1969年4月28日，法国总统戴高乐将军（General de Gaulle）宣布辞职，原因是他所提出的革新计划在全民公投中被否决，而他在公投前就承诺若革新计划不通过则辞职。
在公投前的4月22日戴高乐接见了即将前往北京赴任的新任法国驻华大使Etienne Manac'h（艾蒂安·马纳克），就法国、美国和苏联分别同中国的关系作了评论，应该说戴氏的见识、判断和预期确实都是很高水准的。不过由于戴氏的辞职，他给马纳克所签发的国书也就失效了，所以马纳克拿到以参议院议长而代任总统职务的波尔（M. Poher）新签发的国书后才启程前往北京赴任。
SECRET AND GUARD
9 MAY 1969
I lunched today with Etienne Manac'h, who leaves next Wednesday to take up his post as French Ambassador in Peking. His departure has been delayed because his Letters of Credence, signed by General de Gaulle, became invalid when the General ceased to be President on 28 April, and had to be replaced by Letters signed by M. Poher.
2. Manac'h told me that he had been received by General de Gaulle on 22 April. The General, who said incidentally that this might be their last meeting because he would depart at once if the referendum went against him, said that his essential task in Peking, whatever the result of the referendum, was to make the Chinese realise that France was independent. It was true that France remained in the Atlantic Alliance but in the course of the years the idea of the Alliance had lost almost all real content. If the Chinese ever seemed to believe that France was displaying a preference towards either the Americans or the Russians in matters concerning China, it was the business of Manac'h to convince them that this was not so.
3. As to American/Chinese relations, the General said that President Nixon had indicated to him, much more clearly during their talk in Washington at the time of Eisenhower's funeral than at their earlier meetings in Paris, that he intended to move towards establishing diplomatic relations with China and in consequence towards accepting that the Peking Government should represent China in the United Nations. The General said that he believed the Americans had weighed up this decision very carefully, because they realised that their recognition of Peking would disquiet the Russians and they attached even more importance to achieving a detente with Moscow than with Peking. He thought that they had nonetheless decided to recognise Peking in due course, because they felt that they could make the Russians understand that their motive in doing so was not one of hostility to Moscow.
4. As to the future of Sino/Soviet relations, the General said that he thought there was no danger of an immediate collision, but equally no hope of a real reconciliation, even though temporary agreements over frontier problems might he reached. He believed that there was a fundamental rivalry between the two nations, which would intensify.
5. Manac'h said that he was telling me all this in very strict confidence. I hope that the confidence can be respected. The General's remarks about French independence have obviously lost some of their importance now that he is no longer President, but what he had to say about American intentions will no doubt still interest you.
Yours ever W. B. J. Ledwidge
(W. B. J. Ledwidge)
(to: ) Warner, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
c.c. J. B. Denson. Esq., O.B.E.,
E. E. Tomkins, Esq., C.M.G., C.V.O.,
P. G. P. Dalton, Esq., C.M.G.,