英国外交部远东司Morgan就如何处理苏联船只在香港的问题提出意见：虽然英国外交部和香港政府一贯抵制苏联扩大在香港正式存在的企图，但是苏联通过派商船到香港和在香港修理船只的途径，成功建立起虽然有波动但还比较客观的现实存在。因此，苏联在香港从事情报及不法行为的风险在增加，这也可能给英国与中共国的关系带来麻烦，因此英国政府打算采取行动控制苏联与香港的接触规模。
苏联在香港的正式代表只有苏联Sudoimport公司在香港船厂的两个工程师而已，而且原本每次只给他们有效期为6个月的签证，签证到期后必须更换。最近，香港政府准备把新的签证有效期延长到9个月，但英国外交部建议不必延长。
1970年度的数据表明，本年度任何一个月内都有不少于362名苏联船员停留在香港，该年共有13艘苏联船只在香港进行修理，而且一般停留较长时间。目前这些船员在香港的行动自由没有限制，他们中有些人会说汉语并且在香港有固定的联系人，苏联可以把同一人用不同的名字用不同的船只连续派遣到香港以此保持人员的稳定性。1971年2月份香港报纸报道了苏联船员向香港船厂的华工散发批判中共的小册子。4月份苏联驻英国大使馆希望香港允许两艘苏联科学研究船只分别于7月和8月到访香港3天以补充给养。
虽然中共还没有苏联在港存在正式抗议，但已经通过香港报纸表达了关注。很明显，苏联对通过香港搜集关于中共的情报非常感兴趣。
为限制苏联船员在香港的规模，考虑到国际海员公约的规定，Morgan建议英国外交部应该明确告知苏联驻英国大使馆：
1.
英方对苏联商船在香港修理期间的船员人数过多表示关注；
2.
持有海员证的苏联船员可以上岸活动，但每小时最多放行12人，且每人每天上岸不得超过6小时。没有有效海员证的船员不得上岸，除非申请入港签证。如有违反，轻则禁止船员上岸，重则驱逐船只离岗。
3.
以上规定既不违反国际公约，也不适用于到访英国本国口岸的苏联船只，只适用于香港，因为香港情况特殊。
～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～～
SOVIET SHIPS IN HONG KONG
PROBLEM
1. Over the past year the Russians have
succeeded in establishing a considerable, though fluctuating, presence in Hong
Kong through visits
of Soviet merchant vessels and through arrangements for the repair of Soviet
merchant ships in the Colony dockyards. The risk of Soviet subversive activities and of embarrassment in our
relations with Peking, has increased and
seems likely to continue to grow unless we
take steps to control the scale of Soviet access to the Colony.
ARGUMENT
2. For many years the Russians have sought to expand their official presence
in the Colony but both we and the Hong Kong Government have always refused. At
present they have a small permanent official presence in Hong Kong through two Sudoimport
engineers employed in the Hong Kong and Whampoa docks. These engineers are
normally given 6-monthly visas only and must be replaced after this period. The
Hong Kong Government agreed to give the latest engineers 9-monthly visas on the
grounds that their departure after 6 months would be inconvenient to the
dockyard.
3. The Russians have now succeeded over a period of time in circumventing our ban on a further official
presence by having large numbers of Soviet seamen in the Colony at any
one time, either on ships
putting into the Colony during a cruise visit, or on ships undergoing repair in
the dockyards. The full extent of the Soviet presence is set out in Mr Howells'
letter of 23 February 1971. It is clearly considerable and is growing. For example, in any one month in 1970 there was an average of no less than 362 Soviet seamen in the
Colony.
13 Soviet merchant vessels were repaired in the dockyards in 1970; many stayed for long periods. The crews include Mandarin-speakers, who have
established contacts. There is at
present no restriction on
their movements in the Colony. It
would not be difficult for the Russians to maintain some continuity in the personnel by sending back the same
people on different ships under different names.
4. The situation has recently become even more disturbing. On February 9 this year local Hong Kong newspapers reported that the crew of a Soviet ship had been distributing
pamphlets criticising Chinese policy to local Chinese dockyard workers. We
expressed surprise and regret about this incident to the Soviet Embassy, and
were subsequently told by a member of the Embassy that this was "a private
initiative and that no doubt the necessary steps were being taken”. In
mid-April the Soviet Embassy asked
permission for 2 "scientific research vessels" to put into Hong Kong
for 3 days each in July and
August to replenish supplies. They also asked for information on the current
regulations for visits by such vessels to Hong Kong. The Governor's advice (Hong Kong telegram No 311) is
that we should refuse both requests. This
question will be the subject of a separate submission.
5. The Chinese have not yet protested about the numbers of Soviet seamen in
the Colony although there have been warning hints
in the communist press in Hong Kong that they are aware of the situation. The Chinese are understandably sensitive
about Soviet activities in Hong Kong. It is clear that the Russians are interested in Hong Kong as a source of
intelligence on China and
possibly also as a springboard for
intelligence activities directed against China.
6. We are concerned about the possibility of Soviet subversive activities
within the Colony itself. We must assume that if the Russians are allowed to
maintain and increase their present access to Hong Kong, they
will eventually mount operations there on a large scale. Hong Kong Special Branch are already fully stretched in dealing with other security problems
such as the surveillance of Chinese and nationalist Chinese intelligence
organisations. They do not have the
facilities or man-power
to deal with Soviet activities as well.
7. At our request, the Political Adviser in Hong Kong has sent us a paper
setting out policy recommendations for dealing with this problem. We are in general agreement with the recommendations (but see paragraphs
8-11 below). It is clear that there is no easy solution to the question.
Ideally, we should have liked to tell the Russians that they must reduce the
number of ships which put into the Colony or have repairs carried out there.
However, our shipping policy has always been to encourage free entry to merchant
ships all over the world. The Hong Kong Government would be reluctant to agree
to banning Soviet ships being repaired in the Colony since this would entail a
major row with the dockyard
8. We should also have liked to tell the Russians to confine the crews of
ships under repair, and the crews of cruise vessels, to their ships while in
port. Unfortunately, as far as the crews are concerned, this would be in
contravention of ILO Convention Number 108 of 1958 (the Seafarers' Identity
Documents Convention). Article 6(1) of the Convention provides that signatories
shall allow the entry into a territory for which the Convention is in force of seafarer holding a valid seafarers’ identity
document "when entry is requested for temporary shore leave while the ship
is in port". A seafarer's identity document takes the place of a visa for
this purpose. It would be a contravention of the Convention
to demand a visa as well. The Convention was applied to Hong Kong in 1964 and
was ratified by the USSR in 1969.
9. At first sight Article 6(4) appears to give us a let-out. It provides that nothing shall restrict the right of the signatory to prevent any particular individual from entering or remaining in its territory. In fact, the scope of the paragraph is limited. It would enable us to keep out individual Russians but not all Russians as such. To argue that as each Russian individually presented himself he could be individually refused
would be to interpret the terms of the Convention
in bad faith.
10. A more promising line of approach lies in the provisions of Article
6(1). The expression "temporary shore leave" is not defined anywhere
in the Convention in more exact terms. The
interpretation of this phrase is thus the responsibility of individual
signatories. In theory, it would be possible to interpret "temporary"
in terms of minutes. In practice this would clearly be
unreasonable and would expose the Hong Kong Government and, ultimately, HMG to censure from the ILO. The Legal Advisers see no reason however why
we should not establish a limit of
six hours per day. They agree
that even in the case of crew with valid identity documents we could also
justify restricting parties
of visiting seamen to twelve at, say, hourly intervals. In addition we could give the Russians warning that any breaches of these restrictions or other
misconduct would result in the immediate confinement on board of the group concerned in the event of minor
breaches or misconduct, and of the whole crew in the event of
serious breaches or misconduct, in either case until the ship concerned left
port.
11. The Convention only applies to seamen with identity documents issued in
accordance with the terms of the Convention. It does not apply to passengers on
cruise vessels or to crew without such documents. There would, therefore be no
objection to telling the Russians that Soviet nationals in the latter category (ie crew without documents) will
not be admitted. There are likely to be few of these. As regards Soviet passengers on
Soviet cruise vessels, the only sanction open to us is to insist that they
should have valid visas for Hong Kong if they wish to go ashore. It is not
clear whether present practice in Hong Kong is (as seems
likely) to allow such passengers to disembark for a few hours without visas
during the ship's stay in port. We propose consulting Hong Kong on this point.
12. We doubt whether
there is a real risk of Soviet retaliation, against crews of British ships
visiting ports in the Soviet Union if we take action on the
above lines. We propose to make it clear to the Russians that
these measures are necessary because of the special position of Hong Kong. HM
Embassy at Moscow have recommended that any approach to the Russians should be made in Hong Kong through the
Chairman of the Kowloon Docks to the two Sudoimport
engineers. Their argument
is that it would be best to keep the issue as localised as possible. EESD do not accept this. On a matter
of such importance the correct channel would be the Soviet Embassy here.
RECOMMENDATION
13. I recommend therefore that, subject to the further views of Hong Kong
and Moscow, we tell the Soviet Embassy here that:
a.
We view
with concern the excessive number of Soviet nationals present in the Colony
during the repair of Soviet merchant vessels in the dockyard.
b. Crew members of ships under repair or of cruise
vessels or other ships holding valid seafarers identity documents will be
allowed on shore in groups of twelve at hourly intervals and for periods of up
to six hours per day only. Crew members without valid seafarers identity
documents will be confined to their ships. Any breaches of these restrictions
or other misconduct will result in the immediate confinement on board (i) in
the event of minor breaches or misconduct, of the group concerned, and (ii) in
the event of serious breaches or misconduct of all crew - in either
case until the ship concerned leaves port.
c. Soviet nationals who are passengers on Soviet
cruise vessels calling at Hong Kong will require visas if they wish to go
ashore.
d. If the Soviet Embassy
say that these regulations are contrary to Soviet practice as regards the
treatment of British seamen visiting the Soviet Union, we propose to reply that these measures are necessary because of the special position of Hong
Kong. They will not affect current regulations applying to Soviet seamen
visiting this country.
14. I further recommend that we suggest to Hong Kong that in future they grant only 6-monthly visas to the two
Soviet engineers.
15. A draft telegram to Hong Kong and Moscow is submitted. East European and
Soviet Department, Hong Kong Department, Marine
and Transport Department, Legal Advisers, Sir S Crawford and Mr Wilford agree.
The Department of Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Defence have been
consulted and concur.
J A L Morgan
Far Eastern Department
17 May 1971
Copied to:
Sir S Crawford Mr Dudgeon M&TD
Sir T Brimelow Mr Aiers SWPD
Sir L Monson Mr Eaton
Mr Bullard EESD Mrs Denza Legal Advisers
Mr Ritchie PUSD Mr Madigan Shipping Div. DTI
Mr Tesh Defence Dept
出处：英国外交部档案FCO21/874
没有评论:
发表评论