1.西德与中国的贸易往来基本上由几家长期在中国做生意的德国大公司把持，一些小公司希望能分一杯羹就呼吁西德与中共建立正式的经贸关系，但西德官方向他们指出，和中共做生意成功的关键在于利益计算而不在于正式的协议。当中方感觉吃亏时，有正式协议也解决不了麻烦；相反当中国人有求于你时，即便两国政府没有正式关系，他们也会想办法达成交易。
2.至于和中共国建立外交关系，西德政府并不着急，因为德方认为经营中共与西方关系主要应有美国来负责，毕竟如果中共对西方造成什么威胁，首先要由美国来对付中国。所以，西德不想在与中共建交这个问题上给美国制造麻烦。
3.新西兰人好奇为何西德没有与国民党政权建立外交关系。Jungfleisch解释说1949年西德成立后国民党就撤出了原在德国的使团和军事代表团，就连阿登纳就任西德总理时蒋介石都没有直接发贺电，而是很奇怪的通过一个在德中国人社团转达祝贺。有人猜测很可能是因为蒋介石个人不喜欢德国，所以国民党撤出了驻德外交官。
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CONFIDENTIAL
11 February, 1969
The Secretary
of External Affairs,
WELLINGTON.
Copy to: London Tokyo
Washington Hong Kong
Ottawa Rome
Canberra Brussels
New York (PR)
GERMANY AND COMMUNIST CHINA
In the year 1967 trade between the Federal Republic and Communist China exceeded for the first time DM.
1,000 million and Germany thus become China’s main European trading partner. German exports to China amounted to approximately DM. 700 million and Chinese exports to Germany to about DK.400 million. The bulk of the German exports are made up of heavy
machinery, copper, fertiliser, and steel pipes and the Chinese exports comprise
foodstuffs, tobacco, silk, cotton and tin. The figures for 1968 are not yet available but the indications are that this volume of trade
will be maintained.
2. Foreign Minister Brandt has referred publicly on one or two occasions in the last few months to what he describes as "the positive development" of Germrny's commercial relations with China but he has sought to play down any suggestion
that this stands in curious contrast to Germany's policy of "political restraint" towards Communist
China. He has pointed out that German trade with China has a long and good
tradition and that the Chinese for their part seem to be interested in keeping up a satisfactory trade and in reducing the adverse
balance of trade that they have with Germany. Some
months ago in Hamburg, referring to the possibility of concluding a trade agreement with China, he stated:
"We are often asked why we do not formalise trade relations with China. In our position it would have been unwise to risk dissensions with both
world rowers and to bring disagreement with Japan. This should not exclude a
possible later adjustment of our relations with China.
But we will have to avoid inconveniencing our relations with other friendly nations."
3. In the light of Germany’s developing trade relationship with China and Herr Brandt’s comments we recently took the opportunity to have a discussion with Dr Jungfleisch, deputy Head of the
Foreign Office’s China Division, on Germany’s relations with Communist China. We asked whether there had ever been any formal commercial agreement with Peking and whether this was under consideration.
Jungfleisch said that in 1957 the Federation of German Industry had concluded a commercial agreement with the corresponding
Chinese organization but that it
had only been of one year's duration and had not been renewed, because neither side had expressed any great interest in doing so: it had not greatly facilitated
the development of trade. German trade with China arose from the enterprise of a relatively small number of German firms who had long-standing
ties with the area. There were
occasional murmurings from smaller firms, who were anxious to get into the Chinese
market and who lacked these historical ties, about the desirability of
concluding some sort of consular/commercial agreement with Chine which would
facilitate their operations. The Federal Government however always pointed out
to these firms that success in
dealings with China was governed less by formal agreements than by
considerations of self-interest. If the latter were
lacking, formal consular or commercial agreements, in the experience of other countries
which had these, were of little value. Conversely if the Chinese wanted to trade they
would make sure this was facilitated even if there was no form of official
relations with the country concerned.
4. We then asked
Jungfleisch what was the attitude of the German Government towards diplomatic
recognition of Peking. Jungfleisch said that his Government's basic position
was that German vital interests were not engaged in China but in Europe. The Germans sew it as essentially a responsibility of
the United States to make the running in
the matter of China’s relationship with the Western world. It was the United States which was most directly affected and which bore the
chief responsibility for coping with any danger China might present to the west as a whole. It was not for Germany to interfere and complicate life for the United States. The German Government saw the problem in the perspective of the western alliance as a whole rather than in terms of German- Chinese bilateral relations, and
he thought they would continue to do so.
5. An additional factor influencing the German
Government, Jungfleisch said, was of course the division of Germany. As China
was a divided country too, Bonn had to tread very carefully in the Chinese question.
6. Jungfleisch then asked what the New Zealand attitude was and we explained that while we wished to
encourage China to emerge from its self-imposed isolation we were adamant that this should
not be at the expense of Taiwan. We regarded the latter as one of the success stories in Asia and as a
country which was playing a useful role in regional associations in Asia. We
did not think it would be in the Western interest for Taiwan to be isolated or
deprived of its right to an acknowledged place in the international community.
Jungfleisch indicated that he thought the German Government would be broadly in
agreement with our assessment of the importance of Taiwan to the free world.
7. At this point we asked Jungfleisch how it came
about that the Federal Republic did not have diplomatic relations with Nationalist
China. He explained that up to 1949 Nationalist China had one or two consulates
in Germany and a military mission. With the establishment
of the Federal Republic in 1949 however these missions had been withdrawn and
Chiang Kai Chek had taken the odd step of sending congratulations to Adenauer
not directly but through a local Chinese association. The whole affair was clouded in oriental obscurity but it was Jungfleisch's guess that the withdrawal
of a Nationalist Chinese presence from Germany in 1950 had something to do with
Chiang’s personal attitude towards Germany. He had
participated in several allied summit conferences in the course of the Second
World War but had not been invited in the closing stages to discussions on Germany. Perhaps he was
huffed; perhaps he was unhappy at any form of German state
emerging. It was anyone's guess. Jungfleisch added nevertheless that the Federal
Republic had over the years also developed good trading relations with Taiwan.
8. Finally we
asked Jungfleisch whether in view of the recent Italian and Canadian moves he
thought there was any possibility of the Federal Government coming to feel
isolated within Western Europe and NATO in the matter of recognition of Peking.
Jungfleisch laughed and said he
did not think that was a consideration which would weigh very heavily with Germany. Certainly there was no such feeling at the moment.
Charge d'Affaires a.i
出处：英国外交部档案 FCO_21_435
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