1968.1.22苏联总理柯西金与到访的英国首相谈中国问题

1968.1.22苏联总理与到访的英国首相谈中国问题

按：1968年初英国首相威尔逊（Harold Wilson）到访苏联，苏联总理柯西金到莫斯科机场迎接。在从机场到宾馆的路上，威尔逊向柯西金提议在私下会谈中多讨论一下中国问题。柯氏说中苏关系没什么变化，在政治经济上很复杂。威氏说据悉中苏贸易规模小、范围窄，柯氏说苏联主要卖给中国少量轧钢、非铁类金属和机械，规模是以前的1/8而已，中国想买航空电子设备及类似先进设备，但苏联不卖。

威氏就此谈起贸易禁运，说他打算放松对苏禁运，加强对中禁运，毕竟苏联技术发达，对西方战略物资没有迫切需要。威问柯氏觉得在哪方面英苏贸易可以增加，又应该在哪方面加强对中国禁运。柯西金说中国同日本贸易在增加，虽然由于内部问题中国现在拿不出什么物资卖给日本。中方在农业上的麻烦较小，还声称军事实力不强，但也可能有意想不到的事情发生。
还没说出什么东西，车就到达宾馆了。
1968年初威尔逊出访很多，重要的目的是帮助美国促成越南与美国和谈。中国和苏联分别是越南的两个最大支持者，中国反对和谈，而苏联支持和谈。

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SECRET

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND MR. KOSYGIN IN THE CAR FROM MOSCOW AIRPORT AT 15.00   HOURS. MONDAY, JANUARY 22,  1968    

China and the Strategic Embargo

After agreeing with Mr. Kosygin on the possibility of both formal and private talks, the main subjects which needed to be discussed at formal meetings (Vietnam, European security, the Middle East, and bilateral questions), and the composition of the main representatives on the Soviet side (Messrs. Gromyko, Kirillin, Patolichev, Polyansky and the Soviet Ambassador) the Prime Minister said that it would no doubt be useful if they could also have some more private exchanges about China, and the United States and Vietnam, as they had done last February. He would particularly like to exchange views about China with Mr. Kosygin.

     Mr. Kosygin said that Soviet relations with China had not greatly changed: they were still very complicated, both in a political and economic sense. The Prime Minister said that he understood that Soviet trade with China was very small, and conducted within very narrow limits. Mr. Kosygin said that the Soviet Union was supplying China with rolled steel and non-ferrous metals and machine tools, but their trade had dropped to one-eighth of its former total: it was now minimal. They were refusing to supply the Chinese with sophisticated equipment in the avionics and other similar fields much though the Chinese wanted them.

The Prime Minister recalled his earlier exchanges with Mr. Kosygin about the strategic embargo. It was no longer reasonable to apply the same kind of limitations to the Soviet Union as to China; he himself favoured a liberalisation with the Soviet Union and tighter controls in regard to China. Moreover, Soviet technology was now so advanced that they no longer had such urgent need of Western strategic goods. This was, of course, a question in which our Allies were also involved, but he was considering the possibility of taking certain initiatives. He asked for Mr. Kosygin’s views on the areas in which trade with the Soviet Union might be increased; and about areas in which controls over trade with China could be tightened.

Mr. Kosygin took note of this. He said that the Chinese were trading increasingly with the Japanese. But their problem was that, because of their internal economic failures, they had few goods to sell. In reply to questions from the Prime Minister, he said that the Chinese troubles had had less effect on agriculture. Chinese treatment of Soviet diplomats had returned to normal. The Soviet Government only had a Charge d'Affaires in Peking, as the Chinese did in Moscow. The essence of the Chinese position was that they had no real military strength; but the unexpected could happen.

The Prime Minister agreed. He added that he thought that the world situation had worsened in a number of respects since he and Mr. Kosygin had met year ago. This gave a special importance to their forthcoming discussions. ……   

At this point the car drew up at the Dacha.

Distribution. (Secret and Personal)

Foreign Secretary

Chancellor of the Exchequer

President of the Board of Trade

Sir Burke Trend

January 30. 1968.

出处：英国外交部档案FCO 21/42