按：红色标记系录入者所加。
1966年10月31日中共在北京举行大型集会纪念鲁迅，11月2日中共喉舌《人民日报》转载《红旗》杂志社论《以毛主席为代表的无产阶级革命路线的胜利》，11月3日毛泽东率领中共要人再次接见来自全国的红卫兵和师生。英国驻华代办Hopson结合这几件事对文革形势进行了简单评论：相关演讲和文章中气势汹汹的话说明中共党内冲突提升到新的层级，刘少奇、邓小平、李雪峰或即将被公开点名批判。
1.激进派称要向鲁迅学习，学习他对阶级敌人毫不留情斗争到底。看起来中共内部对文革的抵制势力仍然不小，比如成都军区前不久出面支持受到红卫兵攻击的中共四川省委。
2.官方称没有“第三条道路”，指责骑墙派和和稀泥的。外交圈认为这可能是指周恩来。
3.中共宣称要毫不妥协、不怕孤立，有两重意义：国内，中央的激进派和地方上的红卫兵都还是少数，但不要怕；国际，不仅要反对帝国主义和修正主义，还要反对国际共产主义运动中那些以为“惟独自己得了‘中庸之道’”的人。
4.姚文元在纪念鲁迅的讲话中说“只有革命的人们，才有资格来纪念革命的战士。”而刘少奇、邓小平、李雪峰没能出现在纪念鲁迅大会现场，这就很能说明问题了。尽管刘、邓、李都出现在11.3接见红卫兵大会，但位置都很不显眼。
5.红旗杂志社论重点批判镇压群众运动的人。英国人认为派出工作组和最早反对红卫兵是两个主要问题，而刘少奇都与此有关，这说明他自身难保。
___________________________________________________
CONFIDENTIAL
FROM PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
CYPHER/OTP FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION
Mr. Hopson
No. 917 D.08.24 3 Novermber
1966
3 Novermber R.11.28
3 Novermber 1966
PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL
Addressed
to Foreign Office telegram No.917 of 3 November.
Repeated for information to: Washington POLAD Singapore
Hong Kong Moscow
My telegram Nos.908,909 and 915: Cultural revolution.
In their content and the violence of their language the articles and
speeches commemorating Lu Shun indicate that the internal party struggle has
reached a new intensity and may be approaching a crisis. Nevertheless, some
passages clearly refer to the international situation and it is sometimes hard to determine where the emphasis lies.
2. Broadly the lines of the struggle seem to be those indicated in my
telegram No.870 of 22 October and Cradock's letter to Bolland of 26 October: but the following aspects are worth noting:
(a) Lu Shun is being used by the extremists as an example
of struggle to the death against class enemies, defined in the domestic
context as the handful of people within the party who are in position of power
and have taken the capitalist road. Despite the efforts in the Press to present these enemies as on their last legs it seems clear
that they have been putting up a powerful resistance. Presumably their
centres are the old-style party apparatus and certain provincial party
committees. It is even possible that in some
provinces local army units have been giving at least
moral support to local party committees under criticism. One poster for
example reports that the PLA in Ch'engtu have supported
the local party committee in a show of force against Red Guards:
(b) Attacks on "peacemakers" and
"fence sitters " suggest that there are a group of moderates
in the party who are preaching compromise. It is hard to suggest who might be
the members of such a group though some of our colleagues
have suggested Chou En-lai for this role. The party is now told that
there is no middle way and that everyone must quickly decide where he stands:
(c) The curious passages on isolation and encirclement may reflect a
situation in which the extremists at the top level find themselves, at least
temporarily, in a minority against the combination of the enemies and the fence sitters. This may explain the shrillness of
the call for increased militancy. The passages may also be an encouragement to “Left
Comrades" and Red Guards in the provinces where they would normally be in
a minority:
(d) There are exhortations for a similar uncompromising struggle, if need
be in isolation, on the international front. Attacks are made not only on
Imperialists and modern revisionists but also on "those in the
international Communist movement who consider that they alone are pursuing the doctrine
of the mean: they are in fact showing themselves up as the most vulgar of
Revisionists".
(e) Rally of 31 October may have been an attempt to prepare public opinion
for an attack on certain leading figures, e.g., Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-sp'ing, and LiHsueh-feng. Whether they would be represented as insufficiently revolutionary or as
out-and-out enemies is not clear. Their non-attendance at the rally and Yao Wen-yuan’s statement that only true revolutionaries could take part in commemorating Lu Shun
were very pointed. Teng was not present at the airport to
see K'ang Sheng off to Albania. On the other hand all three were present on the
rostrum at today's mass rally in Tien an-men though given minimum notice.
3. The Red Flag editorial carried by the People's Daily of 2 November spells out the internal party situation in some detail and
makes it clear that the main indictment against erring comrades will be that of
opposing and suppressing the masses. This could cover both opposition to the
initial idea of the Red Guards and responsibility for the errors of the first
work-teams. On both counts Liu Shao-ch'i would seem vulnerable. The editorial
repeats the warning of the Red Flag article of 3 October (my telegram No.832) that, failing recantation, the contradictions
with these comrades will be treated as antagonistic i.e., with the enemy. By
apparently leaving this opening for repentance and by allowing that there may
be various categories of guilt, this editorial strikes a slightly less tough
note than the Lu Shun polemics. But the general effect is minatory enough.
F.O. please pass Washington 343 and Moscow 245.
[Repeated as requested]
88888 CONFIDENTIAL
出处： FO_371_186983
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