访问结束后，李洁明写了份简报，时任中情局副局长（主管国家情报分析）的Robert R. Bowie认为这份简报很有意思，推荐给中情局局长Stansfield M. Turner阅读，并建议列入“总统每日简报”中，而且最好是Turner带上李洁明向卡特汇报。
“在四川省，中国人口最多的省份，那里的人们承认生产遇到问题，但都归咎于四人帮的破坏。事实上我们观察到那里落后的生产工具和方式，懒惰的劳动力和可怜的生产安全措施。但我夜间在四川的城市里散步时没有发现去年施勒辛格（按：James Rodney Schlesinger作为前美国国防部长于1976年9月访华）所报告的紧张气氛。
Approved For Release 2004/03/17: CIA-RDP80M00165A000500350003-9
THE DIRECTOR OF
Deputy for National intelligence 10/18/1977
NOTE FOR : The Director
You might be interested in reading this brief report by Jim Lilley on his trip to China.
Robert R. Bowie
(handwritten note) POSSIBLE PRESIDENTIAL BRIEFING ITEM? AND/OR TAKE LILLEY WITH YOU?
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4. Observations of Chinese Officials (Cadres): The Chinese cadres accompanying us (seven of them including the high level intelligence official) were more open and forthcoming than any officials I have encountered in my long exposure to the Chinese. This was characterized by the following:
a. Humor and some sarcasism about the party line in China.
b. Improvised conversation unbound by inflexible dogma. For instance, discussions of Chinese history were often free of ideology.
c. Desire to acquire knowledge of our culture. They were interested in American music, habits and games. For instance, we taught them dominoes and gin rummy and had a bang-up musical evening with them. I suggest this augers well for future DDO development of Chinese officials.
5. Visits to Remote Areas:
a. In the most populous province of China, Szechwan, the Chinese admitted their serious problems in production and disruptions. They blamed it all on the "Gang of Four". This did not obscure their more basic problems of primitive machinery and methods, deplorable safety measures, indolent work force.
b. I took the opportunity to take long walks through reported troubled cities in Szechwan late at night. I did not detect the tension that the Schlesinger party reported last year.
c. I believe that I'm the first US Government official to visit Tibet. I met the Chinese, Jen Jung, who runs this huge region and talked directly with him. I questioned him on the progress of their railroad from the north and about their border situation with India. He was not forthcoming on the railroad. He did take a belligerant tone on India, certainly more so than reflected in public statements. My impressions are that Tibet is under a tight Chinese grip backed by military power. Although the Tibetans may resent this there isn’t much they can do about it. I will report details of all these observations to Domestic Contact Division.
6. Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping: We spent an hour and a half with Teng who is considered by many analysts to be the most powerful man in China. Teng came across to me as a confident, aggressive and skillful leader. He talked authoritatively without notes and he only occasionally referred to his staff. Great deference was shown to him by the Chinese present. There was a patronizing tone to much of what he said. He made these points:
--He had nothing against negotiations with the USSR but he made it clear that he thought the Soviets bested the US in strategic negotiations. (I believe Teng was indicating the Chinese too could negotiate with the Russians.) He did attack the trend of "appeasement" in the US.
--Eurocommunism did not overly disturb the Chinese. Teng said that he was well aware of the history of the European communist movement. Teng took the simplistic view that if West Europe parties followed the Soviet line they would be exposed as puppets and rejected by the people. If they refused to obey the orders of Russia then this could lead to the development of independent communist parties, a desirable thing.
--On Taiwan, Teng repeated, the standard position of the PRC. He did convey a sense of patience but with the warning that the longer the US took to solve the problem the more unfavorable the US position became. He passed the message via Bush to Vance that his concern that Vance had misrepresented the Chinese position by terming it flexible was a thing of the past.
Teng said the Chinese were prepared to proceed with negotiations at the UN (USLO considered this an important signal).
7. Bush and the-Chairman of Pennzoil, Hugh Liedtke, made a major proposal to Teng and later to the Minister of Foreign Trade on a massive arrangement between China and the US on the exploration, refining and transportation of oil. Bush considered the proposal to have strategic implications for dealing with the Soviet problem. The Chinese first made noises that the state of relations between US and China was not conducive for such an arrangement but later asked for the proposal in writing which Liedtke intends to provide.
James R. Liliey