1971.11.19
港英当局首度从逃港者得知林彪事件的中国官方说法
按：红色标记系录入者所加。
英国外交部称这是从中国叛逃者中第一次得知官方关于林彪事件的解释（This
is first account we have from a defecter from China of the explanations being
given about Lin P'iao，见附图1），当然这不代表英国政府此前没有通过别的渠道得知林彪之死，而且美国政府早在几天前也从类似渠道获知了林彪事件
：11月16日白宫战情室（The White House Situation Room）向基辛格提供的晚间要报（Evening
这位逃港者是一位20岁出头的广州青年，在广州市小学六年级毕业后就下乡到了，智力一般但记忆力不错，逃港理由是生活艰辛（见附图3）。他下乡地点在番禺县石楼公社清流大队，1971年11月7日他在此和另外2000余人一起听到传达7份中共中央秘密文件，这才得知两个月前发生的林彪事件。
经查， 1971年10月24日中共中央发出《关于向全国群众传达林彪叛党叛国事件的通知》（中发
［1971］67号）其中所列的，决定“将林彪叛党叛国事件，向全国广大工农兵群众传达”，传达内容为“毛主席最近批示的五个重要文件（中发［1971］66号文件）和本通知，毛主席的《我的一点意见》”。而中发［1971］66号文件提到的5个文件为：中发［1971］57号、61号、62号、64号、65号文件。（这5个文件的全文，见本博客《1971.10.17合肥传达林彪事件后的反映》http://communistchinadoc.blogspot.com/2014/10/19711017.html
）
所以这位逃港者听到的7份文件，应是毛1970年庐山会议上写的《我的一点意见》和中发［1971］57号、61号、62号、64号、65号、67号文。（《我的一点意见》见附件1，中发［1971］67号见本文附件2）
比对文件原文后，发现这位逃港者提供的内容大体是准确的，只是在具体文件号码和细节上有多处错误。比如：
1.逃港者说57号文件提到林彪谋刺毛泽东、另立中央。错，实际上这个内容出现在65号文件。因为，在1971年9月18日中共发出57号文件时，还不知道为何林彪在9月13日出逃，只是刚确定林彪摔死在蒙古，需要紧急发文件通知高干此事并且笼统地从政治路线上批判林彪而已，在此后清查中才发现林立果谋刺毛泽东之事，于是在10月6日发出的65号文件里具体化林彪的罪名，即两谋“谋害毛主席”和“另立中央”。
2.逃港者说57号文件提到林彪9月13日从庐山乘三叉戟飞机出逃。错，实际上中共几个文件里都没有提到林彪是从哪里出逃的。或许是因为7个文件中的第一个即毛泽东1970年《我的一点意见》提到了庐山会议，所以逃港者对庐山印象很深。
3.逃港者说57号文件还提到“9月13日一架直升飞机带着两个林彪同伙和驾驶员出逃但被迫降，一人打死驾驶员后自杀，另一人被捕”。不确，57号文件原文说“直升飞机迫降后，林彪死党周宇驰、于新野打死驾驶员，两人开枪自杀，其余被我活捉，”这说明机上原本至少有4人。其实57号文件也未说明实情，该直升机上共有5人，其中三人是林立果的同伙周宇驰、于新野、李伟信，另外两人是驾驶员陈修文、陈士印。直升机降落前周宇驰开枪打死陈修文，降落后于新野向陈士印开枪却误伤周宇驰，后来周宇驰、于新野、李伟信三人相约自杀，但李伟信放了空枪活了下来，周宇驰、于新野则自尽，剩下李伟信和陈士印被活捉（见康庭梓《真相：专机副驾驶亲历“九一三”》）。
4.逃港者说61号文件提到林立果曾在广州、上海、天津从事反革命行动，并图谋推翻毛泽东。错，这些内容其实是在65号文件提到的，而且原文说的是北京市而非天津市。61号文件讲的是黄永胜、吴法宪、李作鹏、邱会作已离职反省，由叶剑英主持中央军委日常工作。
关于11月7日传达会，逃港者提供了一些值得注意的细节，比如礼堂会场讲台的背后挂上了大标语“声讨林贼反革命大会”。宣读文件的是番禺县革委会派来的一位姓孔的人，他念完文件后，有些听众表示不敢相信林彪竟做出这种事，并怀疑林彪是否真的死了。这位姓孔的就补充了一些林彪叛变的细节。比如：
1.关于林彪摔死在蒙古，中国驻蒙大使当时就去了现场看到林彪尸体，这不可能有错。
2.林彪谋害毛泽东总共有3种办法：第一，打算在毛泽东途径北京机场去上海时，引爆机场的燃油库；第二，在毛的专列上放毒气，但因为毛所在车厢的门窗都是密闭的，所以没成功；第三，毛在上海的住所安放了定时炸弹，但毛临时改变住址，所以躲过去了。
有意思的是，以上3种办法在中共文件中都未有传达，尤其是在中共事后清查中从未提到过第2、第3种办法，第一项倒是在65号文件中有些影子，该文说“妄图乘毛主席巡视南方的机会，在上海或上海附近炸掉毛主席乘坐的火车”，但也不是说在北京机场炸油库。真不知道这位孔姓革委会成员是从何得知这些小道消息的？
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CONFIDENTIAL
Overt Intelligence Report (OIR)
0256/71 Date of Report: 19 Nov 71
Distribution Lists:
J. Defence
X. Political
Y. Security
Z. Personalities
CHINA: KWANGTUNG
DENUNCIATION OF LIN PIAO
Reference:
A. Map KWANGTUNG Series L781
(1:50,000) Sheet 7623 I Ed 4
SUMMARY
1. Latest Date of Information (LDl):
NOV 71
2. Contents
a. Background.
b. Denunciation of LIN PIAO.
c. Denunciation of other leaders.
d. New Minister of Defence.
NOTES ON SOURCE
3. Source who was in his early
twenties was born and educated to primary six level in CANTON. Having completed
his primary education, he was assigned to a rural commune until he left CHINA illegally
in Nov 71. He was of average intelligence with a retentive memory and gave
harsh living conditions as his reason for leaving the country.
BACKGROUND
4. Source was assigned to CHINGLIU
Production Brigade (PB) of SHIHL0U Commune, PANYU County. The commune was
located at ref A.225835N 1132842E. From time to time he returned to CANTO to visit
relatives, but spent the majority of the time working in his commune area. He
was on quite good terms with some of the local farmers with whom he discussed
commonplace affairs and the current rumours. He paid more attention to matters
directly affecting his own circumstances rather than items of general interest.
There were rumours to the effect that Down-to-the-Courtryside Youths (DCY) were
to be re-assigned to the north of KWANGTUNG Province and rumours concerning the
proposed visit of President NIXON to CHINA. He had
heard nothing, either in CANTON or in the countryside, concerning possible
change in the leadership in PEKING until 7 Nov 71.
DSMUNCIATION OF LIN PIAO
5. Special Meeting. Early on the morning of the 7 Nov 71 source
was informed by his production team (PT) leader that he was to attend a special
meeting in the PB hall that morning. The meeting started at 0730 and Source
attended, staying until the meeting ended later in the day. More than 2,000
people attended the meeting from all the PBs within the commune.
6. Official Representatives.
Seated on a dais at one end of the hall were approximately 10 officials, whom
as far as Source could recall included the following:
a.
A representative from the PANYU County Revolutionary Committee (RC).
b.
The following members of the CHINGLIU PB RC.
(1)
The Chairman.
(2)
The Deputy Chairman.
(3)
The Militia Battalion Commander.
(4)
The responsible Person for Security.
(5)
Members.
7. Banner on Display. Behind the dais on
which the officials sat was a large banner bearing the following inscription:
‘ Discuss the thief LIN’s anti-revolutionary
meeting’
(STC: 5116/6062/2651/6329/0646/7245/0730/1129/2585)
8. Introduction of County representative.
The chairman of the PB RC then opened the meeting and introduced the county representative
KUNG (STC: 1313) who had secret documents from the Central Committee which were
to be read out.
9. Documents' Title. KUNG read out the title of the documents which
was ‘CCP Central Committee Secrets Documents - Approved by Chairman MAO Tse-tung'.
10. Contents.
a. First Document. “In my
opinion (Chairman MAO’s) the so-called politician CHEN Po-ta has followed the
PENG Te-huai line. I do not know where he was at the first LUSHAN meeting –
perhaps the decisions were not to his satisfaction; it was exactly the same at the
second meeting”. (The document then went on to criticize CHEN for trying to
rally support for LIN Piao in the Central Committee).
b. Second Document.
The second document was described as the 57th
Central Committee Secret Document. In this
document it was stated that LIN Piao had
attempted to assassinate Chairman MAO, set up a
new central committee and stage a count revolutionary coup, but had been
killed. The details were:
On 13 Sep 71 LIN Piao left LUSHAN at 0700 in a TRIDENT aircraft with his wife YEH Chun, son LIN Li-kuo, the pilot
and personal bodyguards. One of the bodyguards attempted to stop LIN Piao but
LIN shot and injured the guard. At this stage LIN’s daughter LIN li-heng
telephoned CHOU En-lai several times reporting the incident. CHOU En-lai
informed Chairman MAO who allegedly stated that pursuit
was not necessary as the aircraft did not have much fuel. The airc craft
crashed in OUTER MONGOLIA killing all on board. On the same day, 13 Sep, a helicopter with three passengers, two friends of LIN Piao
(unnamed) and a pilot took off from PEKING; the helicopter was forced to
land by CCAF aircraft. On landing one of LIN Piao’s
friends shot the pilot and then committed suicide but the other man was
arrested and the helicopter searched. The helicopter was found to contain a
large number of secret documents.
c. Third Document. The third document was described as the 61st Central Committee Secret Document. In
this document it was stated that the son of LIN Piao, LIN
Li-kuo had carried out counter-revolutionary activities in CANTON, SHANGHAI,
TIENTSIN and other cities. He was engaged in plotting to overthrow MAO
with the assistance of the army.
d. Fourth Document. The fourth document was described as the 64th
Central Committee Secret Document. In this document it was stated that all
those who had assisted LIN Piao in his attempt to assassinate Chairman MAO had
been arrested and would be investigated by the Central Committee.
11. Reaction of the meeting. At this
stage in the proceedings several members of the commune expressed disbelief
that LIN Piao could have acted in this way and that he was dead.
12. Confirmation of LIN Piao’s
Treachery. KUNG having listened to the
doubts raised as a result of what he had read out, then produced additional information
to confirm LIN Piao’s treachery as follows:
a. Proof of Death. The Chinese
Ambassador to OUTER MONGOLIA had visited the scene of the crash and had seen
LIN Piao’s body and it was impossible for him to be mistaken.
b. Assassination Attempts. Three separate assassination attempts all took
place in Sep 71, details as follows:
(1) First Attempt. Chairman MAO went to SHANGHAI on a tour of
inspection. A plan had been made to detonate a fuel
storage tank when MAO arrived at PEKING airport in transit to SHANGHAI,
but the plan failed. (No reasons were given for the failure of this plan nor
were details revealed of LIN’s involvement.
(2) Second Attempt. An attempt was made to use poison gas to assassinate Chairman MAO when he was
travelling in a train but this was foiled due to the fact that all windows and
doors of that part of train in which MAO travelled, were sealed.
(3) Third Attempt. On a visit to SHANGHAI Chairman MAO was due
to stay overnight with a military unit but plans were changed and he stayed
elsewhere. It was subsequently discovered that a ‘time
bomb’ had been planted in the original building in which MAO was intended to
remain!
NOTE: The contents of seven documents were read
out to the meeting but Source could not remember anything concerning the other
three.
出处：英国外交部档案 FCO_21_805
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附件1：我的一点意见
毛泽东
1970.08.31
毛泽东
1970.08.31
这个材料是陈伯达同志搞的，欺骗了不少同志。第一，这里没有马克思的话。第二，只找了恩格斯一句话，而《路易·波拿巴特政变记》这部书不是马克思的主要著作。第三，找了列宁的有五条。其中第五条说，要有经过考验、受过专门训练和长期教育，并且彼此能够很好地互相配合的领袖，这里列举了四个条件。别人且不论，就我们中央委员会的同志来说，够条件的不很多。例如，我跟陈伯达这位天才理论家之间，共事三十多年，在一些重大问题上就从来没有配合过，更不去说很好的配合。仅举三次庐山会议为例。第一次，他跑到彭德怀那里去了。第二次，讨论工业七十条，据他自己说，上山几天就下山了，也不知道他为了什么原因下山，下山之后跑到什么地方去了。这一次，他可配合得很好了，采取突然袭击，煽风点火，唯恐天下不乱，大有炸平庐山，停止地球转动之势。我这些话，无非是形容我们的天才理论家的心（是什么心我不知道，大概是良心吧，可决不是野心）的广大而已。至于无产阶级的天下是否会乱，庐山能否炸平，地球是否停转，我看大概不会吧。上过庐山的一位古人说：“杞国无事忧天倾”。我们不要学那位杞国人。最后关于我的话，肯定帮不了他多少忙。我是说主要地不是由于人们的天才，而是由于人们的社会实践。我同林彪同志交换过意见，我们两人一致认为，这个历史家和哲学史家争论不休的问题，即通常所说的，是英雄创造历史，还是奴隶们创造历史，人的知识（才能也属于知识范畴）是先天就有的，还是后天才有的，是唯心论的先验论，还是唯物论的反映论，我们只能站在马列主义的立场上，而决不能跟陈伯达的谣言和诡辩混在一起。同时我们两人还认为，这个马克思主义的认识论问题，我们自己还要继续研究，并不认为事情已经研究完结。希望同志们同我们一道采取这种态度，团结起来，争取更大的胜利，不要上号称懂得马克思，而实际上根本不懂马克思那样一些人的当。
附件2：中共中央关于向全国群众传达林彪叛党叛国事件的通知
1971.10.24；中发 ［1971］67号
1971.10.24；中发 ［1971］67号
毛主席批示：照发。
各省、市、自治区党委，各大军区、各省军区、各野战军党委，军委各总部、各军兵种党委，中央和国务院各部委领导小组、党的核心小组：
中央决定：各地、各单位自接到通知之日起，将林彪叛党叛国事件，向全国广大工农兵群众传达。传达的办法如下，
一、传达的文件：毛主席最近批示的五个重要文件（中发［1971］66号文件）和本通知，毛主席的《我的一点意见》。
二、传达的范围：全体共产党员，中国人民解放军全体战士，工厂、矿山、企业、事业单位全体职工，农村人民公社全体贫下中农和中农，大学、中学的教职员工和学生，小学教职员工和高年级学生，城镇居民中的劳动人民，党、政、军机关工作人员。
地、富、反、坏、右、资本家，有严重政治历史问题和正在进行审查的人，都不能听传达。外国人也不能听传达。
传达的范围可以逐步扩大，先党员、工农兵，后其他；也可以同时传达。由各地、各单位自行安排。但最迟应在十一月底以前传达完毕。
爱国人士、外国专家和中国籍外国人如何传达，另行通知。
三、传达的方法。根据若干试点单位的经验，首先应将中央文件原原本本地向群众宣读。其中，57号、65号和《我的一点意见》要反复宣读、讲解多次。宣读的同志，事先要弄懂文件，做好准备。宣读以后，组织群众讨论。群众提出的问题，属于文件已经讲了的，可以通过讨论、讲解文件解决。庐山会议情况，可以由参加批陈整风的同志进行说明。在宣读、讨论和讲解的过程中，要始终抓住重点，而不要追究枝节问题。要引导群众学习毛主席关于社会主义社会中存在两个阶级、两条道路、两条路线斗争的多次指示，使广大群众充分认识林彪陈伯达反党集团妄图改变中国共产党的路线和政策，改变社会主义制度，颠覆无产阶级专政，复辟资本主义的罪恶阴谋，鼓舞广大群众同林彪陈伯达反党集团斗争的决心和信心。一个单位经过十天左右的时间，经过几次宣读、讨论、讲解，大部分问题都可以得到解决。有些问题，需要在今后学习中逐步解决。
四、加强领导。将林彪叛党叛国事件在全党、全军、工、农、兵和广大群众中进行传达，是全国政治生活中极其重要的大事。各级党委务必抓紧，抓细，抓好。要根据本地区、本单位的具体情况，作出统一规划。在农村，要注意农时，适当安排。各级领导机关、领导干部都应当亲自试点，向群众宣读、讲解中央文件，参加群众的学习和讨论，总结群众的经验，正确地执行党的路线和政策。同时，要密切注意阶级斗争的动向，作出恰当的处置。中央相信：经过传达、讨论，经过对林陈反党集团的斗争，全党全军全国人民在伟大领袖毛主席领导下，必将进一步团结起来，争取更大的胜利。
五、在广大群众中传达以后，原来关于林陈反党集团问题的保密规定，应作相应的修改。在工农兵和劳动人民中议论这个问题，是允许的。但是，仍然不登报，不广播，不写大字报，不写标语口号。同时，要教育听传达的群众，提高警惕，不要向阶级敌人泄露。
六、各单位传达讨论情况和揭发材料，逐级上报。重要的可以直送党中央和毛主席。
中共中央
一九七一年十月二十四日 |
（此件发至农村人民公社党支部，城市工、矿、企业、事业单位党支部，机关、连队党支部）
来源：根据中央文件原件打印
按：附件1、2均转自宋永毅主编《中国文化大革命文库》2006年版。
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