Procedures for IDEALIST/TACKLE Missions" was approved jointly by
the Director of Special Activities, DD/S&T and the Director, National Photographic
Interpretation Center. This procedure calls for NPIC to be given advanced
notice of planned routes for U-2 flights. NPIC uses these canned routes in the
conduct of a search of all photography as it is received. The spotting of a SAM
site during this search is instantly reported. When OSA specifically takes
steps to launch a U-2 mission, the Center is advised. NPIC quickly double
checks to make sure that all photography was in fact searched upon its receipt
and, an advisory cable is sent from NPIC to OSA before
the "go" signal is given. NPIC is normally given word of a
pending flight from 30 hours to 12 hours in advance of mission takeoff time.
NPIC undertakes to insure that a search of all available photography had been
carried out in areas 30 NM on either side of planned
route and within a 50 NM radius of the principal
targets and suspect SAM areas specified by OSA. NPIC rechecks “suspect”
and interest areas indicated by OSA.
2. Chronology – C297C
a. Canned route 1058
received 31 August 1967.
b. 1600, 5 September 1967
-NPIC alerted following weather briefing.
c. 1620, 5 September 1967 -
NPIC alerted to conduct SAM search of canned route 1O58 (C297C).
d.2111, 5 September 1967 -
Formal cable request for SAM search received by NPIC from OSA.
e. 1224, 6 September 1967 -
Results of search sent by cable to OSA. Copy attached as Tab 1.
f. 1600. 6 September 1967.
Go-No-Go briefing attended by NPIC. Overlay of coverage searched was provided
OSA.
g. 0215, 7 September 1967 -
Mission alerted and delayed 24 hours. No further search was required.
h.1400, 7 September 1967 -
Second Go-No-Go briefing attended by NPIC.
i. 0300,
8 September 1967 - NPIC advised by call from (CROSSOUT) (OSA) of shoot down
and requesting that NPIC call in personnel to check area of shoot down for SAM
site.
j. 0420, 8 September 1967 –
Search started by PAG personnel and completed by about noon.
3. Shortly after receipt of news o£ the 8
September shootdown, OSA asked NPIC to undertake a new search of areas believed
to be related to the incident. NPIC has completed this renewed search and
remains unable to identify a SAM site in the specified areas.
4. The photography used for this search was from
a KH-4 mission and is dated (CROSSOUT). The scale and resolution may
prevent the Center’s identification
of a SAM. This would be particularly true if deceptive measures such as
camouflage were employed to conceal or otherwise disrupt a visible pattern. It
is, of course, possible that a SAM position was deployed some time after (CROSSOUT)
the date of latest coverage.
5. One point should be made clear. The Chinese
Communist SAM site is unlike the Soviet or Cuban. It lacks fixed signature. Meager SAM resources are deployed with great mobility.
Identification of a ChiCom SAM site in photography,
particularly at KH-4 type of resolution is difficult. Mobility means
that a SAM site, spotted, as such and seen to be
operational one day, may be vacant the next.
6. The attached chart portrays areas researched by NPIC following the
8 September shootdown. Areas within the rectangles were rescanned in detail.
Both of the large, circled areas have been thoroughly searched by two separate
teams, each team having searched the entire area. The smaller circled area has
been thoroughly searched four times, each time by a different analyst. The
results were, as stated, negative.
E.H. Knoche
Executive
Director.
National
Photographic Interpretation Center.
Attachment:
Tab 1 – Cable
Overlay Route 1058
Distribution:
Copy 1 – DDI
_____________________________________________________________
1967
September 6 1640Z
TOP SECRET
A. C297C (CANNED ROUTE 1058)
B. 1200L 6 SEPT
C. SHANGHAI SAM SITES B-36 AND A-02 ARE LOCATED
WITHIN 30 NM OF THE CANNED ROUTE. B-36 WAS
UNOCCUPIED ON (CROSSOUT). A-02 WAS OCCUPIED ON (CROSSOUT). BOTH SITES ARE INDICATED
ON THE PHOTO COVERAGE OVERLAY. NO OTHER SAM ACTIVITY WAS OBSERVED WITHIN 30 NM
OF THE CANNED ROUTE FOLLOWING SEARCH OPERATIONS CONDUCTED IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING
RECEIPT OF THE MOST RECENT PHOTOGRAPHY.
D. PHOTOGRAPHIC MISSIONS WHICH HAVE 10 PERCENT
OR LESS CLOUD COVER ONLY ARE PLOTTED ON THE PHOTO COVERAGE OVERLAY FORWARDED
UNDER SEPARATE COVER. HOWEVER, ALL PHOTOGRAPHY IS SEARCHED TO THE BEST OF OUR
ABILITY. A SEARCH OF THE AREA WITHIN A 50 NM RADIUS OF THE FOLLOWING POINTS HAS
BEEN COMPLETED WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS IN CLOUD-FREE AREAS:
SHANGHAI 3114N
12128E (SEE “C” ABOVE)
HANG CHOU 3015N
12010E
CHIA HSING 3044N 12042E
LU CHIAO 2834N 12125E
LIEN CHIANG 2614N 11930E
FU CHOU
2600N 11919E
LUNG TIEN 2534N 11927E
(THESE POINTS ARE ALSO INDICATED ON THE PHOTO COVERAGE OVERLAY).
PHOTOGRAPHY.
(CROSSOUT)
TOP SECRET.
END OF MESSAGE
(Next 4 page In Document
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_____________________________________________________________
Attachment 4
OSI ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT SAM THREAT
1. We believe that the Chinese have fielded at least one, possibly two
modified versions of the SA-2 system, although the available (CROSSOUT) evidence
suggests that as many as three separate ChiCom versions may exist. All versions
appear to employ substantially the same missile -- the Guideline Mod I and a
Chinese production copy of it. All the Chicom modifications have been observed
in the (CROSSOUT).
(Next 15 pages In Document
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_____________________________________________________________
Attachment 7
TOP SECRET 201902Z (CROSSOUT)
PRIORIT Y OPCEN (MULTI ADDEE)
(CROSSOUT)
THE FOLLOW INS IS FROM THE CIA/IMAGERY ANALYSIS SERVICE:
1. A NEWLY
IDENTIFIED PROBABLE SA-2 SITE IS LOCATED AT CHIA HSING AIRFIELD, CHINA, AT
30-42-45N 120-41-35E, APPROXIMATELY 4.5 NAUTICAL MILES (NM) SOUTHWEST OF CHIA HSING,
AND APPROXIMATELY 52 NM SOUTHWEST OF SHANGHAI, CHINA.
2. THE SITE IS
LOCATED AT THE NORTHEAST END OF THE AIRFIELD, IN AND AROUND EXISTING AIRCRAFT
REVETMENTS. TWO LAUNCH POSITIONS HAVE APPARENTLY BEEN INTERSPERSED AMONG THE
AIRCRAFT REVETMENTS. UNIDENTIFIED EQUIPMENT IS VISIBLE IN THESE TWO POSITIONS.
SIX NEARBY AIRCRAFT REVETMENTS, IN WHICH UNIDENTIFIED EQUIPMENT IS VISIBLE, MAY
ALSO REPRESENT LAUNCH POSITIONS AND/OR STORAGE POINTS FOR ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT.
3. ON THE HARD
SURFACED RUNWAY SERVING THE AIRCRAFT REVETMENT AREA AT
CHINESE SAM SITES, A POSSIBLE VEHICLE PARK WHICH MAY ALSO BE ASSOCIATED IS
ADJACENT TO THE TAXIWAY.
4. THIS ACTIVITY
CAN BE OBSERVED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON (CROSSOUT) AND CAN BE NEGATED (CROSSOUT).
IT WAS LAST OBSERVED (CROSSOUT).
5. TO DATE, THE
COVERAGE OF THIS SITE IS LIMITED TO SMALL-SCALE KH-4 PHOTOGRAPHY OF FAIR
QUALITY. THE SITE CONFIGURATION CANNOT DEFINITELY BE DETERMINED AT THIS TIME.
IT DOES MOT CONFORM TO USUAL SA-2 PATTERNS, BUT BEARS SOME SIMILARITY TO KUANG-CHOU
SA-2 SAM SITE B 27-2, AS OBSERVED (CROSSOUT).
6. THIS
IDENTIFICATION IS CONCURRED IN BY NPIC.
PHOTOGRAPHY:
(CROSSOUT) .
TOP SECRET TOR: 201933Z
SEP 67
出处：美国中情局档案
CIA-RDP74B00836R000100060013-0
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